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ABSTRACT
Process systems are prone to accidents as they deal with hazardous material at high
temperature and/or pressure. Process plants are also characterized as complex systems
where a dense cluster of pipes and equipment may cause a chain of accidents. Therefore,
implementation and maintenance of safety measures through risk assessment is cmcial to
maintain risk below the acceptance criteria. Risk assessment methodologies such as
quantitative risk analysis (QRA) and probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) comprise
different steps among which accident scenario analysis is a common task. Accident
scenario analysis includes accident sequence modeling and associated consequence
assessment. Among many techniques available to conduct accident scenario analysis,
bow-tie (BT) and Bayesian network (BN) are the most popular. Both techniques are
graphical methods illustrating an accident scenario completely and taking advantage of
robust probabilistic reasoning engines. BT technique addresses causes and consequences
of an accident scenario in a transparent manner that is readily tractable and
communicable with stakeholders. However, it suffers limitations of being static and
unable to model conditional dependencies. These limitations significantly reduce BT's
efficacy to do dynamic risk analysis. In the present study, Bayesian updating and real-
time monitoring of operational parameters in the form of physical reliability models are
used to overcome these limitations. Physical reliability models provided the analyst with
a deepr insight into the behavior of risk while Bayes' mle helps to capture variations over
time and to learn from experiences. Bayesian network is an alternative technique to
conventional methods such as fault tree and bow-tie, with ample potential in risk
iii
assessment and safety analysis. Mapping fault tree and bow-tie into Bayesian network, it
is shown that how conditional dependencies, multi-state variables, common cause failures
can be considered and most importantly, probability updating can be conducted.
Advanced aspects of Bayesian networks such as object-oriented Bayesian networks
(OOBN) and discrete-time Bayesian networks (DTBN) are examined in this study. The
former decomposes a large network to sub-models with desired level of abstraction,
facilitating the modeling and capturing of dependencies. The latter explicitly takes time
into account to model sequential failures by means of dynamic gates. To improve the
performance of DTBN, an innovative algorithm is introduced to reduce the size of
probability tables. Further, two new relationships are developed for dynamic gates cold
spare and sequential enforcing gates to make them compatible with most distribution
functions. Applying Bayesian networks in the field of domino effects, both propagation
pattern and probability of domino effect at different stages are calculated. In this study,
the efficacy of BN in safety analysis and accident scenario modeling of a variety of
applications such as loss of well control, risk-based design of safety systems and domino
effect is examined.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Risk analysis is important in processing facilities as they deal with a large amount of
hazardous chemicals; also, process areas are congested with complex piping, high-
pressure compressors, and separators of which malfunctions and mishaps may lead to
catastrophic accidents (Khan et aI., 200 I; TOITes-Toledano and Sucar, 1998).
There have been many fatal explosions and fires imposing major capital loss and
considerable death toll in the past two decades. On 23 March 2005, the BP refinery
explosion in Texas City caused 15 deaths and more than 170 injuries (CNN, 2005).
According to the final repOlt issued by BP (2005), a lack of process safety measures and
insufficient risk reduction measures were to blame for the accident. On 7 February 20 I0,
the Kleen Energy power plant exploded in Middletown, Connecticut, killing 6 and
injuring at least 12. The explosion was one of the worst industrial disasters in the U.S. in
recent years (Reuters, 20 lOa). Most recently, on 20 April 2010, explosion and fire on
Transocean Ltd's drilling rig killed 11 and injured 17 in the Gulf of Mexico. The failure
of a blowout preventer (BOP) has been determined as the primary cause of the accident
(Reuters, 20 lOb). It is important to broaden the risk analysis scope by considering
accident scenario and real-time safety analysis to predict and continuously update the
likelihood of catastrophic accidents and to take actions to prevent them.
Forecasting likely accident scenarios is the most important step in safety analysis. Khan
(2001) proposed a maximum credible accident scenario approach that short-lists the
important scenarios based on both their consequences and the likelihood of accident
occurrence. Delvosalle et al. (2006) used two methodologies: MIMAH (Methodology for
Identification of Major Accident Hazards), in which no safety system was considered,
and MIRAS (Methodology for Identification of Reference Accident Scenarios), in which
all the actual safety functions and balTiers were included in the analysis.
1.2 Risk Assessment Methods
Risk analysis focuses on quantifying the occurrence probability of the selected accident
scenarios. There are many techniques available, among which fault tree (Fr), event tree
(ET), bow-tie (BT), safety balTier diagram, and Bayesian network (BN) are very popular.
Although conventional risk assessment methods have played an important role in
identifying major risks and maintaining safety in process facilities, they suffer limitations
which restrict their application in the risk analysis of complex and interlinked systems.
For example, conventional Frs, as one of the most popular techniques used in
quantitative risk analysis, are not suitable for analyzing large systems, particularly if the
system presents redundant failures, common cause failures, or dependent primary events.
More importantly, events in a conventional Fr are assumed independent, which is not
usually a valid assumption (Bobbio et aI., 2001; Torres-Toledano and Sucar, 1998; Simon
et aI., 2007).
Likewise, most of the limitations of conventional techniques such as Fr and ET arise due
to the static nature of these methods that fails to catch up with the dynamic operation
environment of process systems. This dynamic nature can be either due to any change in
the process environment or operational situation such as variations in temperature,
2
pressure, humidity and geometry or due to change in analyst's initial beliefs based on
observed near-misses, mishaps, incidents, and accidents.
1.3 Dynamic Risk Analysis
There have been efforts to make risk assessment methods dynamically adapted as real-
time changes occur in a process. Shalev and Tiran (2007) introduced condition-based
fault tree in which failure rates of components are periodically updated using information
obtained through predictive maintenance. Consequently, the failure probability of the top
event is updated by recalculating the Ff for new failure rates. However, this method has
to be implemented in specific conditions where, for example, gradual deterioration
process of a component can be discretized into several stages. And at each of stage there
should be a correlation between residual time of the component and its total failure time.
The issue of deficiency of conventional methods in dynamic risk analysis has remarkably
been addressed by introducing the application of Bayesian techniques in the field of risk
assessment and safety analysis in the late 1970s (Apostolakis, 1978; Parry and Winter,
1981). Bayesian methods have proven to be an effective technique in handling sparse
data as well as different sources of information, and also a well suited framework for
subjective probability domains such as decision making under uncertainty (Siu and Kelly
1998). Accordingly, several forms of Bayesian analysis such as two-stage Bayesian
methods (Kaplan, 1983) and empirical Bayes methods (e.g., Carlin and Lous, 1989;
Martiz and Lwin, 1989) have been applied in the context of probabilistic risk analysis.
Consequently, there have been many attempts to equip conventional risk analysis
methods such as Ff and ET with Bayesian techniques for dynamic risk analysis. For
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example, Ching and Leu (2009) also used Bayesian theory to update Fr while
Kalantamia et al. (2009), Meel and Seider (2006), and Rathnayaka et al. (20 II) used
Bayesian theory to update the failure probability of the safety functions of an ET.
Apart from the aforementioned efforts, other researchers have attempted to substitute
Bayesian network (BN) for reliability block diagrams (Torres-Toledano and Sucar,
1998), static Frs (Bobbio et ai, 2001), Dynamic Frs (Boudali and Dugan, 2005; Montani
et aI., 2008) and ETs (Bearfield & Marsh, 2005).
BNs have provided a promising framework for system safety analysis and risk
management (Mahadevan et aI., 2001). A comprehensive and state of the art application
of Bayesian inference and Bayesian network in risk analysis can be found in Kelly and
Smith (2009), Siu and Kelly (1998) and Weber et al. (2010). Further, there are attempts
to substitute Markov models for Fr (Xing et aI., 1996) or to construct dynamic Fr and
ET from corresponding Markov models such that time-dependent failures can be taken
into account (Bucci et aI., 2008). However, the application of Markov models in complex
systems has been limited due to the well-known problem of state-space explosion and
also the error-prone mapping procedure (Boudali and Dugan, 2005).
1.4 Motivation
In this research, the application of advanced risk analysis methods such as BT and BN are
investigated and discussed in the context of dynamic safety analysis of process systems.
\n the following sections, a brief description of these methods as well as the motivation of
this research is explained.
1.4.1 Application of Bow-tie Approach in Dynamic Safety Analysis
Among accident analysis models, BT has been well proven to be a reliable and efficient
tool, due to its ability to incorporate causes and consequences of an accident in a
graphical model. It has been widely used in different safety and risk contexts such as
process safety analysis (Markowski et aI., 2009), accident risk assessment (Chevreau et
aI., 2006; Delvosalle et aI., 2005; Delvosalle et aI., 2006; Dianous and Fievez , 2006;
Gowland 2006) and risk management (Cockshott, 2005).
The most important motivations of this research are to utilize unique features of BT and
also overcome its limitations including:
• BT consists of a FT and an ET. Conventional FTs and ETs cannot adapt
themselves to the dynamic nature of accidents. These techniques are unable to use
the real-time information directly obtained through the operational time of the
process of interest to update prior beliefs.
• Comprising of a FT and ET, BT suffers limitations of both techniques. For
example, it is not suitable for accident scenarios where common cause failures or
dependent failures take place. Further, it is not capable of incorporating multi-
state variables, which are frequently encountered in process systems modeling.
• In BT, it is not possible to model potential conditional dependencies among the
primary events of the FT and the safety barriers of the ET. Also, the conditional
failure probabilities of a safety barrier given that the initiating event of the ET (i.e.
the top event of the FT) has not occurred could not be modeled.
1.4.2 Application of Bayesian Network Approach in Dynamic Safety Analysis
In recent years, Bayesian Network (BN) approach has begun to be used in engineering
applications. BN is a graphical inference technique used to express the causal
relationships among variables. BNs are used either to predict the probability of unknown
variables or to update the probability of known variables given new information of other
variables (evidence). Updating is done through the process of probability propagation and
reasoning which is based on Bayes' theorem.
The important motivations of the present work of using BN approach are:
• Although BNs have widely been used in the context of reliability engineering
(Langseth and Portinale, 2007) and risk assessment (Weber et aI., 2010), their
application in probabilistic safety analysis is yet to be explored.
• Flexible structure and robust inference engine of BN make it possible to conduct
dynamic risk assessment and safety analysis for a wide variety of process system.
• Incorporating multi-state variables and dependent failures and also handling
various types of structural and functional uncertainties are strong modeling
features of BN relying on which most of limitations of conventional risk analysis
methods can be relaxed to a great extent.
• BN can perform probability updating using chain rule and d-separation criteria
which cannot be done using conventional methods unless they are coupled with
Bayes' theorem.
• Aside from probability updating, BN is able to perform sequential updating or
probability adapting. Through sequential updating, experiences gathered from the
process of interest over time can be taken into account to adapt the probability
values of the system considering real observations. This is of great importance in
the frequency estimation of rare events based on frequent accident precursors.
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is written in manuscript format (paper based). Outline of each chapter is
explained below:
Chapter 2 discusses the novelties and contributions this thesis has made to the safety
analysis of process systems. It comprises innovative applications of bow-tie and Bayesian
network (particularly in the field of safety analysis) as well as new algorithms and
proposed improvements in both approaches.
Chapter 3 presents the literature review pertinent to this thesis. The literature review
mainly deals with risk analysis methods such as fault tree and event tree as well as
advanced approaches such as bow-tie and Bayesian approaches.
Chapter 4 discusses process safety analysis. This chapter briefly presents analyses
performed using conventional fault tree and Bayesian network. Subsequently, it is shown
how the limitation of fault tree can be relaxed using the latter approach. It also highlights
various modeling techniques of Bayesian network. This chapter was published in the
Journal of Reliability Engineering and System Safety 2011; 96: 25-32.
Chapter 5 introduces bow-tie approach and its application in risk assessment and safety
analysis. Similar to Chapter 4, a comparison is made between bow-tie and Bayesian
network, and it is shown how limitations of bow-tie can be effectively addressed by
mapping it into Bayesian network. This chapter was published in the Process Safety and
Environmental Protection 2012, doi: lO.1016/j.psep.2012.01.005.
Chapter 6 discusses the application of bow-tie approach in dynamic risk analysis of
process systems. Physical reliability models and Bayes' theorem are used to make bow-
tie suitable for dynamic risk analysis. This chapter was published in the Journal of
Reliability Engineering and System Safety 2012; 104: 36-44.
Chapter 7 presents the application of dynamic Bayesian network to risk-based design of
process system. ill this chapter, unique developments of Bayesian network approach in
discrete time domain is discussed. This chapter also introduces innovative revisions in
existing analysis. This form of Bayesian is most applicable in process safety system
design. This chapter was accepted for publication by the Journal of Reliability
Engineering and System Safety for publication.
Chapter 8 presents another application of bow-tie and Bayesian network in highly
complex and interlinked system of well control risk analysis. In this chapter, Object-
Oriented Bayesian network (OOBN) is used to reduce the complexity of the model and
make it tractable. This chapter was submitted for publication to the Safety Science.
Chapter 9 is devoted to the application of Bayesian networks to the modeling of domino
accidents in process plants. It illustrates how using noisy gates and auxiliary nodes the
complex behavior of domino effects can effectively be modeled using Bayesian
networks. This chapter has been accepted for publication by the International Journal of
Risk Analysis.
Chapter 10 reports the summary of the thesis and the main conclusions drawn through
this work. Recommendations for future work are presented towards the end of the
chapter.
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2 Novelty and Contribution
2.1 Overview
The novelties and contributions of this work are classified into two categories:
• Innovative application of advanced methods in dynamic safety analysis, and
• Modification of discrete-time Bayesian network using new algorithms and
equations.
[n this chapter, these novelties are briefly explained while the details are presented in the
relevant chapters.
2.2 Innovative application of advance methods in dynamic safety analysis
2.2.1 Mapping fault tree into Bayesian network
[n this research, fault tree is mapped into Bayesian network to perform safety analysis in
process systems where multi-state variables and dependent failures are frequently
encountered. A[though such a technique has widely been used in the field of reliability
engineering and fault diagnosis, its application in safety analysis is not well recognized.
Further, functional uncertainty and expert opinion are explicitly modeled by modifying
the network. A[so, the most critical minimum cut-set in fault tree is found to be
analogous to the most probable explanation concept in Bayesian network. This
contribution is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
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2.2.2 Mapping Bow-tie into Bayesian network
In this research a methodology is introduced for mapping bow-tie model into Bayesian
network. This methodology makes it possible to model conditional dependencies among
the components of the model. Further, the concept of probability adapting or sequential
learning is applied along with probability updating. Following this methodology, it is
further illustrated how a large and complex system, which is intractable through bow-tie
model, can be modeled using object-oriented Bayesian network. This contribution is
drawn from Chapters 6 and 8.
2.2.3 Dynamic bow-tie
In this research, a methodology is developed to make bow-tie approach well suited to
dynamic risk analysis. The methodology is based on physical reliability models and
Bayes' theorem. Although condition monitoring and physic-based failure models are
widely used in reliability engineering and maintenance engineering, the application of
physical reliability models in the field of risk analysis is for the first time introduced here.
The methodology is explained in detail in Chapter 5.
2.2.4 Application of Discrete-time Bayesian network in risk-based design
This research illustrates the effective application of dynamic Bayesian networks in risk-
based design of process systems. The main focus of past works was mainly on layers of
protection, this study shows how the system safety can be improved without introducing
additional safety barriers. In other words, the main focus in this work is on the placement
and time sequence of safety barriers. This contribution is the foundation of Chapter 7.
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2.2.5 Application of Bayesian networks in domino effect modeling
In this work, an innovative methodology is developed to model and analyze domino
effect accidents using Bayesian networks. Complex probabilistic causal relationships
among components of the system of interest are modeled using noisy gates and leak
probability. This contribution is the basis of Chapter 9.
2.3 Proposed modification to discrete-time Bayesian network
2.3.1 Cold spare gate and Sequential enforcing gate
In this work, a new equation is derived for cold spare gate (CSP gate) in dynamic
Bayesian networks. The equation has the advantage of modeling components with non-
exponential probability distributions. The equation is shown to have closed-form
analytical solution for most probability distributions. The equation can also be used to
model sequential enforcing gate (SEQ gate) as a special case of cold spare gate.
Comparison with analytical methods such as Markov Chain demonstrates the accuracy
and applicability of the newly developed equations. This contribution is discussed in
Chapter 7.
2.3.2 Neutral dependency algorithm
A novel algorithm, neutral dependency, is introduced in this research to reduce the size of
large and intractable conditional probability tables. The algorithm decomposes a sparse
matrix of size (n + 1)3 to an identity matrix and a lower triangular matrix, both of size
(n + 1)2. The algorithm is effectively used to model priority And gate (pAND gate). Due
17
to its compact and structured relations, the algorithm can also be applied to traditional
AND gate and OR gate in discrete-time Bayesian networks. This contribution is fully
developed and discussed in Chapter 7.
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3 Literature Review
3.1 Risk Assessment
There are many methods for risk assessment of envisaged accident scenarios in the
process industries, such as quantitative risk assessment (QRA), probabilistic safety
analysis (PSA), and maximum credible accident analysis (Khan, 2001; Khan & Abbasi,
1998). Although these methods consist of different steps and follow specific procedures,
accident scenario identification in terms of both mechanism and likelihood is a common
and central step to all of them. Among the different models available to identify and
analyze accident scenarios, fault tree model (Ff), event tree model (ET), and bow-tie
model (BT) have been well proven to be a reliable and efficient tool.
Although conventional risk assessment methods have played an important role in
identifying major risks and maintaining safety in process facilities, they have the
disadvantage of being static and using generic failure data (Meel & Seider, 2006). So, a
probabilistic method based on Bayes' rule, i.e., Bayesian network (BN), has began to
become popular among risk society and safety experts. The following sections briefly
discuss former methods, mostly known as conventional methods, and the latter method,
i.e.,BN.
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3.2 Conventional Methods
3.2.1 Fault Tree
Fr is a deductive, structured methodology to determine the potential causes of an
undesired event, referred to as the top event. The top event usually represents a major
accident causing safety hazards or economic loss (Lewis, 1994). While the top event is
placed at the top of the tree, the tree is constructed downwards, dissecting the system for
further detail until the primary events leading to the top event are known. Primary events
are considered binary (with two states) and statistically independent In a Fr, the
relationships between events are represented by means of gates, of which AND-gates and
OR-gates are the most widely used.
Once completed, the Fr can be analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the
qualitative evaluation, using Boolean algebra, an expression is derived for the top event
in terms of combinations of primary events. In the quantitative part, the probability of the
top event is expressed in terms of the occurrence probability of the primary events or in
terms of the minimal cut-sets.
Small Frs can be evaluated manually; however, large and complex Frs require the aid of
computerized methods for evaluation. Methods for Fr analysis include the analytical
method, Monte Carlo simulation, and binary decision diagram. Due to limitations in
using the Monte Carlo simulation, an analytical approach (e.g., minimal cut-sets
determination) is more frequently used for evaluation of a Fr. To reduce the margin of
error due to inaccuracy and incompleteness of the data of the primary events, some
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authors have recently used fuzzy set theory and evidence theory in Fr analysis (Ferdous
et aI., 2009; Lin & Wang, 1997; Markowski et aI., 2009; Yuhua & Datao, 2005).
Although having some limitations, Frs are extensively used in the field of risk analysis
of process systems (Khan et aI., 2001; Ferdous et aI., 2009; Ferdous et aI., 2007) and fault
diagnosis (Khoo et aI., 200 I; Bartlett et aI., 2009; Kavcic and Juricic, 200 I). Standard
Frs are not suitable for analyzing large systems, particularly if the system presents
redundant failures, common cause failures, or mutually exclusive primary events. More
importantly, events in a Fr are assumed independent, which is not usually a valid
assumption (Bobbio et aI., 2001; TOlTes-Toledano and Sucar, 1998; Simon et aI., 2007).
3.2.2 Event Tree
ET is an inductive method widely used in quantified risk analysis and safety assessment.
ET is used to analyze possible progression routes originating from an initiating event
while affected by a sequence of other events commonly placed in chronological order. In
safety analysis, ET is used to quantify the probability of possible accident scenarios
resulting from the occurrence of a hazardous event, as initiating event. The initiating
event's progression can be either mitigated or escalated depending on the successful
operation or failure of subsequent safety baniers, respectively. When reaching a safety
barrier, ET is usually branched in two; the upward branch denotes the operation of the
safety barrier while the lower represent its failure.
ET has been used in the field of accident modeling (Bearfield and Marsh, 2005;
Rathnayaka et aI., 20 II), dynamic failure assessment (Meet and Seider, 2006), and
dynamic risk assessment (Kalantami et aI., 2009; Kalantamia et aI., 2010).
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3.2.3 Bow-lie
BT is one of the best graphical approaches to represent a complete accident scenario,
starting from accident causes and ending with its consequences. While centered on a
critical event, BT is composed of a fault tree on the left-hand side identifying the possible
events causing the critical event, and an event tree on the right-hand side showing the
possible consequences of the critical event based on the failure or success of safety
functions (Delvossale et aI., 2005; Delvossale et aI., 2006). Figure 3.1 shows a typical
BT, composing of different components such as primary events (PE), intermediate
events, (IE), the top event, (TE), safety barriers, (58), and accident consequences, (C).
Figure 3.1. Generic Bow-tie model
It helps to understand which possible combination of primary events will lead to the top
event in the fault tree and which safety function failures will escalate the top event to a
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pm1icular consequence in the event tree. For example, the occurrence probability of
consequence C3 in Figure 3.1 can be assessed as:
p(e3) = P(TE)P(SB1)P(SBZ)(1 - P(SB3»
Where P(TE) is the top event probability, and P(581), P(582) and P(583) refer to the
failure probabilities of 581,582 and 583, respectively.
BT has been well proven to be a reliable and efficient tool. It has been used in a broad
range of applications such as in process safety analysis (Markowski et aI., 2009), accident
risk assessment (Delvosalle et aI., 2005; Delvosalle et aI., 2006; Dianous and Fievez ,
2006; Gowland 2006), risk management (Cockshott, 2005), and ban'ier implementation
(Badreddine and Ben Amor, 2010).
3.3 Bayesian Methods
3.3.1 Bayes' Theorem
Bayes theory has been usually coupled with conventional methods such as ET (Meet and
Seider, 2006; Kalantamia et aI., 2009; Kalantamia et aI., 2010; Rathnayaka et aI., 2011)
and BT (Badreddine and Ben Amor, 2010; Khakzad et aI., 20 II) in dynamic risk
assessment and safety analysis. Such hybrid methods take advantage of Bayes theory to
update initial beliefs or prior probabilities of events using data observed from the
accident studied:
P(xldata) = P(X~~~:;~~IX)
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3.2
Where P(x) is the prior failure probability of event x, P(datalx) is the likelihood
function of x, P(data) is the probability of data observed (commonly called as
evidence), and P(xldata) is the posterior probability of x. According to Ferson (2005),
the estimation of P(data) is probably the most difficult part of the calculation. If the
prior and likelihood function are conjugate (Ferson, 2005; Meel and Seider, 2006), the
posterior distribution would be the same as that of prior, making calculation very easy.
For example, if prior probability has a Beta distribution (or camm.£l) and the likelihood
function has a Bernoulli (or Poisson) distribution, the distribution of the posterior will be
Beta (Gamma). However, in the case of non-conjugate distributions, the posterior
distribution should be calculated using numerical methods, making the application of the
method restricted.
3.3.2 Bayesian Networks
BNs are increasingly used for the constmction of system reliability models, risk
management, and safety analysis based on probabilistic and uncertain knowledge. Similar
to other graphical probabilistic methods (e.g., fault tree and reliability block diagram),
BNs consist of both qualitative and quantitative parts. BNs are directed acyclic graphs, in
which the nodes represent variables, arcs signify direct causal relationships between the
linked nodes, and the conditional probability tables assigned to the nodes specify how
strongly the linked nodes influence each other (Torres-Toledano & Sucar, 1998).
In BNs, the nodes without any arc directed into them are called root nodes, possessing
marginal prior probabilities. All other nodes are intermediate nodes and each one is
assigned a conditional probability table (en). Among intermediate nodes, the nodes
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having arcs directed into them are called child nodes and the nodes that have arcs
directed from them are called parent nodes (Figure 3.2). Each child has an associated
CPT, given all combinations of the states of its parent nodes. Nodes without any child are
also called leaf nodes.
A: Root node, Parent of Band C
B: Intermediate node, child of A, parent of C
C: Intermediate node, child of A and B,
parent of D
D: Leaf node, child of C
Figure 3.2. Various types of nodes in Bayesian networks
BN takes advantage of the "d-separation" criterion (Pearl, 1998; Jensen and Nielsen,
2004; Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2007) and the chain rule to do quantitative analysis. Node A
is d-separated from node C if node B blocks the path between A and C. In this case, A is
conditionally independent of C given B; i.e., P(AIB, C) = P(AIB). In either a serial path
or a diverging path (Figure 3.3a and 3.3b), A and Care d-separated from each other if the
state of B is known. In a converging path (Figure 3.3c), A and C are independent if the
state of B is unknown. Based on these three conditions, in a BN all root nodes are
conditionally independent of each other and the other nodes are conditionally dependent
on only their direct parents (Bobbio et aI., 2001).
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According to the conditional independence and the chain rule, BNs represent the joint
probability distribution P(U) of variables U = {AvAz•.. ,An} included in the network
3.3
where Pa(A;) is the parents of Ai in the BN, and P(U) reflects the properties of the BN
(Jensen and Nielsen, 2007). Figure 3.3 summarizes the three probabilistic relationships
commonly used in a BN (Wilson and Huzurbazar, 2007).
0-0-0
(a) Serial Path. P(A,B, C) =P(A)P(BIA)P(CIB)
0-0-0
(b) Diverging Path. peA, B, C) = P(B)P(AIB)P(C1B)
0-0-0
(c) Converging Path. peA, B,C) = P(A)P(C)P(BIA, C)
Figure 3.3. Joint probability distributions based on the chain rule and d-separation (Wilson and
Huzurbazar,2007)
Using Equation 3.3, the joint probability distribution of the variables included in the BN
in Figure 3.2 would be represented
P(U) = P(A,B,C,D) = P(A)P(BIA)P(CIA,B)P(DIC).
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BN's main application in accident analysis is an inference engine for updating the prior
occurrence probability of events given new information, called evidence E. The new
information is usually operational data induding occurrence or non-occurrence of the
accident or primary events:
P(UIE) = P;~~~) = 'i:~:)£) 3.4
Equation 3.4 can be used for either probability prediction or probability updating. In
predictive analysis, conditional probabilities of the form P(Accidentlevent) are
calculated, indicating the OCCUITence probability of a particular accident given the
occurrence or non-occurrence of a certain primary event. On the other hand, in updating
analysis, those of the form P(eventIAccident) are evaluated, showing the occurrence
probability of a paI1icuiar event given the occurrence of a certain accident (Przytula and
Thompson, 2000).
BNs are increasingly used in reliability assessment (Langseth & Portinale, 2007;
Mahadevan et aI., 2001; Torres-Toledano & Sucar, 1998; Wilson & Huzurbazar, 2007),
fault diagnosis (Przytula & Thompson, 2000; Huang et aI., 2008), and updating the
failure probability of safety systems (Giribone & Valette, 2004). Boudali and Dugan
(2005) have examined the parallels between BNs and Frs and have shown the obvious
superiority of BNs over Frs in terms of modeling and analysis capabilities. Bobbio et al.
(200 I) showed that the limitations of Frs can be relaxed to a great extent by relying on
BNs. Other relevant works have been done by either mapping static Frs to BNs (Simon
et aI., 2007; Graves et aI., 2007; Lampis and Andrews, 2009; Khakzad et ai, 2011) or
mapping dynamic Frs into the corresponding dynamic BNs (Montani et aI., 2008;
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Montani et aI., 2006; Boudali and Dugan, 2005). A comprehensive review of Bayesian
network application in risk analysis, safety assessment, and reliability engineering can be
found in Weber et al. (2010).
3.3.3 Dynamic Bayesian Networks
Dynamic fault tree (DFf) was introduced as an extension to SFf to model sequentially
dependent failures in dynamic systems (Dugan et al. 1992). In a dynamic system, the
failure sequence of events is as important as their combinations for the system to be
unavailable or to fail. In other words, compared to SFf in which it only matters which
components participate in a minimal cut set, in DFf the failure sequence of the
participating components is also important (Boudali and Dugan, 2005a). DFf takes the
sequential dependencies into account by using several dynamic gates such as a functional
dependency gate (FDEP), cold spare gate (CSP), sequence enforcing gate (SEQ) (Dugan
et aI., 1992) and priority-AND gate (PAND) (Fussel et aI., 1976).
Due to the sequential dependencies and dynamic behavior among the components of the
system, DFf cannot be analyzed using conventional algorithms available for SFf. In this
regard, DFf has traditionally been converted to the corresponding Markov chain model
(MC) for which well-established and efficient solving techniques have been developed.
Nevertheless, convelting DFf into MC is an error-prone and cumbersome exercise
(Dugan et aI., 1992). Moreover, the state space of the MC (i.e., the set of its nodes) grows
exponentially with the number of components of the corresponding DFf, making the MC
very large and intractable. Indeed, for a MC equivalent to a DFf with m binary-state
components (i.e., work/fail) for which k out of m components are sequentially dependent,
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the number of states is proportional to the product of 2111 (the number of state
combinations) and k! (the possible number of sequence combinations) (Boudali and
Dugan, 2005b). This problem is frequently encountered in Markov processes and is
referred to as the state space explosion. It should be noted that even a relatively simple
DFT can result in a complicated and time-consuming MC, particularly in the presence of
dynamic gates cascade (Boudali and Dugan, 2005b; Dugan et a!., 1992; Boudali and
Dugan, 2005a; Marquez et a!., 20 I0). Also, MC has been mentioned to have limitations
in modeling dependencies among components with non-exponential failure time
distributions (Marquez et a!., 2010).
Considering the abovementioned problems encountered in converting DFT into MC,
temporal Bayesian networks (TBNs) have alternatively been proposed to explicitly
incorporate time in the modeling of sequential dependencies without resort to MC.
Accordingly, two different approaches have been adopted: instant-based (time-sliced)
approach and interval-based (event-based) approach (Boudali and Dugan, 2006). In the
first approach, the time line is divided into a finite number of time instants (e.g.,
tH ,t; ,t;+1 ), and identical BN stmctures are generated for each time instant, connected to
each other by means of temporal arcs (e.g., Montani et a!., 2008; Portinale et a!., 2010).
In the second approach, the time line is partitioned into a finite number of time intervals
(e.g., ]t;_I,tJk,ti+1j), and only one BN is generated, each node of which has a finite
number of states equal to the number of time intervals (Boudali and Dugan, 2005b;
Marquez et aI., 2010; Boudali and Dugan, 2006).
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Following the instant-based approach, Montani et al. (2008) developed the RADYBAN
software tool for reliability analysis of dynamic systems by converting DFr into a 2-
time-slice BN. They also introduced the probability dependency gate (PDEP) as a
probabilistic case of FDEP proposed by Dugan et al. (1992). Their work was further
developed by Portinale et al. (2010), enabling the modeling of repairable systems by
introducing the repair box gate. The instant-based approach has been criticized for either
being too general or resulting in unnecessarily large networks due to repeating the same
structure for each time instance (Boudali and Dugan, 2005b). However, 2TBN as an
instant-based approach models any time horizon using only 2 slices, effectively
addressing the foregoing drawback (Montani et aI., 2008; Portinale et aI., 2010).
3.4 References
Badreddine, A., & Ben Amor, N. (2010). A dynamic barriers implementation in
Bayesian-based bow tie diagrams for risk analysis. Proceedings of International
Conference on Computer Systems and Applications, 1-8.
Bartlett, L.M, Hurdle, E.E., & Kelly E.M. (2009). Integrated system fault diagnostics
utilizing diagraph and Fr-based approach. Journal of Reliability Engineering and System
Safety, 94, 1107-1115.
Bearfield G, Marsh W. Generalizing event trees using Bayesian networks with a case
study of train derailment. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2005; 3688: 52-66.
Bobbio A, Portinale L, Minichino M, Ciancamerla E. Improving the analysis of
dependable systems by mapping Frs into Bayesian networks. Reliability Engineering and
System Safety 200 I; 71: 249-60.
30
Boudali H, Dugan 18. A new Bayesian approach to solve dynamic Frs. Proceedings of
Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS 05) 2005a: 451-6.
Boudali H, Dugan JB. A discrete-time Bayesian network reliability modeling and
analysis framework. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 2005b; 87: 337-49.
Boudali H, Dugan 18. A continuous-time Bayesian network reliability modeling and
analysis framework. IEEE Transaction on Reliability 2006; 55: 86-97.
Cockshott, J.E. (2005). Probability bow-ties a transparent risk management tool. Process
Safety and Environmental Protection, 83, 307-316.
Delvosalle, C., Fievez, C., Pipart, A., Casal Fabrega, J., Planas, E., Christou, M., and
Mushtaq, F. (2005). Identification of reference accident scenarios in SEVESO
establishments. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 90, 238-246.
Delvosalle C, Fievez C, Pipart A, Debray B. ARAMIS project: a comprehensive
methodology for the identification of reference accident scenarios in process industries.
Journal of Hazardous Materials 2006; 130: 200-19.
Dianous V.D., & Fievez, C. (2006). ARAMIS project: a more explicit demonstration of
risk control through the use of bow-tie diagrams and the evaluation of safety barrier
performance. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 130,220-233.
Dugan JB, Bavuso SJ, Boyd MA. Dynamic fault tree models for fault tolerant computer
systems. IEEE Transaction on Reliability 1992; 41: 363-77.
Ferdous, R., Khan, F.I., Veitch, B., & Amyotte, P. (2007). Methodology for computer-
aided Fr analysis. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 85, 70-80.
31
Ferdous, R., Khan, F.I., Veitch, B., & Amyotte, P. (2009). Methodology for computer
aided fuzzy FT analysis. Journal of Process safety and Environmental Protection, 87,
217-226.
Ferson, S. (2005). Bayesian methods in risk assessment. Unpublished report prepared for
the Bureau de Recherches Geologiques et Minieres (BRGM), New York.
Fussell 18, Abel' EF, Rahl RG. On the quantification analysis of priority-AND failure
logic. [EEE Transaction on Reliability 1976; 25: 324-26.
Giribone, R., & Valette, B. (2004). Principles of failure probability assessment (PoF).
[nternational Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping, 8 [,797-806.
Gowland, R. (2006). The accidental risk assessment methodology for industries
(ARAM[S)/layer of protection analysis (LOPA) methodology: a step forward towards
convergent practices in risk assessment? Journal of Hazardous Materials, 130,307-310.
Huang, Y., McMUlTan, R., Dhadyalla, G., & Jones, R.P. (2008). Probability based vehicle
fault diagnosis: Bayesian network method. Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, [9,301-
311.
Jensen FV, Nielsen TD. Bayesian networks and decision graphs. 2nd ed. New York:
Springer; 2007.
Kalantarnia, M., Khan, F., & Hawboldt, K. (2009). Dynamic risk assessment using
failure assessment and Bayesian theory. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries, 22, 600-606.
Kavcic, M., & Juricic, D. (200[). CAD for FT-based diagnosis of industrial processes.
Journal of Engineering Application of Artificial Intelligence, 14,203-216.
32
Khakzad N, Khan F, Amyotte P. Safety analysis in process facilities: comparison of fault
tree and Bayesian network approaches. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 20 II;
96: 925-32.
Khan, F., & Abbasi, S. A. (1998). Techniques and methodologies for risk analysis in
chemical process industries. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 11,
261-277.
Khan, F.1. (2001). Use maximum-credible accident scenarios for realistic and reliable risk
assessment. Chemical Engineering Progress, II, 56-64.
Khan, F.I., Sadiq, R., & Husain, T. (2001). Risk-based process safety assessment and
control measures design for offshore process facilities. Journal of Hazardous Materials,
A94,1-36.
Khoo, L.P., Tor, S.B., & Li, J.R. (2001). A rough set approach to the ordering of basic
events in a FT for fault diagnosis. International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing
Technology, 17,769-774.
Kjaerulff, U.S., & Madsen, A.L. (2007). Bayesian networks and influence diagrams A
guide to construction and analysis. New York, Springer.
Lampis, M., & Andrews, D. (2009). Bayesian belief networks for system fault
diagnostics. International Journal of Quality and Reliability Engineering, 25, 409-426.
Langseth H, Portinale L. Bayesian networks in reliability. Reliability Engineering and
System Safety 2007; 92: 92-108.
Lewis, E.E. (1994). Introduction to reliability engineering. 2nd edition, New York, John
Wiley& Sons.
33
Lin, C.-T., & Wang, M.-J.J. (1997). Hybrid Fr analysis using fuzzy sets. Journal of
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 58, 205-123.
Mahadevan, S., Zhang, R., & Smith, N. (2001). Bayesian networks for system reliability
reassessment. Journal of Structural Safety, 23, 231-251.
Markowski, A.S., Mannan, M.S., & Bigoszewska, A. (2009). Fuzzy logic for process
safety analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 22, 695-702.
Marquez D, Neil M, Fenton N. Improved reliability modeling using Bayesian networks
and dynamic discretization. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 20 I0; 95: 412-25.
Meel, A., & Seider, W. D. (2006). Plant-specific dynamic failure assessment using
Bayesian theory. Chemical Engineering Science, 61, 7036-7056.
Montani, S., Portinale, L., Bobbio, A., & Codetta-Raiteri, D. (2006). Automatically
translating dynamic Frs into dynamic Bayesian networks by means of a software tool.
Proceedings of Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS'06), 434-441.
Montani S, Portinale L, Bobbio A, Codetta-Raiteri D. RADYBAN: a tool for reliability
analysis of dynamic fault trees through conversion into dynamic Bayesian networks.
Reliability Engineering and System Safety 2008; 93: 922-32.
Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems, Morgan Kaufmann, San
Francisco, California. ISBN 0-934613-73-7.
Portinale L, Codetta-Raiteri D, Montani S. Supporting reliability engineers in exploiting
the power of dynamic Bayesian networks. International Journal of Approximate
Reasoning 2010; 51: 179-95.
34
Przytula, K.W., & Thompson, D. (2000). Construction of Bayesian networks for
diagnostics. Proceedings of IEEE Aerospace Conference,S, 193-200.
Rathnayaka, S., Khan, F., & Amyolte, P. (201l). SHIPP methodology: predictive
accident modeling approach. Part II. Validation with case study. Process Safety and
Environmental Protection, 89, 75-88.
Simon, c., Weber, P., & Levrat, E. (2007). Bayesian networks and evidence theory to
model complex systems reliability. Journal of Computers, 2, 33-43.
Torres-Toledano JG, Sucar LE. Bayesian networks for reliability analysis of complex
systems. Lecture notes in computer science 1998; 1484: 195-206.
Weber, P., Medina-Oliva, G., Simon, C., & lung, B. (2010). Overview on Bayesian
networks applications for dependability, risk analysis, and maintenance areas.
Engineering Application of Artificial Intelligence, doi: 10.1016/j.engappai.2010.06.002.
Wilson, A.G., & Huzurbazar, A.V. (2007). Bayesian networks for multilevel system
reliability. Journal of Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 92, 1413-1420.
Yuhua, D., & Datao, Y. (2005). Estimation of failure probability of oil and gas
transmission pipelines by fuzzy FT analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries, 18,83-88.
35
Safety Analysis in Process Facilities: Comparison of Fault Tree and
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Abstract
Dynamic safety analysis in gas process facilities is necessary to prevent unwanted events
that may cause catastrophic accidents. Accident scenario analysis with probability
updating is the key to dynamic safety analysis. Although conventional failure assessment
techniques such as fault tree (FT) have been used effectively for this purpose, they suffer
severe limitations of static structure and uncertainty handling, which are of great
significance in process dynamic safety analysis. Bayesian network (BN) is an alternative
technique with ample potential for application in safety analysis. BNs have a strong
similarity to FTs in many respects; however, the distinct advantages making them more
suitable than FTs are their ability in explicitly representing the dependencies of events,
• Khakzad et al. Journal of Reliability Engineering and System Safety 20 II.
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updating probabilities, and coping with uncertainties. The objective of this paper is to
demonstrate the application of BNs in dynamic safety analysis of process systems. The
first part of the paper shows those modeling aspects which are common between Fr and
BN, giving preference to BN due to its ability to update probabilities. The second part is
devoted to various modeling features of BN, helping to incorporate multi-state variables,
dependent failures, functional uncertainty, and expert opinion which are frequently
encountered in safety analysis, but cannot be considered by Fr. The paper concludes that
BN is a superior technique in dynamic safety analysis because of its flexible structure,
allowing it to fit a wide variety of accident scenarios.
Keywords: Bayesian network, Fault tree analysis, Dynamic accident analysis,
Uncertainty modeling.
4.1 Introduction
Safety analysis is very important in gas process facilities as they deal with a large amount
of flammable chemicals; also, process areas are congested with complex piping, high-
pressure compressors, and separators of which malfunctions and mishaps may lead to
catastrophic accidents (Khan et aI., 2001; Torres-Toledano and Sucar, 1998).
There have been many fatal explosions and fires imposing major capital loss and
considerable death toll in the past two decades. On 23 March 2005, the BP refinery
explosion in Texas City caused 15 deaths and more than 170 injuries (CNN, 2005).
According to the final report issued by BP (2005), a lack of process safety measures and
insufficient risk reduction measures were entirely to blame for the accident. On 7
February 2010, the Kleen Energy power plant exploded in Middletown, Connecticut,
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U.S., killing 6 and injuring at least 12. The explosion was one of the worst industrial
disasters in the U.S. in recent years (Reuters, 20 lOa). Most recently, on 20 April 2010,
explosion and fire on Transocean Ltd's drilling rig killed II and injured 17 in the Gulf of
Mexico. The failure of a blowout preventer has been determined as the primary cause of
the accident (Reuters, 20 lOb). It is important to broaden the risk analysis scope by
considering accident scenario and real-time safety analysis in order to predict and
continuously update the likelihood of catastrophic accidents and to take actions to prevent
them.
Forecasting likely accident scenarios is the most important step in safety analysis. Khan
(2001) proposed a "maximum credible accident scenario" approach that short-lists the
important scenarios based on both their consequences and the likelihood of accident
OCCUlTence. Delvosalle et al. (2006) used two methodologies: MIMAH for the
identification of major accident hazards, in which no safety system was considered, and
MIRAS for the identification of reference accident scenarios, in which all the actual
safety functions and barriers were included in the analysis. The next step in safety
analysis is to quantify the occurrence probability of the selected accident scenarios. For
this, there are many techniques available, among which fault tree (FT) is very popular.
Although having some limitations, FTs are extensively used in the field of risk analysis
of process systems (Khan et aI., 2001; Ferdous et aI., 2009; Ferdous et aI., 2007) and fault
diagnosis (Khoo et aI., 2001; Bartlett et aI., 2009; Kavcic and Juricic, 2001). Standard
FTs are not suitable for analyzing large systems, particularly if the system presents
redundant failures, common cause failures, or mutually exclusive primary events. More
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importantly, events in a Fr are assumed independent, which is not usually a valid
assumption (Bobbio et aI., 2001; Torres-Toledano and Sucar, 1998; Simon et aI., 2007).
In recent years, a Bayesian Network (BN) methodology has begun to be used in
engineering applications. A BN is a graphical inference technique used to express the
causal relationships among variables. BNs are used either to predict the probability of
unknown variables or to update the probability of known variables given the certain state
of other variables (evidence) through the process of probability propagation or reasoning.
The reasoning is based on Bayes' theorem. Due to this ability, BNs have provided a
promising framework for system safety analysis and risk management (Mahadevan et aI.,
2001).
BNs are increasingly used in reliability assessment (Langseth & Portinale, 2007;
Mahadevan et aI., 2001; Torres-Toledano & Sucar, 1998; Wilson & Huzurbazar, 2007),
fault diagnosis (Przytula & Thompson, 2000; Huang et aI., 2008), and updating the
failure probability of safety systems (Giribone & Valette, 2004). Boudali and Dugan
(2005) have examined the parallels between BNs and Frs and have shown the obvious
superiority of BNs over Frs in terms of modeling and analysis capabilities. Bobbio et al.
(2001) showed that the limitations of Frs can be relaxed to a great extent by relying on
BNs. Other relevant works have been done by either mapping static Frs to BNs (Simon
et aI., 2007; Graves et aI., 2007; Lampis and Andrews, 2009) or mapping dynamic Frs
into the corresponding dynamic BNs (Montani et aI., 2008; Montani et aI., 2006; Boudali
and Dugan, 2005).
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Many authors have investigated different techniques in accident scenario analysis, very
few of whom have used BNs in their work. Sklet (2004) qualitatively compared some
commonly used methods such as Fr analysis, event tree analysis, and barrier analysis for
accident analysis. The comparison was made based on criteria such as graphical
representation and the ability to support safety batTiers. Nivolianitou et al. (2004) used
Fr, event tree, and Petri nets for a qualitative accident scenario analysis in an ammonia
storage plant, concluding that Petri nets are able to incorporate the evidence through
scenario analysis and thus are more appropriate for dynamic accident analysis. Zheng and
Liu (2009) made a comparison among some widely used methods for accident
forecasting. Although Fr as a scenario analysis method and BN were briefly discussed,
the main focus in their research was devoted to methods such as regression models, time-
series methods, and neural networks.
Most recently, Weber et al. (2010) gave an exhaustive statistical review of BN
application in different areas such as risk and maintenance analysis, in which BN was
qualitatively compared with other methods such as Frs, Markov chains and Petri nets.
The present work is aimed at showing the parallels between Frs and BNs in the specific
area of accident modeling and process safety analysis, which have not been studied thus
far. The paper also discusses the modeling potential offered by BNs, making them a
superior method compared to Frs for dynamic safety analysis.
A brief description of the fundamentals of Frs, BNs, and the mapping algorithm are
presented in section 4.2. The comparison of the two methods is done in section 4.3,
where a simple accident scenario is modeled using both methods. Section 4.4 is devoted
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to the application of BN to more complicated scenarios which cannot be modeled using
Frs. The conclusions and recommendations for future work are presented in section 4.5.
4.2 Failure Analysis Techniques
Many approaches have been developed for accident analysis, among which Fr analysis is
the most common. Recently BNs have drawn much attention. In the subsequent
subsections, both approaches are described, and the mapping algorithm from Fr to BN is
recapitulated.
4.2.1 Fault Tree
Fr is a deductive, structured methodology to determine the potential causes of an
undesired event, referred to as the top event. The top event usually represents a major
accident causing safety hazards or economic loss (Lewis, 1994). While the top event is
placed at the top of the tree, the tree is constructed downwards, dissecting the system for
further detail until the primary events leading to the top event are known. Primary events
are considered binary (with two states) and statistically independent In a Fr, the
relationships between events are represented by means of gates, of which AND-gates and
OR-gates are the most widely used.
Once completed, the Fr can be analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the
qualitative evaluation, using Boolean algebra, an expression is derived for the top event
in terms of combinations of primary events. In the quantitative part, the probability of the
top event is expressed in terms of the occurrence probability of the primary events or in
terms of the minimal cut-sets.
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Small Frs can be evaluated manually; however, large and complex Frs require the aid of
computerized methods for evaluation. Methods for Fr analysis include the analytical
method, Monte Carlo simulation, and binary decision diagram. Due to limitations in
using the Monte Carlo simulation, an analytical approach (e.g., minimal cut-sets
determination) is more frequently used for evaluation of a Fr. To reduce the margin of
error due to inaccuracy and incompleteness of the data of the primary events, some
authors have recently used fuzzy set theory and evidence theory in Fr analysis (Ferdous
et aI., 2009; Lin & Wang, 1997; Markowski et aI., 2009; Yuhua & Datao, 2005).
4.2.2 Bayesian Network
BNs are increasingly used for the construction of system reliability models, risk
management, and safety analysis based on probabilistic and uncertain knowledge. Similar
to Frs, BNs consist of both qualitative and quantitative parts. BNs are directed acyclic
graphs, in which the nodes represent variables, arcs signify direct causal relationships
between the linked nodes, and the conditional probability tables assigned to the nodes
specify how strongly the linked nodes influence each other (Torres-Toledano & Sucar,
1998).
BN takes advantage of the "d-separation" criterion (Jensen and Nielsen, 2004) and the
chain rule to perform quantitative analysis. Based on d-separation criteria, all root nodes
are conditionally independent and the other nodes are conditionally dependent on only
their direct parents (Bobbio et aI., 2001).
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According to the conditional independence and the chain rule, BNs represent the joint
probability distribution P(U) of variables U = {A v Az, .. , An} included in the network
Where Pa(A;) are the parents of Ai in the BN, and P(U) reflects the properties of the BN
(Jensen and Nielsen, 2007).
BNs' main application in accident analysis is an inference engine for updating the prior
occulTence probability of events given new information, called evidence E. The new
information is usually operational data including OCCUITence or non-occulTence of the
accident or primary events:
P(UjE) = P;~~:) = L:~:'~) 4.2
Equation 4.2 can be used for either probability prediction or probability updating. In
predictive analysis, conditional probabilities of the form P(Accidentlevent) are
calculated, indicating the occulTence probability of a pmticular accident given the
occulTence or non-occulTence of a certain primary event. On the other hand, in updating
analysis, those of the form P(eventIAccident) are evaluated, showing the occurrence
probability of a particular event given the occulTence of a certain accident (Przytula and
Thompson, 2000).
4.2.3 Mapping Fault Trees to Bayesian Networks
A mapping algorithm includes graphical and numerical tasks. In graphical mapping,
primary events, intermediate events, and the top event of the Ff are represented as root
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nodes, intermediate nodes, and the leaf node in the corresponding BN, respectively. The
nodes of a BN are connected in the same way as cOITesponding components in the Fr. In
numerical mapping, the occurrence probabilities of the primary events are assigned to the
corresponding root nodes as prior probabilities. For each intermediate node as well as leaf
node, a CPT (Conditional Probability Table) is developed. The CPTs are developed
according to the type of gate (Bobbio et aI., 200 I; Lampis and Andrews, 2009). Figure
4.1 illustrates the simplified procedure of mapping Frs into BNs.
Fault tree Mapping Bayesian
network
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Figure 4.1. Mapping fault tree into Bayesian network
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4.3 Safety Analysis
4.3.1 Case Study
The perfonnance of a feeding control system transferring propane from a propane
evaporator to a scrubbing column is selected to illustrate the methodology for the purpose
of safety analysis. To maintain a specified pressure inside the scrubbing column, the feed
pipeline is equipped with an automatic valve operated by an actuator. Immediate and
proper functioning of the actuator depends on a pressure relay and signals that are
received from a pressure controller via a pressure transmitter. A manual valve is also
considered to avoid pressure increase in case of malfunction of the automatic valve. All
components are assumed binary (Work/Fail). The occurrence frequency data of primary
events that would contribute to the occurrence of this accident scenario is presented in
Table 4.1. while intermediate events and the top event have been identified by the type of
gates leading to these events.
Table 4. t. Different events related to an accident scenario in the feed control system and their
occurrence probabilities
Component Symbol Probability
Pressure transmitter failure
Pressure controller failure
No signal received by pressure controller PC_signal OR-gate
Pressure relay failure
No signal received by actuator Accsignai OR-gale
Automatic valve mechanical failure A_valve
Actualormechanicalfailure 0.2015
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Automatic valve improper control A_valve_ctr! OR-gate
Human failure in operating manual valve Hum_error 0.2696
Manual valve mechanical failure M
-
valve 0.1393
Manual valve improper control M
-
valve_ctrl OR-gate
Feed system improper control Feed_ctrl AND-gate
4.3.2 Fault Tree Analysis
Considering the behavior of the components and the intermediate events, the Ff is
constructed as shown in Figure 4.2. OCCLltTence probabilities presented in Table 4.1 are
then assigned to each primary event. Considering the probabilities, the prior probability
of the top event is calculated as 0.2720.
For comprehensive accident scenario analysis and effective safety decision-making, it is
necessary to determine the critical primary events and also minimal cut-sets leading to
the top event occurrence (Lewis, 1994). To this end, the contribution of each event (e.g.,
Ci ) is estimated by repeating the Ff analysis while keeping that particular event absent,
i.e. peCi = 1) = O. Subsequently, the contribution of each event is transformed into an
"improvement index" (Khan et aI., 2001) that signifies the percent contribution of that
event in leading to the top event (Table 4.2). The higher the index of an event, the more
vulnerable it is in leading to the top event. As may be noticed in Table 4.2, events C9,
C/O, C6, and C2 have the highest improvement indices (components are numbered
according to Table 4.1). Therefore, in order to improve the safety of the system these
events are considered first.
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Figure 4.2. Fault tree for malfunction of the Feed system
Table 4.2. Top event probability and improvement indices for FT and BN analysis
Fault Tree Analysis Bayesian Nelwork Analysis
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occurring
Probability
0.2720
0.2525
Improvemenl
Index (0/0)
0.0
5.2
Probability
Improvemenl
Index (0/0)
0.0
5.2
0.2208
0.2470
C9 0.1020
13.8
6.7 0.2470
0.1975
6.7
20.0
The IT in Figure 4.2 may be expressed as the union of 10 minimal cut-sets:
TE=M 1 UM2 U ... UM10 4.3
Where Mj represents the ith minimal cut-set. Each minimal cut-set consists of the
intersection of the minimal number of primary events required to cause the top event:
Knowing the minimal cut-sets, the following considerations would be of great help
(Lewis 1994):
Rank of each minimal cut-set defined by the number of its primary events. This would
help to identify the shortest path in accident causation and consequently help to devise
measures against such an occurrence.
This would help to identify the most probable minimal cut-set in the accident causation
sequence. The cut-set importance for the ith minimal cut-set is defined as:
1M =P(M/)
/ P(TE)
If each event C, has the probability of occurrence P(C,), the probability of the cut-set is
defined as:
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Equation 4.6 implies that the primary events included in the minimal cut-set are assumed
independent. It is important to note that p(Ca refers to the prior occurrence probability of
each event; therefore, Equation 4.6 yields a prior importance. According to the above
discussion, all minimal cut-sets of the FT in Figure 4.2 are twines, that is, they all consist
of two events; therefore, all of them are of the same ranking. Also, the most important
minimal cut-set is M = C6 n C9 with IM=O.3373, showing that mechanical failure of
automatic valve (A_valve) and failure of the operator to close the manual valves
(Hum_error) are the likely explanations for system failure.
4.3.3 Bayesian Network Analysis
Using the algorithm described in section 4.2.3, the Bayesian network is constructed for
the accident scenario in the feed control system (Figure 4.3). Once developed, BN is
analyzed using HUGIN 7.3 (http://www.hugin.com).
The prior probability of the leaf node in the BN is calculated to be P(FeecCclrl)=O.2720,
which is the same as that of the FT. The improvement indices are estimated for each
event (Table 4.2) by instantiating that particular event (i.e., C; =0) and subsequently
calculating the conditional probability P(Feed_ctrIICi = 0). As shown in Table 4.2, the
events Cg, C/O, C6• and C2 are again identified to contribute most to the leaf node
(FeedJlrl).
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Figure 4.3. Bayesian network structure based on the fault tree in Figure 4.2
It is worth noting that during predictive analysis to calculate the scenario occurrence
probability (deductive reasoning), the BN provides similar results to those of the
traditional Ff as long as primary events are independent of each other. However, one of
the unique characteristics of BN for dynamic accident scenario analysis is its ability for
abductive reasoning, aimed at updating the occurrence probability of the primary events
given the occurrence of the accident precursors. (Kjaerulff & Madsen, 2005). Throughout
abductive reasoning, two inherent features of BNs are revealed, i.e., probability updating
and uncertainty reducing, both of which are of great importance in dynamic safety
analysis.
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Although some authors have combined Frs with other methods to accommodate the two
aforementioned features, these methods are to be implemented under specific conditions,
making their application limited in accident scenario and safety analysis. For instance,
Shalev & Tiran (2007) coupled Fr analysis with condition monitoring to obtain an up-to-
date Fr. Also, Ferdous et a\. (2010) and Markowski et a\. (2009) have equipped Frs with
fuzzy theory and evidence theory to cope with parameter uncertainty due to using data
obtained from similar accidents or expert knowledge.
On the other hand, BNs are naturally able to reduce parameter uncertainty through
probability updating. In BN analysis, the posterior probabilities reflect the characteristics
of the accident studied more specifically than prior probabilities and hence are less
uncertain. This is because posteriors, unlike priors, are probabilities that have been
updated using the accident's latest information. BN can repetitively substitute the
posteriors for priors in the accident re-analysis when a new set of accident-related
information is observed. This substitution not only continuously reduces the data
uncertainty, but it also provides the accident scenario with real-time and up-to-date
analysis.
4.3.4 Probability Updating
Beyond the usual measures available in Frs, BN is able to perform probability updating
analysis, given new observations (Bobbio et a\., 2001). In this regard, the computation of
the posterior marginal probabilities of root nodes given the scenario occurrence is the
most popular (i.e., abductive reasoning). To this end, the posterior probability of each
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root node C j is calculated using P(C;lFeedJtrl), indicating the probability of Ci
conditioned to the Feed_ctrl malfunction (column 4 of Table 4.3).
It may be observed from Table 4.3 that the occurrence probability of the events C9, C/O.
and C" had the highest increase. Also, event severity ranking based on posteriors is
different from that based on priors. Based on the event posterior probabilities, the most
important minimal cut-set is defined as M = C6 n C9 (the same as in the Ff) with the
posterior importance index as IM=0.3372. It is to be noted that in the calculation of the
posterior importance index, P(Feedctrl ) = 1 is considered.
The posterior joint probability of all the primary events given the accident occurrence is
much more helpful than the most important minimal cut-set if a precise and
comprehensive safety analysis is desired. This is because the latter does not provide any
information about the occurrence or non-occurrence of the primary events not included in
it (Bobbio et aI., 2001).
To determine the most probable state of all the variables given the accident occurrence,
the most probable configuration, the BN searches over the state space of each variable to
identify weak links. Using the most probable explanation concept, the most probable state
given the accident occurrence is the one corresponding to the occurrence of the primary
events C6, C9, and CIO, and the non-occurrence of the other primary events:
It is important to note that unlike the posterior minimal cut-set, which identifies C6 and
C9 as the most likely causes for system failure, the most probable explanation provides
more information by adding C/O to the foregoing set. Also, it implies that the other non-
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mentioned events do not contribute to system failure. In this regard. using BN in safety
analysis helps to identify critical events and allocate preventative safety barriers not only
to the primary events directly leading to the top event but also to weak links (combination
of non-critical events).
Table 4.3. Comparison between prior and posterior probabilities in different modeling steps
First Modeling Alarm Modeling Uncertainty Modeling
Component Prior Posterior Prior Posterior Prior
0.1647 0.2248 0.1647\ 0.2248
0.2818 0.2818 1 0.3847 0.2818
PC_signal 0.4001 0.5461 0.4496
0.2099 0.1538 0.2099 0.1538 0.2219
Act_signal 0.4924 0.6721 0.6024
A_valve 0.4645 0.3403 0.4645 0.3403
0.2015 0.2015 0.2751
A_valve_ctr! 0.7326 1.0000 0.7326 1.0000 0.6932 1.0000
Hum_error 0.2696 0.7260 0.2696 0.1272
M_valve 0.1393 0.8905
M_valve_ctrl 0.3713 1.0000 0.4017 1.0000
Feed_ctrl 1.0000
0.2614. 0.0639, 0.3031. 0.1302.
0.0134 0.0000 0.0190 0.0000
4.4 Modeling Techniques
Modeling aspects of BN such as handling multi-state variables. sequentially dependent
failures. and uncertainty handling are discussed in this section to demonstrate that BN has
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a more flexible structure than Fr, and is also a preferred option over Fr for modeling
some accident scenarios.
4.4.1 Multi-state Variables and Dependent Failures
To make the aforementioned accident scenario more realistic, it is assumed that the
manual valve is closed by the operator only if an alarm system sounds due to the
automatic valve failure (i.e, A_vaLve_ctrL occurrence). As before, all components are
assumed binary, except the alarm system which is considered ternary, i.e., having three
states: No-sound (alarm fails to sound), Wrong-sound (alarm sounds although automatic
valve works), and Right-sound (alarm sounds when automatic valve fails). It has also
been assumed that human failure probabilities to close the manual valve differ for wrong
and right alarm sounds.
Based on the causal relationships among the aforementioned components and their failure
probabilities, a BN was developed to predict the probability of improper operation of the
control system (Figure 4.4). The occurrence probabilities of the BN components are the
same as before, except ALarm and Hum_error which are assigned CPTs. For ease of
comparison in subsequent calculations, CPT values have been identified such that the
prior probability of Hum_error would be 0.2696 (as before).
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Hum_error No-sound wron;~:~:nd Right-sound
Fail 1 0.07 0.01
Work 0 0.93 0.99
Figure 4.4. Bayesian network structure for feed control system with alarm system
When constructed, the BN was modeled using the HUGIN 7.3 and the failure probability
of FeedJtrl; the prior probabilities of the intermediate nodes were also calculated
(column 5 of Table 4.3). It should be noted that the two numbers for Alarm are for the
No-sound and Wrong-sound states, respectively; the prior probability of Right-sound is
readily calculated by subtracting the summation of No-sound and Wrong-sound priors
from unity.
To determine the most critical primary events, abductive reasoning was performed given
the accident occurrence (i.e., the malfunction of the feeding control system), yielding
updated probabilities (column 6 of Table 4.3). Also, the most probable configuration of
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the primary events leading to the accident was specified to be the occurrence of the
components [6 and [9 , and the non-occurrence of the rest, with the probability of
Although adding an alarm system to the accident scenario did not change the prior
probability of human failure, it significantly decreased its posterior probability, excluding
it from the most probable configuration. According to the new most probable
explanation, mechanical failure of the automatic valve is to blame for A_valveJlrl
occurrence, triggering the alarm system (Alarm=Righl-sowuf). Despite alarm system
proper functioning, the manual valve cannot be closed because of mechanical failure, not
the operator failure. So mechanical failure of the automatic and manual valve i.e.,
A_valve and M_valve, eventually caused the feed system to not work properly. If prior
probabilities of accident OCCUITence (priors of FeedJlrl) are compared before and after
Alarm is added to the system, it can be seen that using the alarm system helps the
operator to intervene more effectively in accident occurrence prevention. This decreases
the probability of accident occurrence from 0.2720 to 0.1179.
4.4.2 Functional Uncertainty and Expert Opinion
While BN reduces the uncertainty of prior beliefs through probability updating, there are
other modeling techniques that help to capture some types of uncertainty (Kjaerulff &
Madsen, 2007). Among these, functional uncertainty and uncertainty due to expert
opinion are of significant importance in accident analysis.
Functional uncertainty is due to the lack of certitude in accurate determination of a causal
function among nodes. However, to handle this kind of uncertainty, alternative functions
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and their relative frequencies must be known. Two common functions used to link a child
to its parents in BNs are intersection and union of variables (corresponding to OR-gate
and AND-gate in Frs).
As an example, it is assumed that in the BN shown in Figure 4.2, it is not clear whether
PC-signal = PC U PT or PC-signal = PC n PT, but it is known that the likelihood of
the former is three times that of the later, i.e., P(U) = 3P(n). This lack in certainty can
be modeled by adding another parent to PC_signal's parent set, e.g., node Function with
two states U and n such that P(Function) = p(u,n) = (0.75,0.25), and also by
modifying its corresponding CPT (Figure 4.5).
As previously mentioned, most prior beliefs used to construct the model are based on
domain experts' opinions. So, it is likely to have different beliefs about probability
parameters due to different experts assessing the model values. BN allows the
incorporation of different judgments in the network structure by adding an auxiliary node
to the parent set of the node of interest. The newly added node has one state for each
expert, and its prior probability represents the reliability degree of each expert. For
instance, it is assumed that two experts (e.g., Expl and Exp2) have been asked to assess
the causal effect of A_valveJtrl on Alarm. So, node Expert with two states Expl and
Exp2 is added to parent set of Alarm in which the reliability of the first expert is 60% and
that of the second is 40% (i.e., P(Expert) = P(Expl, Exp2) = (0.6,0.4).
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Fail 1
Work 0
Figure 4.5. Modified BN to capture functional uncertainty and expert opinion
The different opinions of experts about the conditional dependence of Alarm on
A_valveJtrl are included in the corresponding CPT (Figure 4.5).
The prior and posterior probabilities of the modified BN have been also listed in Table
4.3 (columns 7 and 8, respectively). For ease of comparison, variables Function and
Expert are not included in Table 3; however, their posterior probabilities given failure of
FeetCctrl are P(Function) = (0.793,0.205), showing an increase in the likelihood of
union relationship between PT and PC, and P(Expert) = (0.563,0.437), showing an
increase in the reliability degree of Exp2. It is to be noted that after the foregoing
modifications, the prior probability of the leaf node, i.e., Feed_ctrl, increases from O. 115
to 0.116, showing the effect of uncertainty consideration in the model.
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The most probable configuration of events, leading to FeecCctrl failure after the
modifications, is identified to be the same as before, but with a different probability as
0.0734. The new most probable configuration determines that the states of FUllction and
Expert have to be Union and Expl, respectively.
4.5 Conclusion
The present study has illustrated the use of BNs in both accident OCCLlITence probability
estimation and updating in the light of new information. It also focused on various
modeling techniques to capture some types of uncertainty which are common in accident
analysis and risk assessment. The first half of the paper was devoted to common features
of Ff and BN, where a Ff was used to construct a corresponding BN. Although both
methods resulted in similar estimations for accident occurrence probability, it was the BN
that was able to update the prior beliefs about the accident by taking new information into
account and by taking advantage of probability updating. The second half of the paper
discussed those aspects and modeling issues of BN which Ff is incapable of handling,
such as multi-state variables, dependent failures and uncertainty. The main conclusions of
this study can be summarized as follows:
By propagation of new observations through the network, BN updates the prior
probabilities, yielding posterior probabilities. These posteriors, unlike priors that are
based mainly on generic data and expert knowledge, are more specific to the accident
studied and better reflect its characteristics.
2. The calculation of CPTs requires a comprehensive study of causal relationships
and a huge amount of data usually provided by domain experts. However, the current
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study has shown that a BN is a superior technique to a traditional Fr even if its CPTs are
developed deterministically (Figure 3). This may be helpful in situations where there is
not enough information to estimate the CPT values probabilistically.
3. Considering minimal cut-set importance, it is observed that BN produces a more
reliable measure of such importance by providing the most probable configuration of
primary events leading to an accident. Unlike minimal cut-sets, the most probable
configuration provides information about both occurrence and non-occurrence of primary
4. Each Fr can be mapped to its corresponding BN, while a BN does not necessarily
have an equivalent Fr due to multi-state variables, different causal relationships rather
than simple Boolean functions such as OR-gate and AND-gate, and sequentially
dependent failures. BNs are also able to handle uncertainty without coupling by other
methods i.e., by simply modifying their structure.
In general, BN has a much more flexible structure than Fr, fitting to a wide range of
accident scenarios. Its ability for abductive reasoning and uncertainty handling makes it a
more suitable technique for real-time accident analysis and more importantly, for design
and evaluation of safety measures. However, before BNs can be used in a comprehensive
accident risk assessment, their applicability in accident consequence analysis, safety
baITier implementation, and decision making must be examined thoroughly.
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5 Dynamic risk analysis using bow-tie approacht
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Abstract
Among many techniques available, bow-tie model (BT) is very popular because it
represent the accident scenario altogether including causes and consequences. However,
it suffers a static structure limiting its application in real-time monitoring and probability
updating which are key factors in dynamic risk analysis. The present work is focused on
using BT approach in a dynamic environment in which the occurrence probability of
accident consequences changes. In this method, on one hand, failure probability of
primary events of BT, leading to the top event, are developed using physical reliability
models, and constantly revised as physical parameters (e.g., pressure, velocity,
dimension, temperature) change. And, on the other hand, the failure probability of safety
t Khakzad et al. Journal of Reliability Engineering and System Safety 2012.
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barriers of the BT are periodically updated using Bayes' theorem as new information
becomes available over time. Finally, the resulting, updated BT is used to estimate the
posterior probability of the consequences which in tum results in an updated risk profile.
Keywords: Dynamic risk analysis, Bow-tie approach, Bayes' theorem, Physical
reliability models.
5.1 Introduction
There are many methods for risk assessment of envisaged accident scenarios in the
process industries, such as quantitative risk assessment (QRA), probabilistic safety
analysis (PSA), and maximum credible accident analysis (Khan, 2001; Khan and
Abbassi, 1998). Although these methods consist of different steps and follow specific
procedures, accident scenario identification in terms of both mechanism and likelihood is
a common and central step to all of them.
While conventional risk assessment methods have played an important role in identifying
major risks and maintaining safety in process facilities, they have the disadvantage of
being static and using generic failure data (Meel and Seider, 2006; Shalev and Tiran,
2007). The static structure of the aforementioned methods fails to catch up with the
variations which almost always occur during the operational time of a process. Also,
using generic data prevents the analysis from being case-specific and brings uncertainty
into the results.
On the other hand, a dynamic risk assessment method should be able to take any new
information into account and to tailor itself to the dynamic environment which is
dominant in process system risk and safety analyses. A risk assessment method not only
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can be employed at the design phase of a process system, but it can also be considered
during the system's life time as a decision support and risk management tool (Shalev and
Tiran, 2007).
Dynamic risk assessment methods take advantage of case-specific data and updating
mechanisms to revise the failure probabilities obtained from the initial generic data in the
design phase of the system. In non-Bayesian updating approaches, new data which is
supplied by real-time monitoring of parameters or inspection of process equipment is
usually substituted for generic data to obtain updated failure rates using physics-based
models, structural models, mechanical models, or condition-based models (Ching and
Leu, 2009). On the other hand, Bayesian approaches employ new data in the form of
likelihood functions to update prior failure rates using Bayes' theorem (Ferson, 2005;
Kelly and Smith, 2009; Siu and Kelly, 1998).
There have been efforts to make risk assessment methods dynamically adapted as real-
time changes occur in a process. Shalev and Tiran (2007) introduced condition-based
fault tree in which failure rates of components are periodically updated using information
obtained through predictive maintenance. Consequently, the failure probability of the top
event is updated by recalculating the fault tree (FT) for new failure rates. However, their
method has to be implemented in specific conditions where, for example, gradual
deterioration process of a component can be discretized into several stages at each of
which there should be a correlation between residual time of the component and its total
failure time.
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In the context of Bayesian updating, Meel and Seider (2006), Kalantamia et al. (2009,
2010), and Rathnayaka et al. (2011) used Bayes' theorem to update the failure probability
of event tree (ET) based on the occurrence number of consequences recorded over time.
Other researchers have also attempted to use Bayesian network (BN) instead of Ff
(Bobbio et aI., 2001; Boudali and Dugan, 2005; Khakzad et aI., 2011; Marquez et aI.,
2010), ET (Bearfield and Marsh, 2005) and Bow-tie (BT) model (Khakzad et aI., 2012)
for probability updating. A comprehensive and state of the art application of Bayesian
inference and Bayesian network in risk analysis can be found in Kelly and Smith (2009),
Siu and Kelly (1998), and Weber et al. (2010). Further, there are attempts to substitute
Markov models for Ff (Xing et aI., 1996) or to construct dynamic Ff and ET from
corresponding Markov models such that time-dependent failures can be taken into
account (Bucci et aI., 2008). However, the application of Markov models in complex
systems has been limited due to the well-known problem of state-space explosion and
also the error-prone mapping procedure.
Among the different models available to identify and analyze accident scenarios, BT has
been well proven to be a reliable and efficient tool. It has been used in a broad range of
applications such as in process safety analysis (Markowski et ai, 2009), risk management
(Cockshott, 2005), and recently in ARAMIS project for accident risk analysis Chevreau
et ai, 2006, Delvosalle et aI., 2005 and 2006; Dianous et aI., 2006; Gowland, 2006).
Nevertheless, as BT is composed of Ff and ET, it is influenced by the same limitations as
its constituents (i.e., Ff & ET) in dynamic risk assessment.
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The present work is aimed at showing the importance of dynamic BTs in real-time risk
assessment. In this method, the Ff part of BT is updated using varying physical
parameters supplied by continuous monitoring of process equipment. For this purpose,
failure distributions of primary events are developed using physical reliability models,
allowing to substitute newly observed parameters in the model and therefore to
recalculate the top event (TE) probability (i.e., physics-based updating). On the other
hand, the ET part is updated using Bayes' theorem which in tum employs the periodically
recorded number of accident consequences in the form of likelihood functions (i.e.,
evidence-based updating). Finally, the resulting updated BT is used to estimate the
posterior probability of the consequences and subsequently to estimate updated risk.
Section 5.2 provides a brief description of BT model. Section 5.3 explains the methods
used in this work to update the BT. The application of the method to a real-life case study
and the discussion of the results are included in sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. Section
5.6 is devoted to the conclusions and recommendations for future work.
5.2 Bow-tie approach
BT is a graphical tool to illustrate an accident scenario, starting from accident causes and
ending with its consequences. While centered on a critical event, BT is composed of a Ff
on the left-hand side identifying the possible events causing the critical event (or top
event), and an ET on the right-hand side showing the possible consequences of the
critical event based on the failure or success of safety barriers. Figure 5.1 illustrates a
typical BT in which PE, IE and TE are primary, intermediate and the top event,
respectively. Also, SB and C stand for safety barrier and accident consequence.
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Figure 5.1. Generic bow-tie
BT represents a complete accident scenario qualitatively and quantitatively. From a
qualitative perspective, BT clearly illustrates the logical relationship among the
components of an accident scenario. It helps to understand which possible combination of
primary events would lead to the top event and which safety barriers' failure would
escalate the top event to a particular consequence.
Once BT has been structured, quantitative analysis can be carried out by assigning
probabilities to the primary events of the FT and the safety barriers of the ET. In a FT, the
occurrence probability of the top event can be calculated as the union of minimal cut sets.
A minimal cut set is defined as the intersection of the minimum number of primary
events, the occurrence of which is necessary to cause the top event to occur. The ET of
the BT model starts from the top event provided by the FT and proceeds toward each
branch to calculate the occurrence probability of each consequence based on failure or
success of various safety barriers. For example, the occurrence probability of
consequence (or end event) [2 in Figure 5.1 can be calculated as:
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5.1
Where P(TE) is top event probability, and P(5B1 ) and P(SB2 ) refer to the failure and
non-failure probability of safety barriers 5B1 and 5Bz, respectively.
5.3 Bow-tie Updating
There are many efforts in the literature attempting to update conventional Ff and ET
given new observations. However, the works dedicated to update BT are few, particularly
in the field of risk assessment and safety analysis. Recently, Khakzad et al. (2012)
introduced a methodology for dynamic safety analysis of process systems based on
mapping BT into the corresponding BN. As a result, the probable conditional
dependencies between the top event and the safety barriers could be considered. They
also suggested performing probability adapting rather than probability updating when the
cumulative number of failures over a time period is available.
However, this study aims to apply BT in the context of dynamic risk analysis without
resort to BNs. This BT should thus be capable of being updated as new data, whether
associated with the primary events or safety barriers, is observed. Consequently, the
probability of accident consequences can be re-calculated as the probability of the top
event (due to primary events) and safety barriers are updated separately or some together.
Using the updated probabilities of accident consequences, the estimated risk can be
revised.
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5.3.1 Fault Tree Revising: Use of Physical Reliability Models
In the current research, the concept of physical reliability models Ebeling, 1997) is used
to revise the probability of primary events of Fr, which, in tum, results in top event
updating. Physical reliability models aim to explain the reliability (or failure) of a
component as a multivariate function of operational physical parameters. Physical models
particularly structural models, mechanical models, and physics-of-failure models have
long been recognized in reliability and maintainability analysis in civil and mechanical
engineering (Ching and Leu, 2009; Hull and Strutt, 2003). However, their application is
not widely adopted in process safety and risk analysis. This section aims to illustrate how
physical reliability models can effectively be used for real-time and dynamic risk
assessment of process systems. Among different types of physical reliability models,
covariate models and static models are used in this study to incorporate operational
physical parameters in the failure probabilities of the Ff's components.
5.3.1.1 Covariate models
Operational physical parameters, also called covariates, may be temperature, velocity,
pressure, or vibration amplitude. Covariate models explain the failure rate of a
component as a function of the dominant physical parameters (covariates) (Ebeling,
1997):
,i(t,X) =Au(t)g(X,A)
Where ,i(t,X) is the failure rate as a function of time and the covariates; Au(t) is the
baseline failure rate just as a function of time; g(X, A) is a positive function which is
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independent of time, incorporating the effect of covariates in the failure rate;
x =(xl'xz""'xlI ) is a vector of covariates; A=(al'aZ ,Oo.,all ) is a vector of unknown
parameters such that a j is the coefficient of Xi' The value of a j is often estimated using
least-squares method or maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) (Ebeling, 1997).
In order to make the failure rate of Weibull distribution dependent on covariates, it is
common practice to assume the scale factor 8 as a function of covariates, i.e.
e(x) =EXP(~ajXj)' The time-dependent failure rate of Weibull distribution is given
by:
Where f3 is the shape factor. Substituting 8(x) in equation 5.3 results in:
5.3
In which X o =1 by convention. Therefore, the covariate model for failure probability
F(t) will be:
F(t) =1- EXP{-(-.~-)pj
Exp(~ajxj)
It is evident from Equation 5.5 that with any change in covariate x j ' the failure
probability F(t) will change.
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5.3.1.2 Static models
Static models, on the other hand, do not consider time as an influential parameter and
only count on the component's strength and stresses. Similar to covariates, stresses are
often considered as physical or chemical parameters affecting a component's operation.
Strength is defined as the highest amount of stress that a component can bear. According
to the definitions of stress and strength, a failure occurs when the stress on the component
exceeds its strength (Ebeling, 1997). Both stress and strength can be constant or
considered as random variables having probability distribution functions. For example,
the failure probability of component Q having a constant strength, k, and being under a
random stress, Y, can be defined as the probability of Y being greater than k:
Pr(Q) =Prey > k) =!fy(y)dY 5.6
In which fy(Y) is the probability density function (PDF) of the stress, Y. Assuming an
exponential distribution for fy(y), Equation 6 can be written as:
Since in the exponential distribution A. = E:Y)' Equation 5.7 becomes as:
Pr(Q)=e E(Y)
In which E(Y) is the expected value of the stress. Therefore, the failure probability of
component Q can be reassessed when a new value for k is observed.
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5.3.2 Event tree updating: use of Bayes' theorem
Bayes' theorem has frequently been used for probability updating in dynamic risk
analysis. In this regard, the number of failures over time or over a number of trials is
usually taken into account to form likelihood functions. Due to mathematical
convenience, it has been common practice to choose a prior distribution and its
corresponding likelihood function from well known conjugate families which in tum
result in a posterior distribution from the same family (Meel and Seider, 2006). However,
recent developments in probabilistic software tools such as WinBUGS (Bayesian
inference Using Gibbs Sampling) (Lunn et aI., 2000) have made it possible to choose
from a wide range of probability distributions of arbitrary complexity.
Siu and Kelly (1998) suggested using gamma prior distribution for failure rates of events
and Poisson likelihood function for the number of failures over time intervals. On the
other hand, Meel and Seider (2006) and Kalantamia et al. (2009, 2010) chose a Beta prior
distribution for failure probabilities and a Binomial likelihood function based on the
number of failures. In situations where no parametric likelihood function can be
considered, nonparametric or empirical likelihood functions can also be directly extracted
from the data (Rathnayaka et aI., 201l). However, such likelihood functions must be
applied cautiously to avoid zero preservation problems in which any likelihood function
equal to zero prevents the updating process from proceeding (Ferson, 2005). This is
because a likelihood function equal to zero over some region of the parameter leads to a
posterior equal to zero (over that region) which cannot be updated in the next updating
try, no matter what additional data is used.
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In the present study, it is assumed that prior failure rates of safety barriers follow gamma
distribution:
Where f(A) is gamma distribution of A, A is the failure rate, a and fJ are distribution
parameters, and l(a) =Ixa-1e-xdx is gamma function. Further, for the number of
failures over time, Poisson likelihood function is considered as:
S.IO
In !he above equation L(r IA) is the likelihood function of r given A, and r is the
number of failures in [O,t] interval. Using Bayes' theorem, the posterior failure rates
given in Equation 5.11 have also gamma distribution yet with different parameters:
f(Alr) f(A)L(rIA)
jJ(A)L(rIA)dA
fJ,a'Aa'-le_fJ'A
l(a')
Where f(A Ir) is the posterior distribution of the failure rate; fJ' = fJ + t and a' =a + r
are new distribution parameters. The mean value of !he prior gamma distribution,
E(A) =i' thus changes to
E(A')=~= a+r
fJ' P+t
77
5.3.3 Consequence updating
Having a BT either the top event of which can be updated using physical reliability
models (Section 5.3.1) or the safety barriers of which can be updated using Bayes'
theorem (Section 5.3.2), it is possible to update the probability of the consequences (Ci in
Figure 5.l). The reason is that the probabilities of consequences in a BT are calculated by
multiplication of the top event and the safety barriers' probabilities (see Equation 5.1).
Using the updated probabilities of the consequences, the estimated risk can thus be
updated. Figure 5.2 schematically illustrates the updating process described in detail in
the aforementioned sections. In the next sections, it is shown how different kinds of
information, such as changes in physical parameters (through application of physical
reliability models) or changes in our beliefs as more information becomes available over
time (through application of Bayes' theorem), can be used to update the estimated risk.
/2.-... Updating using
~Bayes'rule
Figure 5.2. SchematicofBT updating
5.4 Case Study: Sugar Refinery Explosion
In February 2008, a devastating dust explosion occurred at the Imperial Sugar
manufacturing facility, Georgia, U.S. This accident was chosen to implement the
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methodology proposed here. The refinery plant included equipment to produce
granulated sugar from raw sugar, conveyor belts and bucket elevators to transport
granulated sugar to the silos and from the silos to the packing building, and grinding and
packing machines.
According to the final report issued by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (2009), faults in
design and maintenance of equipment such as the conveyor belts and the packing
machine, inadequate housekeeping, and defects in the dust removal system resulted in
significant accumulations of granulated sugar and airborne sugar dust in the work area.
These combustible forms of sugar along with deficient safety measures caused a primary
explosion whish was escalated into a secondary, much more devastating explosion. The
primary explosion was reportedly due to high concentration of sugar dust inside a
recently enclosed conveyor belt and an overheated bearing as ignition source. Based on
the detailed investigation carried out by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board, different
accident scenarios were envisaged using a BT model (Figure 5.3).
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Major Accidenl
Figure 5.3. Bow-tie modeling of sugar dust explosion at Imperial Sugar manufacturing facility
In order to show the updating procedure, it is assumed that all primary events follow a
time-dependent exponential distribution, except Dust pipes clogged with dust (PE4) and
Blockage of sugar flow (PE6) which are explained in the form of covariate and static
models, respectively. In this regard, it has been considered that PE4 has a Weibull
distribution whose scale parameter, e, is a function of covariates such as air velocity
inside the pipe (V) and pipe diameter (d), i.e., e(x)= Exp(ao +a, V +az d). Covariate
models demand for experiments and laboratory data or data taken during operation of
commercial scale equipment to establish regression coefficients using MLE or least-
squares methods (see Appendix). In this study, using the data in Table 5.1, the failure
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distribution parameters of PE4 were estimated as p=1.5, ao =0.01, a\ =0.2 and
a2 = 6.75 applying the least square method.
Table 5.1. Data used to estimate the unknown parameters of Weibull distribution for PE4
Failure time Air velocity Pipe diameter
t(year) V (rnls) d(m)
0.86 2 0.08
1.6 2.3 0.07
2.67 3 0.06
3.27 0.04
On the other hand, the failure distribution of PE6 is developed using static models with
conveyor belt speed (Va) as the strength and the velocity of sugar (Vs) flowing from silo
openings on the conveyor belt as the stress. Assuming that Va is a constant and Vs has an
exponential distribution with the mean value E(Vs) = 1.5 mis, Equation 8 can be used to
estimate the probability of PE6 as P(PE6) = Exp(-~). In other words, it is considered
that sugar blockage occurs when the speed of the belt is less than the velocity of sugar
flowing from silos, i.e., Va < 1.5 mls.
The prior probabilities of the remaining primary events are determined based on data
recorded by, for example, Center for Chemical Process Safety (2000), Offshore
Reliability Data Handbook (2002), CSB historical records, and using expert judgment.
Table 5.2 illustrates the prior failure rates of the primary events. The initial values of
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distribution parameters and covariates have been chosen as VB = 2 mis, V = 2 mis, and
d = a.1m.
Table 5.2. Prior probabilities of primary events of fault tree.
Index Components A(per year) Probability
Grinding machine 0.2592
Packaging machine
PE3 Roof dust collector disrepair 0.02
Dust pipe clogged with dust Physical model 0.1783
Undersized filters O.QI 0.01
PE6 Blockageofsugartlow Physical model
Not properly sealed
PE8 Poor housekeeping 0.1
In the BT model, three safety barriers have been considered, that is, high concentration
alarm barrier (HCA), primary explosion barrier (PEX), and venting barrier (VENT), for
which prior failure rates are assumed to have gamma distribution with parameters listed
in Table 5.3. The failure rates of safety barriers are determined as mean value of the
distributions. It is also considered that safety barriers follow an exponential distribution.
HCA has been devised to warn staffs about sugar dust concentrations above the minimum
explosible concentration (Near miss). If this barrier fails to work, or staffs ignore the
alarm and neglect to remedy the high concentration, PEX is supposed to prevent the dust
from igniting (Incident). On the condition that a primary explosion occurs, VENT can
prevent it from escalating to a secondary explosion (Accident). Otherwise, a primary
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explosion propagates through the packaging building, causing a stronger and more
destructive explosion (Major accident).
Table 5.3. Prior parameters of safety barriers.
SB;
HCA 0.88 0.349
0.81 0.1707
8.98 0.1917
5.5 Application of the Methodology
5.5.1 Fault tree revising
Figures 5.4 through 5.6 show the application of physical reliability models in Ff
reassessment. In Figures 5.4 and 5.5, probability of the top event is recalculated for
different values of covariates V = 1.5 - 10.5 m/s and d = 0.01 - 0.1 m, respectively,
via PE4 and using Equation 5.5.
Similarly, in Figure 5.6, probability of the top event is shown for different values of
covariate VB = 0.5 - 5 m/s via PE6 and using Equation 5.8. These revised probabilities
of the top event directly affect the probabilities of consequences (see Equation 5.1),
which in tum result in updated estimates of risk.
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V(m/s)
Figure 5.4. Event probability updating for different air velocities (Y).
e- 0.89
~~ 0,88
Figure 5.5. Top event probability updating for different pipe diameters(d).
08~';-5----:------::-----:---;;';-----:---;;';-----:------::-----:
Va(mlS)
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Figure 5.6. Top event probability updating for different conveyor belt speeds (VB)'
The top event probability can also be re-quantified using different pairs of covariates,
making it possible to investigate the simultaneous effects of several covariates on the top
event probability. Figure 5.7 shows the top event probability contours for the covariates
VB and V. Through the combinations of such contours, it is possible to determine several
sets of scenarios for which the top event probability is constant in spite of changing
covariates.
Table 5.4 represents, as an instance, six different scenarios leading to P(TE) = 0.2,
while having different covariates. For example, by comparing scenario 2 and 4 in Table
5.3, it can be seen that increases in VB from 3 to 4 mls and in V from 1 to 3.5 mls
compensate for a decrease in d from 0.09 to 0.01 m. However, among different scenarios,
the most practical one should be chosen based on operational limitations and economic
considerations.
Figure 5.7. Top event probability contours for belt speed (VB) and air velocity (Y).
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Table 5.4. Scenarios leading to the same top event probability, i.e. P(TE) =0.12.
Scenario VB (m/s) V (m/s) d(m)
5 0.08
3.5
2 0.06
0.09
0.03
5.5.2 Event tree updating
As described in Section 5.3.2, the number of failures r is used to develop Poisson
likelihood function (Equation 5.10). In this regard, r for each safety barrier equals the
number of consequences resulted from that safety barrier's failure. For demonstration
purposes, the cumulative number of each consequence over the course of 5 years is listed
in Table 5.5. For example, r for safety barrier HCA at the end of the 4th year is calculated
as THeA = Ntncident + NAccident + Nmajor accident = 4 + 3 + 1 = 7.
Where Ni refers to the occurrence number of consequence Cj • It is because according to
the BT in Figure 5.3, the occurrence of each of consequences Incident, Accident or Major
accident implies that safety barrier HCA has failed.
Table 5.5. Cumulative number of consequences over 5 years of process operation.
YearS
Near miss
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Incident
Accident
Major Accident
As mentioned earlier, the posterior failure rates of the safety barriers also follow gamma
distribution with the expected values equal to (X) = ~. Thus, taking into account the
number of failures, r, at the end of each year t, it is possible to obtain the posterior failure
rate of each safety barrier as the expected value of its updated distribution. Accordingly,
the posterior average failure rate of safety barrier HCA is estimated as E(X) = ~::::: =
1.207 (compare with its prior failure rate 0.349). Figure 5.8 shows the posterior failure
probability of the safety barriers. It should be noted that failure probability of safety
barriers is calculated using F(t) = 1 - eE(A)t.
f::
' HeB I--&-PEX
____ VENT
Figure 5.8. Posterior failure probabilities of safety barriers.
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5.5.3 Dynamic risk assessment
The methods proposed in the present study enable updating of Ff and ET. This helps to
revise the accident risk profile as new relevant information becomes available for either
part of BT. The updated probabilities of the top event and safety barriers directly affect
the probabilities of the consequences, which subsequently lead to an updated risk profile.
Figure 5.9 illustrates, as an example, the probability of consequence Near miss for
different VB, Vand updated safety barriers in two different years.
Similarly, the change in the probability of other consequences can be shown for every
pair of covariates in different years. This helps to determine what safety measures are
required and where they should be allocated to most efficiently prevent or mitigate the
accident. It is even more beneficial if the change in the risk profile behavior, instead of
change in consequences, is depicted for different covariates.
Figure 5.9. Updated probability of consequence Near miss using covariates VB and V and updated
safety barriers for year 1 (Ieft)and5 (right). (dis kept constant, i.e.,d=O.lm).
88
As risk is defined as the multiplication of the probability and severity of consequences,
the severity of each consequent is listed in Table 5.6 in dollar amount. The numbers
presented here are for illustrative purposes only.
Table 5.6. Estimated damage of consequences
c; Damage (US$)
Near miss 5000
Incident 50000
Accident 1000000
Major accident 10000000
Figure 5.10 shows the risk profile as a function of VB and V for the 5th year of process
operation (d = 0.1 m). Similar profiles drawn with different pairs of covariates, as
illustrated in Figure 5.10, provide decision makers with a clearer vision of how the risk
profile dynamically changes due to variations in process parameters. Therefore,
appropriate safety measures can effectively be applied to maintain the risk within defined
acceptance criteria.
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Figure 5.10. Risk surface for different VB and V (d is kept constant, i.e., d =0.1 m).
Figure 5.11 shows the risk contours derived from the risk profile in Figure 5.10. For
example, it is evident from Figure 5.11 that for d= 0.1 m and V> 6 mis, the estimated risk
is less than 3 E 04 USD, regardless of the amount of VB.
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
v.(mls)
Figure 5.11. Risk contours for different VB and V (d =0.1 m).
It can also be noted that for a constant d, the effect of V on risk profile is much larger
than that of VB. Thus, in the present study, the most attention have to be given to air
velocity variation, V, in the pipes rather than to the conveyor belt speed, VB, in order to
keep the estimated risk as low as possible.
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5.6 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the role of updated BT in dynamic risk assessment. Physical
reliability models such as covariate and static models were employed to investigate the
effect of real-time variation of physical parameters on the top event probability. It was
illustrated that these physical models provide a deeper insight into the behavior of
process risk by incorporating the influential physical parameters into the failure
distribution functions. Once physical reliability models are developed for primary events
of BT in design phase, the top event probability and consequently the initially estimated
risk can be readily revised as new physical parameters are monitored and observed during
process operation time. Although physical models demand experimental and site data to
be established, this research showed they could provide the analyst with a quick and
practical method for real-time probability estimation.
This study has also used Bayes' theorem to update safety barriers of BT, directly
affecting the probability of consequences and the estimated risk as a result. It used Bayes'
theorem besides physical models in BT to capture all kinds of information available to
revise the risk. In other words, Bayesian inference helped to incorporate those kinds of
information in the updating procedure which were not possible to be considered by
physical models, i.e., changes in initial estimates over time.
Overall, the applied updating methodology has been shown to be an effective technique
in BT updating, which in tum results in real-time and dynamic risk analysis. It was also
demonstrated how changes in either physical parameters (supplied by continuous
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monitoring of equipment) or the initial estimates (resulted from occurrence of accidents
over time) were taken into account to obtain a dynamically updated risk estimate.
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5.7 Appendix
Given a sample of failure times {tv ... , tn } and the set of covariates xij associated with
each failure time (xij is the value of the i-th covariate which is associated with the j-th
failure time), methods such as Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) or least-square
method can be applied to estimate unknown parameters of the distribution.
(i) MLE method
The probability density function of Weibull distribution is given by:
According to unknown parameters Pand e, the likelihood function of parameters is found
" fJ fIt j " t
L(fJ,(}) =I1fUj IfJ,(})=(-)"(~l-IExp(-L(~l)
j=1 (} (} j=1 (}
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5.14
Due to the multiplicative form of the likelihood function, its natural logarithm yields the
additive form which is usually easer to solve considering the derivation procedure:
Which can alternatively be written as:
j3 rltj II t
LnL(j3,B)=nLn(7}+(j3-I) Ln e;1I )- ~(-t)P =
nLnj3-nj3LnB+(j3-I) Lnrl t j - I(~)P
j=1 j=1 B
5.16
To find the best estimate of any unknown parameter of interest, the first derivative of the
likelihood function (or its natural logarithm), with respect to that parameter should be
equal to zero. For example, to find the best estimate of ~, the following derivative should
be solved:
Which in tum leads to a system of n nonlinear equations (i.e., one equation for each
failure time). According to the present study, since B= Exp(ao +a\ V +a2 d), the set of
nonlinear equations represented by Equation 5.17 can be solved only if the values of
covariates V and d are known for each failure time tj (see Table 5.1). Methods such as
Newton-Raphson method can be used to solve the aforementioned system of equations
(Ebeling, 1997).
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(ii) Least square method
The cumulative density function of Weibull distribution is given by:
5.18
Following the common procedure of least square method and seeking for a regression
equation in the form of y =ax + b, Equation 5.19 is derived by taking the natural
logarithm of Equation 5.18 twice:
Assuming Yj = Ln(Ln-l-) , Equation 5.19 would become as:
1-F(t)
5.19
Thus, having a sample of failure times and the associated covariates, such as those listed
in Table 5.1, the regression line y=b, +b2 Lnt+bJx, +b4 x2 can be determined using
multiple regression models. In the regression line, bl = -fJ Go' b2 = fJ, bJ = -fJ G, and
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Dynamic Safety Analysis of Process Systems by Mapping Bow-tie
into Bayesian Network!:
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Abstract
Among the various techniques used for safety analysis of process systems, bow-tie (BT)
analysis is becoming a popular technique as it represents an accident scenario from
causes to effects. However, the BT application in the dynamic safety analysis is limited
due to the static nature of its components, i.e. fault tree and event tree. It is therefore
difficult in BT to take accident precursors into account to update the probability of events
and the consequent risk. Also, BT is unable to represent conditional dependency. Event
dependency is common among primary events and safety barriers. The current paper
*Khakzad et al. Process Safety and Environmental Protection 2012.
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scenarios due to its flexible structure. This paper also introduces the application of
probability adapting in dynamic safety analysis rather than probability updating. A case
study from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board has been used to illustrate the application of
both BT and BN techniques, with a comparison of the results from each technique.
Keywords: Dynamic safety analysis, Bow-tie approach, Bayesian network, Probability
adapting.
6.1 Introduction
Process systems are prone to devastating accidents because they deal with hazardous
material at high temperature and/or pressure. Process plants are also characterized as
complex systems where a dense cluster of pipes and facilities makes it likely that an
accident in a given facility causes loss in neighboring facilities, leading to a chain of
accidents (Khan & Abbasi, 1998). So, the implementation of safety measures followed by
a comprehensive risk assessment is crucial to maintain the level of risk below the
acceptance criteria. Risk assessment methodologies such as quantitative risk analysis
(QRA), probabilistic safety analysis (PSA), and optimal risk analysis (ORA) comprise
different steps among which accident scenario analysis is a common task. Accident
scenario analysis includes accident sequence modeling and consequence assessment
(Khan, 2001). Several methodologies have been used for accident scenario analysis, each
of which benefits from different techniques. For example, Sklet (2006) used barrier block
diagrams to investigate hydrocarbon release accidents on offshore platforms. Delvosalle
et al. (2005) used the bow-tie (BT) technique in ARAMIS project to identify major and
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reference accident scenarios in process plants. However, it is difficult to find a single
technique to completely capture different phases of an accident from the beginning to the
end, and also being flexible enough to fit a variety of accidents. Nivolianitou et al. (2004)
I
made a comparison between some selected techniques such as fault trees, event trees, and
Petri nets for accident investigation, considering criteria such as event sequence, event
dependency, and modeling assumptions. There are also other relevant works in the
I
literature such as that of Khan & Abbasi (1998), Sklet (2004), and Zheng & Liu (2009),
devoted to qualitative comparison among different techniques.
I
Among accident analysis models, BT has been well proven to be a reliable and efficient
tool, partly due to its ability to incorporate both causes and consequences of an accident
in a graphical model. [t has been widely used in different safety and risk contexts such as
process safety analysis (Markowski et aI., 2009), accident risk assessment (Chevreau et
aI., 2006; Delvosalle et aI., 2005; Delvosalle et aI., 2006; Dianous and Fievez , 2006;
Gowland 2006), risk management (Cockshott, 2005), and safety ban-ier implementation
(Badreddine and Ben Amor, 2010).
However, as BT consists of a fault tree and an event tree, it suffers limitations of both the
constituents. For example, standard fault trees are not suitable for accident scenarios
where redundant, common cause or dependent failures take place (Bobbio et aI., 2001,
Khakzad et aI., 20 II). Fault trees are also incapable of incorporating multi-state
variables, which are frequently encountered in process systems modeling. More
importantly, due to their static structures, fault trees and event trees cannot adapt
themselves to the dynamicity of accidents. In other words, these techniques cannot use
I
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the real-time information directly obtained from a facility to update prior beliefs, i.e. prior
failure probability of primary events and safety barriers.
To relax the discussed limitations of the abovementioned approaches, some authors have
used Bayesian inference, in which uncertainty handling and belief updating are inherent
characteristics. In such approaches, Bayes' theorem is coupled with standard fault tree
(Ching & Leu, 2009), event tree (Meel & Seider, 2006; Kalantamia et aI., 2009;
Rathnayaka et aI., 201 I), and bow-tie analysis (Badreddine & Ben Amor, 2010).
Although Bayes' theorem helps to obtain posterior probabilities, it necessitates
identifying likelihood functions, which is a difficult task if it is not a conjugate
distribution to prior probability (Ferson, 2005; Meel and Seider, 2006).
On the other hand, the BN not only benefits from Bayes' theorem to provide updated
probabilities, it also takes full advantage of its flexible structure to fit a wide variety of
accidents. Bobbio et al. (2001), Boudali & Dugan (2005), Marsh & Bearfield (2007),
Montani et al. (2008), and Khakzad et al. (2011) mapped fault trees into BNs, while
Bearfield & Marsh (2005) performed similar mapping for an event tree. Recently, Weber
et al. (2010) presented an exhaustive review of BN application in dependability,
maintenance and risk analysis, and also compared BNs with other methods such as fault
trees, Markov chains, and Petri nets.
The present study demonstrates how the limitations of BT, resulting mostly from its static
constituents, can be relaxed by mapping it into a corresponding BN. The study also
considers various practical modeling aspects offered by BN, making it a well-suited
technique for dynamic safety analysis. A brief description of BT, BN, and the mapping
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algorithm from BT to BN, mostly based on the works of Bobbio et al. (2001) and
Bearfield & Marsh (2005), is presented in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 briefly describes a
process accident used as the case study while Section 6.4 applies the methodology to
dynamic safety analysis of the accident scenario, comparing the results and showing the
BN modeling features of which the BT is incapable. Section 6.5 is devoted to the
conclusions of the current work.
6.2 Safety Analysis Techniques
6.2.1 Bow-tie model
BT is one of the best graphical approaches to represent a complete accident scenario,
starting from accident causes and ending with its consequences. While centered on a
critical event, BT is composed of a fault tree on the left-hand side identifying the possible
events causing the critical event, and an event tree on the right-hand side showing the
possible consequences of the critical event based on the failure or success of safety
functions (Delvossale et aI., 2005; Delvossale et aI., 2006). Figure 6.1 shows a typical
BT, comprised of different components such as primary events, PEi , intermediate events,
lEi, top event, TE, safety barriers, S8;, and accident consequences, Ci.
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C4
C5
Figure 6.1. Generic Bow-tie model
It helps to understand which possible combination of primary events will lead to the top
event in the fault tree and which safety function failures will escalate the top event to a
particular consequence in the event tree. For example, the occurrence probability of
consequence C4 in Figure 6.1 can be assessed as:
Where P(TE) is the top event probability; P(SB1 ) refers to the non-failure probability of
5B1 while P(5Bz) and P(5B3 ) refer to the failure probability of 5Bz and 5B3 ,
respectively.
6.2.2 Bayesian Network
Similar to BT, BN is a graphical technique, which has been widely used in risk and safety
analysis based on probabilistic and uncertain knowledge. BN is a directed acyclic graph,
in which the nodes represent variables, arcs signify direct causal relationships between
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the linked nodes, and Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) assigned to the nodes denote
conditional dependencies.
Based on the conditional independence, resulting from the d-separation concept (Pearl,
1988), and the chain rule, BN represents the joint probability distribution P(U) of
variables U = {Av ... ,An}, included in the network as:
where Pa(A i) is the parent set of Ai (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007).
BN takes advantage of Bayes theorem to update the prior occurrence (or failure)
probability of events given new information, called evidence E, thus yielding the
posteriors. This new information usually becomes available during the operational life of
a process, including occurrence or non-occurrence of accident or primary events:
P(UIE) = P;~~) = l::~:'~)
6.2.3 Mapping Algorithm
6.2.3.1 Fault Tree Mapping
Mapping from the fault tree into the BN is based on the work of Bobbio et al. (200 I),
including a graphical and numerical translation. In the graphical step, the stmcture of BN
is developed from the fault tree such that primary events, intermediate events, and the top
event of the fault tree are represented as root nodes, intermediate nodes, and the leaf node
in the equivalent BN, respectively.
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The nodes of BN are connected in the same way as the cOlTesponding events in the fault
tree. In the numerical step, occurrence probabilities of the primary events are assigned to
the cOlTesponding root nodes as prior probabilities. For each intermediate node as well as
the leaf node, a CPT is assigned. CPTs illustrate how intermediate nodes are related to
precedent intermediate or root nodes (e.g., see Bobbio et aI., 2001).
6.2.3.2 Event Tree Mapping
Mapping from the event tree into the BN is mainly based on the work of Bearfield &
Marsh (2005). Each safety barrier of the event tree is represented by a safety node having
two states, one for the failure and the other for the success of the safety barrier. Also, a
consequence node having as many states as the number of the event tree consequences
(i.e., Ci in Figure 6.1) is added to the network.
When mapping event tree into BN, the safety node SBi is connected to the previous
safety node, SBi- 1 , only if the failure probability of SBi depends on whether SBi- 1 has
worked or failed. In other words, SBi must be connected to SBi- 1 only if
P(SBdSBi- 1 ) "* P(SBdSBi- 1 ). Similarly, the safety node SBi+1 must also be connected
to SBi- 1 if P(SBi+1ISBi-l>SB;) "* P(SBi+1ISBi-l>SBi). In addition, there must be a
connection between each safety node and the consequence node only if the probabilities
of the states of the consequence node are influenced by the failure or the success of that
safety node. After the BN is constructed, the probabilities of safety barriers are
considered as the prior probabilities of safety nodes, and a CPT is assigned to the
consequence node, as well as to the intermediate safety nodes. It is worth noting that
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while the CPT of the consequence node acts like a logical AND-gate, the CPTs assigned
to the safety nodes represent simple causal relationships, different from logical AND and
OR-gates frequently encountered in fault-tree based BNs.
6.2.3.3 Bow-tie Mapping
After the equivalent BNs of the fault tree and the event tree are developed, they are
connected to each other via the top event as a pivot node. The top event node is
connected to the consequence node, and also other states, e.g., Sq!"e state, is added to the
consequence node, taking into account the effect of the non-occurrence of the top event
on the consequence node. For example, consider the BT in Figure 6.2, in which a set of
primary events causes a gasoline release.
Figure 6.2. Bow-tie model for gasoline release accident scenario. For the sake of brevity, the fault tree
part is not completely illustrated
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Depending on the states of the ignition source, the gasoline release accident could result
in two consequences, i.e., a pool fire (Ignition = yes) or vapor cloud (Ignition = no).
However, when the corresponding BN is developed (Figure 6.3), another consequence
can also be resulted from the state combination of nodes Gasoline release and Ignition
(Table6.l).
Figure 6.3. BN model for gasoline release accident scenario
Table 6.1. Possible states of Consequence based on the state combination of Gasoline release and
Ignition
Gasoline release Ignition Consequence
Pool fire
Vapor cloud
So, unlike the BT, the node Consequence in the BN of Figure 6.3 has three states, namely
poolj/re, vapor cloud and safe. It is worth noting that as the sates of node Consequence
are influenced by node gasoline release, there should be a causal arc from the latter to the
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former. On the other hand, because the probability of ignition does not presumably
depend on whether there is a release or not, node gasoline release is not connected to
node Ignition. Generally, if P(SB;lTE) * P(SB;lTE), a causal arc must be directed from
the top event, TE, to the safety barrier SBi' Figure 6.4 illustrates the simplified mapping
algorithm of BT into BN.
Bow-tie Mapping BayesianNetwork
cJ
cJ
cJ
cJ
Figure 6.4. Mapping algorithm from bow-tie into BN.
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Although able to consider the dependency of sequential safety barriers, BT calmot
capture the dependency of safety barriers on the top event. This is because the top event
is simply an initiating event for the event tree, and cannot influence the failure or success
probability of safety barriers. On the other hand, BN accommodates such dependence by
means of causal arcs drawn from the top event to those safety barriers whose failure
probabilities depend on the occurrence and non-occurrence of the top event. For example,
according to the accident scenario described above, Gasoline release and Ignition would
be no longer independent if static electricity were generated due to the release (Crowl and
Louvar, 2002), increasing the ignition probability. Figure 6.5 shows a generic BN which
can be equivalent to the BT in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.5. Generic BN potentially equivalent to the bow-tie in Figure 6.1.
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6.3 Case Study: Vapor Ignition
To implement the previously described methodology, a vapor cloud ignition at Universal
Form Clamp, Inc., Bellwood, Illinois, U.S. on June 14,2006 was selected as the accident
scenario. According to the case study issued by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB,
2007), a flammable vapor cloud consisting of heptanes and mineral spirits overflowed
from an open top mixing and heating tank. The vapor cloud ignited as it met unknown
ignition sources, leading to one death, two injuries and significant business interruption.
The tank was equipped with steam coils supplying it with heat needed for the mixing
process. A temperature controller composed of a temperature sensor and a pneumatic
control unit was installed to operate the steam valves based on the mixture temperature.
In addition to the aforementioned control system, an operator was supposed to check the
temperature using an infrared thermometer and to take any necessary actions. The tank
was also equipped with local exhaust ventilation at the top to control vapors (Figure 6.6).
According to the full-scale investigation conducted by the Chemical Safety Board (CSB,
2007), a malfunction of the temperature control system allowed the steam valves to
remain open long enough to heat the mixture to its boiling point, generating a high
volume of vapor. Consequently, the failure of the local ventilation system due to a broken
fan belt caused the vapor cloud to spill from the tank and finally ignites when exposed to
an ignition source. It was also found that even if the ventilation system had been working,
it would not have had enough capacity to collect such a high volume of vapor.
III
Figure 6.6. Mixing tank and safety measures (CSB, 2007).
6.4 Methodology Application
6.4.1 Bow-tie Analysis
Following the accident description, a BT was developed to investigate the envisaged
accident scenarios and the effectiveness of the various safety measures (Figure 6.7). The
accident components, their symbols and failure probabilities (OREDA, 2002) are listed in
Table 6.2. Because the vapor cloud is non-toxic, it has been assumed that any fatalities or
injuries are due to vapor ignition, not the vapor itself.
It should be noted that the failure probabilities of safety barriers Sprinkler and Alarm are
influenced by either safety barrier Ignition or top event Vapor, showing the conditional
dependency of the former on the latter. Sprinkler and Alarm are activated if vapor is
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ignited, i.e. when Vapor= Overflow and Ignition= Spark, but with failure probabilities
equal to 0.04 and 0.0013, respectively. On the other hand, Alarm can also be stimulated
by a particular amount of vapor concentration in the air even if it is not ignited, i.e. when
Vapor= Overflow and Ignition= No spark, but with a failure probability equal 10 0.225.
C2
C3
C6
C7
Figure 6.7. BT model for the heat exchanger accident scenario (CSB, 2(07).
Table 6.2. Components of the bow-tie in Figure 6.7 and their probabilities
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Symbol
Failure
Probability
0.0400
Pneumatic unit P-unit 0.2015
Temperature control system T-ctrl-sys OR-gate
Operator Operator 0.0200
Infrared Thermometer 0.0468
Temperature measurement system T-sys OR-gate
Manual steam valve 0.0243
Automatic steam valve 0.0276
Automatic temperature control system OR-gate
Manual temperature control system MTCS OR-gate
High temperature proteclionsystem HTPS AND-gale
Inadequatevenlilation 0.0150
Fan failure 0.0100
Belt failure 0.0500
Duct plugging 0.0010
Ventilation system Vent-sys OR-gate
Vaporovertlow Vapor AND-gate
Ignition barrier Ignition
Water sprinkler system Sprinkler
Alarm system 0.0013,0.2250
Table 6.3 shows eight consequences that can be envisaged for the accident scenario
depending on the success or failure of the sequential safety barriers. It has been assumed
that even if there is no fire (i.e. 19nition= No spark), the operation of Sprinkler will lead
to a safer mode compared to its failure. This is because the operation of Sprinkler can
possibly reduce the probability of latter ignitions (delayed ignitions). Thus, consequences
C, and C2 are less severe than CJ and C4 , respectively.
Table 6.3. Consequences of the vaporovertlow accident scenario
Symbol
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Safe evacuation C,
Wet vapor cloud near the ground C2
Safe evacuation with possibility of delayed ignition C3
Vapor cloud with possibility of delayed ignition C4
Fire, moderate property damage, low death toll Cs
Fire, moderate property damage, high death toll C6
Fire, high property damage, low death toll C7
Fire, high propertydamage, high death toll Cs
Assigning the probabilities listed in Table 6.2 to the primary events and the safety
ban'iers of the ST, the probabilities of top event, and accident consequences are
calculated and presented in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4. Accident analysis results for BT and BN techniques
Symbol Probability
Vapor
C, O.OOE+OO
C2 O.OOE+OO
C3 I.04E-03
C4 3.03E-04
Cs 3.23E-04
C6
C7 1.35E-05
Cs 1.75E-08
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6.4.2 Bayesian Network Analysis
6.4.2.1 Accident Analysis
To verify the mapping procedure introduced in this study, a BN (Figure 6.8) was
developed from the BT in Figure 6.7, following the steps illustrated in Figure 6.4. All the
nodes of the BN have been previously described in the BT except the node COllSq, which
is the consequence node, added to accommodate the outcomes of the BT.
Figure 6.8. Corresponding BN of bow-tie in Figure 6.7.
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By connecting node Vapor to Consq, another state, namely Safe state, is added to the
state set including consequences C, to C8 to account for the non-OCCUlTence of the top
event, i.e. Vapor= COiltrolled. To show the dependency among the safety barriers and the
top event, causal arcs are also drawn from Ignition and Vapor to Sprinkler and Alann. As
an example, the CPT of Alarm is embedded in Figure 6.8. It is worth noting that since
various combinations of the failure and success of the sequential safety balTiers result in
different consequences in the BT, all the safety nodes of the BN are connected to node
Conscr Assigning the probabilities listed in Table 6.2 as the priors, the BN is analyzed
using HUGIN 7.4 (http://www.l1ll..in.com). resulting in the same probabilities as those
obtained from the BT (Table 6.4).
6.4.2.2 ProbabiLity Uptkzting
Once it is confirmed that the BT and BN are equally able to analyze the accident
scenario, the BN is used to update the probabilities by taking the evidence into account, a
task which BT is incapable of doing. Two types of probability updating can be performed
using BN, depending on the type of evidence propagated in the network.
The first type, commonly refelTed to as probability updating, calculates the posterior
probability of event Xi given a certain state of event Q, i.e. P(xdQ). It is usually
performed to find the most probable explanation (MPE) of event states leading to the
accident or a specific consequence (Bobbio et aI., 2001; Khakzad et aI., 2011).
In the cUlTent study, the state of node Consq was instantiated to C5 denoting that it is
known a fire with moderate property damage and low number of fatality is observed in
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the process plant. After the posterior probability of the other nodes due to this evidence,
i.e. P(xdConsq = C5 ), is calculated, the most probable explanation is determined to be
the failure of P-llnit, Thermo and Belt, causing the Vapor, which in turn results in Fire
(Cs), provided that Ignition = Spark, Sprinkler = Work and Alarm = Work. The
probability of MPE is 0.244.
6.4.2.3 Probability adapting
The second type of updating, refen·ed to as probability adapting, calculates the posterior
probability of event Xi given that event Q has been occurred n times, i.e. P(xdQ = n). [t
uses prior experience to perform probability updating, in which conditional probability
distributions are adapted using the cumulative information collected during a time
interval, e.g. one year, as evidence. Although this kind of evidence is widely used to
develop likelihood functions for probability updating using Bayes theorem (e.g. Meel &
Seider, 2006; Kalantarnia et aI., 2009; Rathnayaka et aI., 2011), it has not been
commonly used in accident scenario modeling and process safety assessment conducted
using the BN technique. [n the present study, the hypothetical prior experience obtained
during four years of process operation is used for illustrative purposes. Table 6.5 shows
the occurrence number of consequences in each year.
Table 6.5. Experience used to adapt the prior probabilities.
Consequence
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For example, updated probabilities using information at the end of the second year are
estimated using probabilities in the form of P(xdConsq = 4C3 and C5 ), showing the
posterior probability of event Xi given that CJ has cumulatively occurred four times
during the first two years, while C5 has occurred one time. Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show the
probability adapting results for primary events, top event, and safety barriers,
respectively, which have been cumulatively updated at the end of each year for four
sequential years. In these figures, year 0 denotes the priors.
0.6 -,----------------,
0.5
~Vapor
__ Pne-unit
Year
Figure 6.9. Updated probabilities of the primary events and the top event (Vapor).
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Figure 6.10. Updated probabilities of the safety barriers.
It is worth noting that the failure probabilities of the primary events and top event are
increasing while those of the safety barriers either remain constant or decrease. This can
be described using, for example, the data of year 4, i.e. the occurrence of consequences
C3 and C6. The occurrence of C3 implies that Ignition = No spark, Sprinkler = Fail, and
Alarm = Work, while the occurrence of C6 means that Ignition = Spark, Sprinkle = Work,
and Alarm = Fail. In other words, there are observations suggesting that each safety
barrier has been equally observed working or failing during the year. This is why the
failure probabilities of the safety barriers illustrate either a constant or declining trend
On the other hand, the occurrences of C3 and C6 demonstrate that the accident's top event
(i.e. vapor overflow) has occurred two times during the same year. Thus, the occurrence
number of the top event is always greater than or equal to the maximum failure numbers
of each safety barrier. Therefore, its occurrence probability increases rapidly. Also, the
information about the occurrence frequency of the top event propagates backwards
120
through the network, increasing the probability of the primary events. It can also be
implied from Figure 6.10 that although Ignition has the lowest failure probability among
the safety balTiers shown, its failure probability illustrates an approximately constant
trend, showing it has gained the lowest attention compared to the other two safety
barriers.
Using the updated top event and safety barriers, it is possible to dynamically update the
probability of those consequences for which no information is available. For example,
Figure 6. I I represents the updated probability of consequence Cs even though it is not
observed until the end of year 4 (Table 6.5).
1.00E-03 ,----,----,---.---------.---------,
1.00E-04
== 1.00E-05~£ 1.00E-06
1.00E-07
1.00E-08.L----------------'
o
Year
Figure 6.11. Updated probability ofCs over the course of4 years.
Figure 6.11 illustrates that during four years, the occurrence frequency of the most
damaging consequence, i.e. Cs, has increased by four orders of magnitude. Thus, if the
safety measures of the system are not improved, the occurrence of Cs can be expected in
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the near future. Probability adapting can be therefore effectively used as a predictive tool
to investigate the effectiveness and adequacy of a system's safety measures.
Through probability adapting and using sequentially observed accident precursors, the
generic prior probabilities which are assigned to the events at the design stage are
updated to more case-specific posterior probabilities. So, the generality arisen from using
the generic priors is gradually reduced by using the accident-derived data.
6.S Conclusion
The present study has illustrated that BN is an effective technique for dynamic safety
analysis of process systems. It also has been shown that by mapping BT into BN, the
BT's limitations (mainly resulting from its static constituents) can be relaxed. In addition,
conditional dependencies can be better illustrated in BN by means of direct causal arcs
among dependent variables. The paper has also used unique BN modeling aspects to
dynamically update probabilities, to gradually replace generic priors with more case-
specific posteriors, and to predict occurrence frequency of consequences as well as
accident components.
The current paper applied probability adapting, rather than probability updating, to
dynamically revise the prior probability of accident components; this is a new approach
for process system safety analysis. In probability updating, the information about a node
instantiated to one of its states is used as evidence; it is mainly used to determine the
most probable explanation leading to that particular state. On the other hand, in
probability adapting, the information about the cumulative number of times an accident
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has occurred during a time interval is used as evidence. This helps to dynamically assess
the system's safety and to predict the occurrence likelihood of consequences.
The present study has shown that probability adapting is more effective than probability
updating in dynamic safety analysis although it has not been considered in process safety
analysis as much as probability updating. Through probability adapting, the effect of
generic prior probabilities reduces as they are updated using the accident observations.
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Risk-based design of process systems using discrete-time Bayesian
network§
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Abstract
Temporal Bayesian networks have gained popularity as a robust technique to model
dynamic systems in which the components' sequential dependency, as well as their
functional dependency, cannot be ignored. In this regard, discrete-time Bayesian
networks have been proposed as a viable alternative to solve dynamic fault trees without
resort to Markov chains. This approach overcomes the drawbacks of Markov chains such
as the state-space explosion and the error-prone conversion procedure from dynamic fault
tree. It also benefits from the inherent advantages of Bayesian networks such as
probability updating. However, effective mapping of the dynamic gates of dynamic fault
! Khakzad et al. Journal of Reliability Engineering and System Safety.
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trees into Bayesian networks while avoiding the consequent huge multi-dimensional
probability tables has always been a matter of concern. ill this paper, a new general
formalism has been developed to model two important elements of dynamic fault tree,
i.e., cold spare gate and sequential enforcing gate, with any arbitrary probability
distribution functions. Also, an innovative Neutral Dependency algorithm has been
introduced to model dynamic gates such as priority-AND gate, thus reducing the
dimension of conditional probability tables by an order of magnitude. The second part of
the paper is devoted to the application of discrete-time Bayesian networks in the risk
assessment and safety analysis of complex process systems. It has been shown how
dynamic techniques can effectively be applied for optimal allocation of safety systems to
obtain maximum risk reduction.
Keywords: Discrete-time Bayesian network, Dynamic fault tree, Markov chain, Neutral
dependency, Safety analysis, Probabilistic risk assessment
7.1 Introduction
Among several techniques available to quantify the occurrence probability of accident
scenarios or to estimate the failure probability of systems in the context of quantitative
risk assessment, probabilistic safety analysis and reliability engineering, the fault tree
(Ff) method is the most recognized and widely used. Ff is a deductive, user-friendly
methodology constructed intuitively, dissecting the system for further detail until the
primary causes of the system's failure or unavailability are known. Ff could also be
analyzed using well-established algorithms such as binary decision diagrams or analytical
methods such as minimal cut sets. However, conventional or static fault trees (SFfs) are
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characterized by limitations constraining their application in complex systems where, for
instance, redundant failures, multi-state variables and/or sequential and functional
dependencies are common.
In recent years, Bayesian networks (BNs) have become popular for reliability and risk
analysis of complex systems as a robust and viable alternative to most conventional
methods such as reliability block diagrams (Torres-Toledano and Sucar, 1998), FT
(Bobbio et ai, 2001; Langseth and Portinale, 2007; Khakzad et aI., 2011) and event tree
(ET) analysis (Bearfield and Marsh, 2005). BN is a probabilistic method for reasoning
under uncertainty which factorizes the joint probability distribution of a set of variables
by considering local dependencies, significantly reducing both the system complexity and
the computational time (Bobbio et ai, 2001; Langseth and Portinale, 2007; Khakzad et aI.,
2011 ; Boudali and Dugan, 2005; weber et aI., 2010). Most recently, Weber et al. (2010)
have given a statistical review of BN application and shown the appeal of Bayesian
approaches in various areas of reliability, risk and maintenance engineering since 2000.
Many authors have shown the parallels between FT and BN and have examined the
extent to which the limitations of the former can be relaxed by relying on the later.
Bobbio et al. (2001) were the first to map FT into BN to incorporate multi-state variables
and common cause failures by means of the leaking noisy-or model. They also performed
a sequentially dependent failure analysis which was an example of functional
dependency, i.e., without considering the temporal sequence of failures (like the
performance of the functional dependency gate in dynamic fault trees). Similar efforts
have been made by Langseth and Portinale (2007) to account for coverage factors in
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redundant systems by means of the noisy-and model, and also by Khakzad et al. (2011) to
explicitly model functional uncertainty and expert opinion in the safety analysis of
process systems.
Dynamic fault tree (DFf) was introduced as an extension to SFf to model sequentially
dependent failures in dynamic systems Dugan et aI., 1992). In a dynamic system, the
failure sequence of events is as important as their combinations for the system to be
unavailable or to fail. In other words, compared to SFf in which it only matters which
components participate in a minimal cut set, in DFf the failure sequence of the
participating components is also important (Boudali and Dugan, 2005). DFf takes the
sequential dependencies into account by using several dynamic gates such as a functional
dependency gate (FDEP), cold spare gate (CSP), sequence enforcing gate (SEQ) (Dugan
et aI., 1992) and priority-AND gate (PAND) (Fussel et aI., 1976).
Due to the sequential dependencies and dynamic behavior among the components of the
system, DFf cannot be analyzed using conventional algorithms available for SFf. In this
regard, DFf has traditionally been converted to the corresponding Markov chain model
(MC) for which well-established and efficient solving techniques have been developed.
Nevertheless, converting DFf into MC is an error-prone and cumbersome exercise
(Dugan et aI., 1992). Moreover, the state space of the MC (i.e., the set of its nodes) grows
exponentially with the number of components of the corresponding DFf, making the MC
very large and intractable. Indeed, for a MC equivalent to a DFf with m binary-state
components (i.e., work/fail) for which k out of m components are sequentially dependent,
the number of states is proportional to the product of 2m (the number of state
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combinations) and k! (the possible number of sequence combinations) (Boudali and
Dugan, 2005). This problem is frequently encountered in Markov processes and is
referred to as the state space explosion. It should be noted that even a relatively simple
OFf can result in a complicated and time-consuming MC, particularly in the presence of
dynamic gates cascade (Boudali and Dugan, 2005; Dugan et aI., 1992; Marquez et aI.,
2010). Also, MC has been mentioned to have limitations in modeling dependencies
among components with non-exponential failure time distributions (Marquez, 2010).
As an example, consider a parallel system consisting of three pumps A, Band C of
different failure rates, in which B is planned to only operate as a standby to A. In other
words, not only all three pumps have to fail for the system to fail, but also A must fail
before B. Figure 7.1 illustrates the SFf (left), the OFf (middle) and the equivalent MC
(right) for the failure analysis of the system.
~tE¢ ~,-, ¢',
A B
Figure 7.1. 8FT (left), DFT (middle) and MC (right) models for a three-component parallel system in
which A must fail before B. The dashed parts in the MC are not accounted for in the system failure
due to the representation of improper failure sequences. Aisthe failure rate of components.
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As the SFf cannot capture sequential failures, it ignores the sequential dependence
between A and B, approximating the system failure using an AND gate. On the other
hand, the DFf employs a cascade of SEQ gate and AND gate to model the dynamic
behavior. The DFf is then conventionally converted to the MC to be solved. Assuming a
mission time of t == 100 hr and the failure rates 0.3E-03, 0.5E-OJ and 0.7E-03 for A, B
and C, respectively, the failure probability of the system is calculated as 9.76E-05 and
4.94E-05 using SFf and DFf (MC), respectively. This example demonstrates how the
failure probability and also the consequently envisaged risk in dynamic systems can be
overestimated (here by a factor of two) if dependency conditions are ignored or
simplified through using static techniques.
Considering the abovementioned problems encountered in converting DFf into MC,
temporal Bayesian networks (TBNs) have alternatively been proposed to explicitly
incorporate time in the modeling of sequential dependencies without resort to MC.
Accordingly, two different approaches have been adopted, namely: instant-based (time-
sliced) approach and interval-based (event-based) approach (Boudali and Dugan, 2006).
In the first approach, the time line is divided into a finite number of time instants (e.g.,
t i - v t i , t i+I ), and identical BN structures are generated for each time instant, connected
to each other by means of temporal arcs (e.g., Montani et aI., 2008; Portinale et aI.,
2010). In the second approach, the time line is partitioned into a finite number of time
intervals (e.g., lti-v til, lt i • ti+I]), and only one BN is generated, each node of which has
a finite number of states equal to the number of time intervals (Boudali and Dugan, 2005;
Marquez et aI., 2010; Boudali and Dugan, 2006). Figure 7.2 illustrates how a CSP gate is
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converted into interval-based and instant-based (here, a 2-time-slice) BN structures,
respectively.
!SP t t+l1~ ~A¢ B CSPA B B BA
CSPgate
Figure 7.2. Converting a CSP gate into interval-based (middle) and instant-based (right) BN
Following the instant-based approach, Montani et al. (2008) developed the RADYBAN
software tool for reliability analysis of dynamic systems by converting DFf into a 2-
time-slice BN. They also introduced the probability dependency gate (PDEP) as a
probabilistic case of FDEP proposed by Dugan et al. (Dugan et aI., 1992). Their work
was further developed by Portinale et al. (2010), enabling the modeling of repairable
systems by introducing the repair box gate. However, the instant-based approach has
been criticized for either being too general or resulting in unnecessarily large networks
due to repeating the same structure for each time instance (Boudali and Dugan, 2005).
Considering the interval-based approach, Boudali and Dugan (2005) suggested a discrete-
time BN (DTBN). Although being straightforward and consistent with the majority of
conventional inference algorithms, DTBN could potentially result in huge and intractable
conditional probability tables (CPTs) in particular for large number of time intervals
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(Marquez et aI., 2010; Boudali and Dugan, 2006). It is worth noting that the problem is
still much easier to manipulate than the state space explosion problem in Me. It also
requires numerical simulation for non-exponential distribution functions (Marquez et aI.,
2010). To address the foregoing issues, Boudali and Dugan (2006) presented a
continuous-time BN (CTBN) in which parametric functions were substituted for multi-
dimensional CPTs, resulting in lesser computational time and required memory capacity.
Recently, Marquez et al. (2010) developed a hybrid BN to incorporate both discrete and
continuous variables. They also used a dynamic time discretization as opposed to the
static time discretization employed by Boudali and Dougan (2005).
In accordance with the interval-based approach, this paper aims to extend the DTBN
methodology developed by Boudali and Dugan (2005) such that it could be applied to a
broader range of probabilistic distribution functions. In this regard, a new general
formalism is developed for the CSP gate for which input variables can have any arbitrary
(not necessarily exponential) failure distributions. The formalism is also applicable for
the SEQ gate as a special case of the CSP gate. The paper proceeds by introducing an
innovative algorithm, named Neutral Dependency, which reduces the dimension of multi-
dimensional CPTs by an order of magnitude. The paper shows how the algorithm could
efficiently be used to populate the CPTs of PAND gates and also static gates such as
AND and OR. In each step, the results are compared with those obtained from both
analytical methods such as MC and conventional methods in the literature.
In Section 7.2, after a brief review of the fundamentals of BN, the modeling framework
of DTBN is recapitulated. Section 7.3 presents the new approach developed in this study
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to model CSP gates and SEQ gates in DTBN. The approach is shown to not only
replicate the results in the literature but also be in better agreement with MC analysis.
Section 4 is dedicated to the introduction of the Neutral Dependency algorithm, where
this algorithm is efficiently used to reduce the dimension of CPTs. In Section 7.5, a
practical application of the method in the risk analysis of dynamic systems is presented
while the conclusions from this work are discussed in Section 7.6.
7.2 Bayesian network
7.2.1 An overview
BN is a directed acyclic graph for reasoning under uncertainty in which the nodes
represent variables and are connected by means of directed arcs. The arcs denote
dependencies or causal relationship between the linked nodes, and the conditional
probability tables assigned to the nodes determine how the linked nodes are dependent on
each other (Torres-Toledano and Sucar, 1998; Jensen and Nielsen, 2007).
Based on the conditional independency theorem and the chain rule, BN factorizes the
joint probability distribution of a set of random variables U = {A 10 Az, ... , An} by
considering local dependencies. In this regard, the joint probability distribution can be
decomposed as the product of the probabilities of the nodes given their immediate parents
(Jensen and Nielsen, 2007):
where P(U) is the joint probability distribution of variables and Pa(A;) is the parent set
ofYariableA;.
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The main application of BN in reliability and risk analysis was in probability updating
until it was also considered as a viable alternative to DFf for modeling the dynamic
behavior of dependent components. BN takes advantage of Bayes theorem to update the
probability of events given new observations, called evidence E, to yield the posterior
probability:
P(UIE) = p~~~~ = L:~':'~)
Using Equation 7.2, probability updating can be done for versatile types of E such as
knowing that the system has failed during the mission time T or the system has failed in
the time interval ]ti- v td (Section 7.2.3).
7.2.2 Discrete-time Bayesian network
As previously mentioned, DTBN was developed to account for the sequential
dependencies among components by explicit incorporation of time in the BN formalism.
In this regard, the time line ]0, +00] is divided into n+l intervals, partitioning the mission
time ]0, T] into n intervals and leaving the ]T, +oo[ as the last or (n+l)-th interval
(Boudali and Dugan, 2005). In this way, each node has a finite number n+l of states
equal to the number of time intervals (Figure 7.3).
nstates state n+l
r-----"---- ~
Figure 7.3. Time line intervals (Boudali and Dugan, 2006).
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In accordance with the terminology introduced in (Boudali and Dugan, 2005), if random
variable A is mentioned to be in state i (1 ~ i ~ n), or A = i, it simply means A has
failed in the i-fh interval or tA E ](i -1)~, i~]:
peA =i) = P((i-l)~ <fA ";i~) = (iJ~A(t)df = FA(i~)-FA((i-l)~)
where tA is the failure time of component A, FA is the cumulative distribution, ~ is the
interval length ~= ~, and n is the time granularity (Boudali and Dugan, 2005).
Similarly, if A is said to be in state n+l, this means A has survived the mission time T:
7.3 Dynamic gates: a new formalism
7.3.1 Cold spare gate
Spare gates are used to model subsystems with redundant components in which a failed
primary component is immediately replaced by its spares, one after another. Representing
a parallel subsystem, a spare gate does not fail unless all its components, i.e. primary and
spares, fail or are unavailable in case of shared spares (Dugan et aI., 1992). Although
being identical to the primary component, a spare component could have a different
failure rate from the primary as long as it is dormant (not recruited to function) (Montani
etal.,2008).
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With a CSP gate, the failure rate of a dormant spare is equal to zero, implying that it is
impossible for the spare to fail or degrade before or even at the same time as the primary
(Dugan et aI., 1992). Figure 7.4 shows a CSP gate and its equivalent structure in DTBN
(Boudali and Dugan, 2005).
Figure 7.4. CSP gate mapping into DTBN (Boudali and Dugan, 200S).
According to the formalism recapitulated in Section 7.2.2, CSP gates can be modeled by
allocating arbitrary marginal probability tables to primary A, and appropriate CPTs to
spare B and CSP gate. It should be noted that for the sake of simplicity, n= 2 is used (i.e.,
three time intervals) in this example and also in all the following sections.
Table 7.1 shows the marginal probability table of A, where Pi is calculated using
Equation 3 for i= 1,2 and P3 = 1- PI - Pz.
Table 7.1. Marginal probability tabte of node A (or B).
]O,Ll] ]Ll,T] ]T,oo[
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According to the definition of a CSP gate, spare B cannot fail before primary A,
justifying zero entries in Table 7.2; furthermore, entries of unity in the identity matrix
illustrated in Table 7.3 imply that the failures of CSP gate and spare B occur at the same
time.
Table7.2.ConditionalprobabilitytableofspareB.
]O,Ll] ]Ll,T] ]T,oo[
]O,Ll] a a
]Ll,T] P21
]T,oo[ PJ1
Table 7.3. Conditional probability tableofCSPgate.
]a,Ll] ]Ll,T] ]T,oo[
]O,Ll] l
]Ll,T] a
]T,oo[ a
The most important task in the simulation of a CSP gate in DTBN is to obtain an
analytical form for conditional probabilities Pij in Table 7.2, denoting the probability of
B failing in the i-th interval given that A has failed in thej-th interval, i.e.:
Since B cannot fail before thej-th interval, PCB = ilA = j) can be simply approximated
to PCB = ilB > j), resulting in:
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P(B = i IA = j) = P(B = i IB > j) P(B = i nB > j)
P(B>j)
f:«::~ ifi> j1 0 otherwise
If the calculation proceeds for i > j:
J:B(t)dt
]fB(t)dt
FBUi1)-FB((i-I)i1)
I-FB (ji1)
It is worth noting that Equation 7.7 has a closed-form solution for a majority of
probability density functions. For instance, it could be customized by assuming an
exponential density function for B:
lie-Mdt
P(B=iIA=j)=~=e-AL1(i-j)(eAL1-1)
Jk-Mdt
7.8
It should be noted that Equation 7.8 can be further simplified for infinitesimal values of
At1 (because limALI-+O(e ALI -1) = ALl) to yield the equation suggested in [6] in which the
failure rates of both A and B are included, showing the generality of Equation 7.8 as
opposed to that proposed in (Boudali and Dugan, 2005). Equation 7.8 can be manipulated
by solving the denominator integral to obtain another form of solution for the exponential
density function:
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l~.e-.lJdt ill.
P(B =ilA = j) = (i-IJ;_Aill. =(i_~:e-A(t-jll.)dt=
FB (iL'1- jL'1)-FB ((i-I)L'1- jL'1)
7.9
Equation 7.9 is identical to that proposed by Boudali & Dugan (2005) for a CSP gate,
showing that the new formalism developed in this study replicates the previous results in
the literature, i.e., (Boudali and Dugan, 2005). Figure 7.5 explains the time shiftj.1 in the
probability distribution of B in Equation 7.9; because B cannot fail before A, its
distribution is shifted to the right by an amount equal to the failure time of A, i.e., j.1.
[(I) Ii~
Figure 7.5. Shifted probability distribution of spare B.
To validate the formalism developed in Equation 7.7, its exponential form presented by
Equation 7.8 is compared to MC analysis. Figure 7.6 shows a general MC which can be
used to analyze different types of spare gates and also a SEQ gate (in Section 7.3.2).
In Figure 7.6, in the case of CSP gate analysis, is = 0 and AA = As = A. Due to is = 0,
State 3 in Figure 7.6 would not exist in practice.
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Figure 7.6. General Markov chain for CSP and SEQ gates.
According to Figure 7.6, the failure probability of the system (i.e., the probability of State
4) is P4 = 1- e-U - Ate-At. The result of this study, i.e. Equation 7.8, Boudali and
Dugan [6] and MC are compared in Table 7.4 for T = 10 hrs, tJ.= 2 hrs and different
failure rates.
Table 7.4. Comparison of results for CSP gate.
A.(hr-' ) Ref. [6]
2.03£-01
3.73£-03
£quation7.8
2.25£-01 2.64£-01
4.97£-05
As seen in Table 7.4, the results of the current study are in better agreement with those of
MC analysis, showing that Equation 7.8 (or Equation 7.7 in general) is at least as reliable
as the equation developed in Boudali and Dugan (2005).
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7.3.2 Sequence enforcing gate
The sequential enforcing gate (SEQ) is used to model events that have to fail in a strictly
predefined sequential order. Similar to the esp gate, the inputs of a SEQ gate are
recruited to function one after another in the left-to-right order (Dugan et aI., 1992).
However, unlike a esp gate, the inputs do not need to be identical nor have the same
failure rates. So, a SEQ gate can be considered as a esp gate that could accept any basic
or subsystem event as input (Montani et aI., 2008).
Figure 7.7 shows a SEQ gate and its corresponding structure in DTBN. Since Equation
7.8 does not depend on the failure rate of the primary component (A in Figures 7.3 and
7.6), it could be used to model either a esp gate where As = AA or a SEQ gate where
..1.8 iCA.A •
Figure 7.7. SEQ gate mapping into DTBN. Either A or B could be different basic events or
subsystems.
To verify whether Equation 7.8 could be effectively used to approximate a SEQ gate, its
results and those of Me are compared in Table 7.5 for AA = 0.05, As = 0.1,0.01,0.001,
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T = 10 hrs and tJ.= 2 hrs, 1 hr. It should be noted that the results of MC in Table 7.5
are obtained using Figure 7.6 for i B = 0 but A.A *" lB, resulting in the system failure
Table 7.5. Comparison of results for SEQ gate.
A.8 (hr-') tJ.=2hr tJ.= Ihr MC
0.1 1.30E-01 1.43E-01 1.55E-01
0.01 1.67E-02 1.87E-02 2.06E-02
0.001 1.73E-03 1.93E-03 2.12E-03
According to Table 7.5, it is evident that Equation 7.8 can also be used to model a SEQ
gate in DTBN. On the other hand, if the relationship proposed in Boudali and Dugan
(2005) for CSP is modified to model a SEQ gate by considering different failure rates for
A and B, it results in an expression for Pij which is always negative no matter what
values are chosen for distribution parameters such as A.A' lB. and tJ. (Appendix 1).
7.4 Neutral dependency
As mentioned earlier, DTBN has been criticized for potentially having enormous multi-
dimensional CPTs Marquez et aI., 2010; Boudali and Dugan, 2006). Modeling techniques
such as parent divorcing (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007) have widely been used in
conventional BN to reduce the size of probability tables by dividing the parent set of a
node into subsets. However, the probability table of a node (gate) in DTBN can become
intractable even with a small set of parents (inputs).
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This section aims to develop an innovative algorithm, Neutral Dependency, to reduce the
size of multi-dimensional CPTs in DTBN, increasing their efficiency and decreasing the
computational time.
7.4.1 Priority-AND gate
7.4.1.1 Conventional approach
Priority-AND (Fussell et aI., 1976), commonly known as a PAND gate, is another
dynamic gate frequently used to model the interaction between dependant components in
complex systems (Boudali and Dugan, 2005; Marquez et aI., 2010). Similar to the
previously discussed dynamic gates, a PAND gate fails when all its inputs fail but only in
the left-to-rightorder.
Unlike a SEQ gate which forces its inputs to fail exclusively in a pre-assigned order, a
PAND gate allows its inputs to fail in any arbitrary sequence whereas it gives priority to
that failure sequence in which the primary input (leftmost) fails before or at the same
time as the secondary input(s) (Dugan et aI., 1992; Montani et aI., 2008).
Figure 7.8 depicts a PAND gate and its equivalent structure in DTBN for which the CPT
in Table 7.6 is developed. It should be noted that entries of unity in the table imply that
the gate fails only if secondary B fails after or at the same time as primary A.
145
Figure 7.8. Mapping PAND gate into DTBN.
Table 7.6. Conventional CPT for PAND gate.
]O,Ll] ]Ll,T] ]T,oo[
]O,Ll] ]Ll,T] ]T,oo[ ]O,Ll] ]Ll,T] ]T,oo[ ]O,Ll] ]Ll,T] ]T,oo[
]O,Ll] I 0 0 °
]Ll,T] ° 0
]T,oo[ °
Since in the numerical simulation of dynamic systems the CPTs tend to be taken into
account as matrices, such sparse matrices as the one illustrated in Table 7.6 could
adversely affect the computational time and modeling efficiency. The problem could
worsen as the size of the matrix grows exponentially due to larger time granularities.
7.4.1.2 Neutral dependency approach
To avoid sparse matrices, the structure of a PAND node is modified to decrease the
number of its parents from two to one, reducing the dimension of the CPT by an order of
magnitude (Figure 7.9).
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~¢M
Figure 7.9. Modified PAND gate structure in DTBN.
By changing the gate structure, it is assumed that on the one hand, similar to a CSP or
SEQ gate, a PAND gate fails when B fails, resulting in an identity matrix of size (n + 1)
for the PAND gate (Table 7.7). And, on the other hand, B is made apparently dependent
on A (though it really is not), resulting in a lower triangular matrix of size (n + 1) for B
(Table 7.8). However, by assigning P(BIA) = PCB) in the corresponding CPT shown in
Table 7.8, this apparent dependency is neutralized (Appendix 2).
Table 7.7. CPT for PAND gate which is only dependent on B.
]O,Ll] ]Ll,T] ]T,oo[
]O,Ll] I ° °
]Ll,T] ° °
]T,oo[ 0
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Table 7.8. CPT for apparent (but neutralized) dependency of Bon A.
jO,Llj jLl,Tj jT,oo[
jO,Llj P(B=I)
°jLl,Tj P(B=2) P(B=2)
jT,oo[ P(B=3) P(B=3)+P(B=I) P(B=3)+P(B=2)+P(B= I)
As can be seen, the sparse matrix used in the conventional approach (Table 7.6) with
(n + 1)3 entries is successfully decomposed into an identity matrix (Table 7.7) and a
lower triangular matrix (Table 7.8), both of which have (n + 1)2 entries, offering CPTs
an order of magnitude smaller in dimension.
It is worth noting that Table 7.8 could be populated using:
P(B=il A =j) =1 ~(BO=i) ~
1-~P(B=k) if
i~j
i< j
i=n+l
7.10
To verify the Neutral Dependency algorithm, the results are compared with the
corresponding MC in Figure 7.10, for which State 5 is considered as the PAND gate
failure. It should be noted that although both states 4 and 5 could be considered as the
system failure (i.e., both A and B failed), the later state is given priority over the former
due to the failure sequence of its components (A fails before B).
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Figure 7.10. Markov Chain of PAND gate.
According to the MC in Figure 7.10, the failure probability of a PAND gate (or the
failure probability of State 5) is Ps = _e-A8t + AAA:A8 (e-(AA+A8)t + 1). Table 7.9
compares the results obtained from Equation 7.10 and MC for AA = 0.05, T = 10 hrs,
and LI = 1 hr, and different values of AB' Results are in a good agreement, showing that
the Neutral Dependency technique can be successfully applied to model a PAND gate in
DTBN.
Table 7.9. Comparison of MC and the current study for PAND gate.
This study
0.1 I. 14E-0 1
0.01 2.00E-02 2.18E-02
2.IIE-03
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7.4.2 Static gates
Since it is possible to employ conventional OR gates and AND gates along with dynamic
gates to model a complex system, these static gates also need to be modeled as discrete-
time gates to conform with the rest of DTBN. Similar to the conventional PAND gate
(section 7.4.1.1), CPTs of the foregoing static gates could potentially become very large.
In this regard, the Neutral Dependency technique (Figure 7.11) can also be applied to
reduce the size of multi-dimensional CPTs.
!RIAND ¢A B
Figure 7.11. AND/OR gate corresponding structure in DTBN using Neutral Dependency.
In this regard, the CPT of an ORlAND gate, which is only dependent on B, is the same as
Table 7.7 while the values of the CPT of B are calculated using Equation 7.11 (as shown
in Table 7.10) and Equation 7.12 (as shown in Table 7.11) for an OR gate and AND gate,
respectively.
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CPT of B in an OR gate:
1
,,+1 0 if i> j
P(B=iIA=j)= '?;P(B=k) if i=j
P(B=i) if i<j
Table 7.10. CPT ofB for an OR gate structure populated using Equation 7.11.
]O,il]
]il,T]
]T,oo]
]O,il]
P(B= I )+P(B=2)+P(B=3)
°
]il,T] ]T,oo]
P(B=I) P(B=I)
P(B=2)+P(B=3) P(B=2)
° P(B=3)
CPT of B in an AND gate:
j P(B=i) ifP(B=iIA=j)= ~P(OB=k) if
if
i> j
i=j
i< j
Table 7.11. CPT of B for an AND gate structure populated using Equation 7.12.
]O,il]
]il,T]
]T,oo]
]O,il]
P(B=I)
P(B=2)
P(B=3)
]il,T] ]T,oo]
° °
P(B=I)+P(B=2) °
P(B=3) P(B=I)+P(B=2)+P(B=3)
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7.5 Application: risk-based design
Safety system modeling is an integral part of risk assessment studies. In this regard,
safety systems planned to avoid, prevent, limit or control accidents are evaluated to
examine the extent to which they are effective in reducing the risk of the accident to an
acceptable level.
In the past, the effectiveness of safety systems has been studied using static methods such
as bow-tie approach (Delvosalle et aI., 2006), barrier block diagram Aven et aI., 2006)
and safety-barrier diagram (Duijm, 2009). These methods, however'lare not appropriate
for the safety analysis of dynamic systems. For example, in the M1RAS methodology
(Delvosalle et ai, 2006), aimed at investigating the influence of safety systems on the
occurrence probability of accidents, preventive and mitigative safety barriers are placed
upstream and downstream of events, respectively, without considering sequential
dependencies. Also, the optimal placement of safety systems in accident prevention and
mitigation has not been focused, causing unnecessary complexity and cost for the system
studied.
This section aims to illustrate how DTBN could be used to optimally allocate safety
systems through a risk-based approach. This allocation for dynamic systems would result
in the maximum risk reduction and a cost-effective safety management.
7.5.1 Case study: heat exchanger explosion
To implement the methodology, a heat exchanger explosion at the Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company plant in Houston, Texas, U.S. in 2008 was selected as the accident
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scenario (CSB, 201l). Ammonia liquid was used as a coolant in the heat exchanger to
control the temperature of the process. Due to absorbing heat, ammonia liquid transforms
into ammonia vapor, leaving the heat exchanger in a cooling system through a pipeline
equipped by a pressure control valve (CV) and three block valves (BVj). The block
valves are aimed at isolating CV in the case of maintenance. A schematic of the heat
exchanger adapted from (CSB, 2011) is depicted in Figure 7.12.
Arnrrr:mlavaporlO the almosphere
Ammoniavapo<tocooling
system
Figure 7.12. Schematic of the heat exchanger in the Goodyear accident (CSB, 2011)].
CV was designed to maintain ammonia pressure at 150 psig. A rupture disk (RD) and a
relief valve (RV) were also devised to relieve ammonia vapor to the atmosphere in the
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case of overpressure (i.e., above 300 psig). Further, an isolation valve (ISV) was included
to separate RD and RV from the heat exchanger in the case of maintenance.
Based on a full-scale investigation conducted by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (201l),
ISV and BVs were closed for the maintenance of RD and the cleaning of the heat
exchanger, respectively. So, the heat exchanger was isolated from its pressure protection
(i.e., CV) and pressure relief (i.e., RD and RV) equipment when an overpressure gave
rise to an explosion. One worker was killed because of the explosion, and six others
injured due to the exposure to ammonia. According to the recommendations of the ASME
code for pressure vessels (ASME, 2004), the accident could have been prevented if a
worker would have continuously monitored the heat exchanger and manually released the
pressure.
Considering "manual release of the pressure" as the safety function, two safety scenarios
were examined to find the optimal allocation of safety systems:
Scenario 1: the worker opens BV) as the heat exchanger pressure rises above 150 psig,
implying that pressure control package PCP (including BV), CV and BV2) does not work
properly, i.e., either BV) or BV2 is plugged (or closed), or CV does not work.
Scenario 2: the worker does not open BV) until the pressure rises above 300 psig,
inferring that pressure relief package PRP (including ISV, RD and RV) also does not
work properly, i.e., ISV is plugged (or closed), or either RD or RV fails to work.
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7.5.2 Accident modeling
7.5.2.1 Fault tree analysis
Ignoring the dynamic characteristics of the system, the logical model of the heat
exchanger explosion is illustrated in Figure 7.13 using a SFf (leftmost) showing only the
functional dependencies among the components. However, to model sequential
dependencies, the SFf is modified to the DFf (Figure 7.13, rightmost) based on the
assumptions below:
CY and RY are designed to operate at 150 and 300 psig, respectively, implying that PCP
is more likely to fail before PRP. This sequential failure is taken into account by
replacing the corresponding AND gate (shown as AND (1) in Figure 7.13) with a PAND
gate.
BY) is located in parallel with BY 1, CY, and BY2. Also, it is not supposed to be opened
unless either BY 1 or BY2 cannot pass ammonia vapor or CY fails to operate at 150 psig
(scenario 1). BY) thus acts like a spare component for PCP, called on demand only if
PCP fails to work properly. This dynamic behavior is modeled by replacing the
corresponding AND gate (shown as AND (2) in Figure 7.13) with a SEQ gate. However,
if BY) and PCP were of the same type and had identical failure rates, a CSP gate would
be used instead of a SEQ gate.
For the sake of clarity, the static gates and their dynamic substitutes are highlighted in
Figure 7.13.
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Dynamic Fault Tree
Figure 7.13. 8FT and DFT of the heat exchanger explosion (safety scenario 1). For the sake of
brevity, only the modified part of the DFT is illustrated.
As mentioned earlier, if the DFf is converted to a MC to be solved, the MC could
potentially have i I x 7! states, making it computationally very costly to solve unless
simplifying assumptions are used.
7.5.2.2 Bayesian analysis
To solve the DFf shown in Figure 13 and also to conduct probability updating using
different observations, the DFf is converted to the corresponding DTBN structure in
Figure 7.14, considering a mission time T = 10 hrs and a time interval L1 = 1 hr. [t
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should be noted that, using the parent divorcing technique (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007), the
dimensions of CPTs of OPG, PCP and PRP (all three originally had more than two
parents) are decreased by introducing the auxiliary nodes EEH-FY2, BYI-CY and ISY-
RY in Figure 7.14, respectively.
Figure 7.14. BN of the explosion in the heat exchanger.
Then, using HUGIN software 7.4 and the probabilities of the basic components presented
in Table 7.12, the occurrence probability of the explosion is calculated as P(EXP) =
4.83E-ll. It is worth noting that modeling the accident using the SFf would result in
P(EXP) =2.93E-1O, different from dynamic modeling by an order of magnitude.
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Event
Table 7.12. Failure probabilities of the events of DFT in Figure 7.13.
Symbol Description
Explosion
Overpressure Generation
Internal Excessive Heat
EXP Top event
OPG Intermediate event
IEH
Feed Valve for Chemical FYI Failure of valve to regulate the inflow afhot chemical 2.06
Ammonia Vapor Failure of cooling system to condensate ammonia vapor 2.19
Feed Valve for Ammonia FY2 Failure of valve to regulate the inflow of ammonia liquid 2.06
External Excessive Heat
Overpressure Protection
Jet fire, radiation, steam, other
Intermediate event
Pressure Control Package PCP Failure to control the pressure
CV Failure of check valve to operate at l50psig 0.28
BV t ,2 Failure of valve due to plugging, choking, structural flaw 0.59
Block Valve BV] Failure of valve to open on demand 3,98
Pressure Relief Package
Isolation Valve
Rupture Disk
Relief Valve
Failure to release the pressure
ISV Failure of valve due to plugging, choking, structural flaw
Failure of rupture disk to burst
Failure of relief valve to operate at 300psig
0.59
3.3
2.59
To investigate the effect of scenario 2 on the accident probability which in tum affects
the envisaged risk of the accident, the Off is slightly modified such that BY] acts as a
spare to PRP. In other words, BY] is connected to PRP using a SEQ gate (Figure 7.15).
By converting the modified Off into the corresponding OTBN, the probability of the
explosion is calculated as P(EXP) =9.67E-ll, implying a 100% increase in the envisaged
risk as opposed to scenario 1. As can be seen, the safety function "manual release of the
pressure" is more effectively implemented by opening BY] as the safety system in the
case of PCP malfunction (scenario 1) rather than PRP failure (scenario 2).
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Figure 7.15. Modified DFT in which BV3 is opened if PRP fails to release the pressure. The parts
which are not drawn are the same as Figure 7.13.
7.5.2.3 Probability updating
One of the valuable advantages of DTBN over conventional methods such as MC in
solving dynamic systems is its ability to perform probability updating (or diagnosis
analysis) given new observations. The prior probability of events are updated given a
specific state of the top event and also the most likely configuration (MLC) of events,
leading to the top event, are determined (Bobbio et aI., 2001; Khakzad et aI., 2001;
Boudali and Dugan, 2005). In this way, the most critical events are identified, and
preventive safety measures are consequently designed. In the present study, probability
updating is performed for two different types of observation:
Type 1: the accident has occurred during the mission time, i.e., t E ]0, T].
Type 2: the accident has occurred at the i-th time interval, i.e., t E ]ti- v td.
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Regarding the observation of type 1, the posterior probability of the components are
calculated by inserting the evidence P(EXP = n + 1) = 0 in the analysis, showing EXP
has occurred during the mission time without knowing the exact time interval. The
updated probabilities due to this observation, i.e., P(EXP = 11) = 0 are calculated and
compared with the prior ones. The updated probability distributions of BV), BV3, and
RD are illustrated in Figure 7.16 (the middle row). Also, MLC of the basic components is
the failure of AV, BV" and BV2 in the first interval, the failure of RD and BV) in the
second interval and the non-failure of the other basic components with P(MLC) =
3.48E - 05.
Concerning the observation of type 2, the probability of EXP being in the ith time
interval is set to one, i.e., P(EXP = i) = 1, and propagated in the network to yield the
posterior probabilities. Assuming i = 8, the posterior probability distributions of BV),
BV3, and RD are again illustrated in Figure 7.16 (the lower row). Likewise, the
probability of MLC is calculated as P(MLC) = 2.046E - 04, including the failure of
AV in the eighth interval, the failure of BV) and BV2 in the first interval, the failure of
RD and BV) in the second interval and the non-failure of the other basic components.
According to Figure 7.16, BV, has the highest updated failure probability in the first
interval no matter which type of observation is used, implying BV, (and also BV2) is the
most unreliable component. So, proper and immediate safety measures should be
allocated for this component during the early hours of operation. The criticality of BV I
(and BV2) is further acknowledged as it appears in both MLCs, failing in the same time
interval, i.e., the first interval.
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Figure 7.16 shows that BV3 is most likely to fail in the sixth and eighth intervals due to
observations type 1 and 2, respectively. On the contrary, both MLCs demonstrate that the
most probable failure interval for BV3 is the second interval. This difference occurs
because in the MLC analysis, BN searches over the state space of each component to
identify the weakest links while considering the other components' states [4]. So, it is
concluded that MLC provides the analyst with more reliable and holistic results by
considering the whole system.
~:::~..~::: ..
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Figure 7.16. A comparison between prior (the upper row) and posterior probability distributions
(type 1 in the 2nd row and type 2 in the 3rd row) of BV h BVJ and RD.
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7.6 Conclusion
The present study has improved the power of DTBN in dependability analysis of
dynamic complex systems. In this regard, a new approach has been proposed for dynamic
gates such as a CSP gate, which does not necessitate the use of exponential distribution
functions for input variables. The approach was also shown to be successful in SEQ gate
modeling. A comparison between this study and the existing techniques in the literature
demonstrates that the present study not only replicates the results of the previous works,
but it also is in better agreement with analytical techniques such as MC.
Further, a new algorithm called Neutral Dependency was introduced to model dynamic
gates such as a PAND gate and static gates such as an AND/OR gate. Using this
algorithm, the conditional probability table of a gate is decomposed into two tables, both
of which are smaller in size than the original table (usually by an order of magnitude).
This way, the problem of large and intractable multi-dimensional tables for which DTBN
has been criticized is addressed.
This paper has also shown the application of the proposed approach in the risk
assessment and safety analysis of process systems. It has been demonstrated that DTBN
can be used as a safety evaluation tool to optimally allocate safety systems in process
facilities. DTBN can be employed in the design phase of process systems to identify the
best arrangement of safety systems to reduce the envisaged risk. It could also be used as
an inductive tool to analyze system failure in light of new observations.
It may be concluded that using temporal BN in the risk analysis of dependable systems
not only avoids problems such as the state-space explosion and the error-prone
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conversion procedure which are common in MC analysis, but also enables the analyst to
perform probability updating. It is of great importance in the real-time design,
monitoring, and evaluation of safety systems. This is not feasible with continuous-time
approaches such as MC. DTBN is relatively simple to construct and can be solved using
standard inference algorithms provided in most Bayesian software. It also offers the
analyst the opportunity to obtain failure probability distributions rather than single values
for the whole time mission.
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Appendix I
Boudali and Dugan (2005) have introduced the following formalism to calculate Pij
values (in their work Pyx) in Table 2:
P(B=yjA=x)
x6 y.6.
(xJ" (yJ~ -'/(b-,,) k -k, da db
(.1~-Auda
7.13
All 'Sk-AiJdb
~=Alle.lX"e-'/Y"
(xJ~-Auda
in which AA = Aa = A.
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However, if Equation 7.13 is modified to be used for a SEQ gate by considering different
failure rates of A and B, it results in Equation 7.14 which is always negative no matter
what numerical values are used for its parameters, i.e., AA,AB' and L1:
P(B= YIA=x)
x6 )'6
f fABe-A8(b-a)AAe-AAadbda
(x-I)II(y-I)lI
(xJ)~Ae-AAada
~eA811-1(1_e(A8-AA)II)e-A8(Y-X)1I
AB-AA eAAII_I
Appendix 2
To obtain the entries of Table 7.8, the joint probability distributions of both the
conventional structure of Figure 7.8 and the modified structure of Figure 7.9 are
expanded, and the latter is forced to replicate the results of the former.
According to Figure 7.8, the probability of a PAND gate being in the i-th interval could
be obtained by marginalizing the joint probability distribution with respect to A and B as
follows:
P(PAND = i) =£; P(A)P(B)P(PAND =i IA, B)
In fact, Table 6 determines whether or not P(A)P(B) in Equation 7.15 participates in the
calculation of P(PAND = i), for P(PAND = iIA,B) equal to one or zero, respectively.
So, P(PAND = i) for different time intervals is as follows:
P(PAND =1) =P(A = l)P(B =1)
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P(PAND =2) =peA = l)P(B =2) + peA =2)P(B =2)
P(PAND =3) =peA =I)P(B =3) + peA =2)P(B =3) +
~A=~~B=~+~A=~~B=D+~A=~~B=D+
peA =3)P(B =2)
7.15.2
According to Figure 7.9, the same marginalization as Figure 7.8 can be done but with a
different joint distribution to find P(PAND = i):
P(PAND =i) =f; P(A)P(B IA)P(PAND =i IB)
7.16
Similar to Table 7.6, Table 7.7 determines whether or not P(A)P(BIA) in Equation 7.l6
participales in the calculation of P(PAND = i), for P(PAND = ilB) equal to one or
zero, respectively. So, P(PAND = i) for different time intervals is as follows:
P(PAND =1) =peA = l)P(B =11 A =I)P(PAND =11 B =l)
According to Table 7.7, P(PAND = liB = 1), and if PCB = llA = 1) in Table 7.8 is
replaced by PCB = 1) for the sake of neutral dependency, Equation 7.16.1 is thus
simplified to Equation 7.15.1.
P(PAND=2)=
peA = l)P(B =21 A =I)P(PAND =21 B =2) +
peA =2)P(B =21 A =2)P(PAND =21 B =2)
According to Table 7.7, P(PAND = 21B = 2) = 1, and if PCB = 21A = 1) and
PCB = 21A = 2)in Table 7.8 are replaced by PCB = 2), each, Equation 7.16.2 is
consequently simplified to Equation 7.15.2.
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P(PAND=3)=
peA = I)P(B =31 A= I)P(PAND =31 B=3)+
peA = 2)P(B =31 A=2)P(PAND = 31 B =3)+
peA =3)P(B = 31 A =3)P(PAND =31 B =3)+
peA =2)P(B =11 A=2)P(PAND =31 B = 1)+
peA =3)P(B =11 A=3)P(PAND =31 B =1)+
P(A=3)P(B = 21 A=3)P(PAND =31 B =2) 7.16.3
According to Table 7.7, P(PAND = 31B = 3) = 1, and if each of P(B = 31A = 1),
P(B = 31A = 2), and P(B = 31A = 3)in Table 7.8 are replaced by P(B = 3), the first
three sentences on the right hand side of Equation 7.16.3 become equal to the first three
sentences on the right hand side of Equation 7.15.3.
The last three sentences on the right hand side of Equation 7.16.3 are equal to zero (see
Table 7.7) unless P(PAND = 31B = 1) in the fourth and fifth sentences and also
P(PAND = 31B = 2) in the sixth sentence are replaced by (PAND = 31B = 3).
Finally if, according to Neutral Dependency, P(B = 11A = 2) and P(B = 11A = 3) are
replaced by P(B = 1), and P(B = 21A = 3) is replaced with P(B = 2) in Table 7.8, the
last three sentences of Equation 7.16.3 become equal to the last three sentences of
Equation 7.15.3. These terms appear in boldface in Table 7.8 for ease of viewing.
It should be noted that replacing P(PAND = 31B = 1) and P(PAND = 31B = 2) with
P(PAND = 31B = 3) does not really change P(PAND = 3). Indeed, this replacement
only helps the last three sentences remain in the calculation process by transferring them
to the last row of Table 8, where they can be accounted for P(PAND = 3).
Alternatively, one can avoid the foregoing procedure of obtaining P(PAND = 3) by
recognizing that the summation of probabilities in each column of a CPT must be equal
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to one. So, after the conditional probabilities of the first and second rows of Table 7.8 are
determined using Equation 7.16.1 and 7.16.2, respectively, the conditional probabilities
of the third row (the last one) could simply be achieved.
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Risk Analysis of Deepwater Drilling Blowouts: A Bayesian
Approach--
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Abstract
Blowouts are amongst the most undesired and feared accident as the ultimate result of the
loss of well control. The dynamic nature of blowout accidents, resulting from both
dynamic physical parameters and dynamic barriers, necessitates techniques capable of
considering changes and being updated as new observations are made during the lifetime
of a well. The present work is aimed at showing the application of bow-tie method and
Bayesian network to the risk analysis of deepwater drilling blowouts. Considering the
former method, fault trees and an event tree are developed for the kick, kick detection
and the blowout prevention, respectively, and then combined to build a bow-tie model. In
the latter method, the fault trees and the event tree are mapped into respective Bayesian
"KhakzadetaI.SafetyScience2012.
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networks and finally an object-oriented Bayesian network is constructed by connecting
individual Bayesian networks. The Bayesian network method is taken priority over the
bow-tie model since not only it can consider common cause failures and conditional
dependencies but it also makes it possible to perform probability updating and sequential
learning using near misses and incidents as accident precursors.
Keywords: Risk analysis, Deepwater drilling, Kick, Blowout, Bow-tie approach, Object-
oriented Bayesian network, Sequentialleaming
8.1 Introduction
Risk analysis is very important for offshore activities since given an accident the rescue
and evacuation actions are usually performed with difficulty due to the harsh
environment and remoteness. The compact cluster of equipment and staffs on a relatively
small area, e.g. drill ships and offshore installations, also makes any accident give rise to
far more severe consequences than for onshore plants. In offshore industry, drilling
accidents are reportedly more frequent than the others. Regarding drilling accidents,
blowouts, though rare, are presumably the most feared and violent accidents significantly
threatening human lives, environment and material assets (Holland, 1997).
Generally, blowout is an uncontrolled flow of hydrocarbons (gas, condensate, or even
saltwater) from a well to the surrounding environment whether the atmosphere (surface
blowout) or other exposed formations (underground blowout) as the ultimate
consequence of kick. Kick is an unwanted influx of formation fluids into the wellbore as
a result of loss of well control (LWC), in which the pressure of formation fluids, i.e. pore
pressure (Pp ), exceeds the pressure exerted by the column of drilling fluid on the bottom
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of the wellbore, i.e. bottom hole pressure (RHP). A kick can finally end up with a
blowout if not timely detected and properly prevented. Well control measures whether
technical, managerial or organizational are aimed at maintaining the well integrity and
reducing the risk of Lwe through kick prevention, kick detection, blowout prevention
and kill operations (Figure 8.1).
Figure 8.1. Schematic of well control procedure.
Figure 8. L shows the sequential steps followed to maintain the well integrity. The first
three steps are related to the loss of well control while the last one is related to the regain
of well control and is performed only if a blowout can be prevented. Recently, a complex
series of human errors and mechanical failures resulted in a Lwe in Macondo Well on
April 20, 2010, which finally led to a blowout, leaving totally 28 deaths and injuries and
a significant amount of hydrocarbon spill. The fire and explosions that followed the
blowout finally caused the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig to sink. According to the
report provided by BP incident investigation team (BP, 2010), a chain of events was to
blame for the LWC. Of these events, those such as replacing the drilling mud with
seawater and poor cementing caused a kick to occur (i.e., failure of step 1 in Figure 8.1)
while failing to notice the kick indications such as changes in the flow rate and the
wellbore pressure made the kick not being detected until it flowed up into the riser (i.e.,
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failure of step 2 in Figure 8.1). The failure of the blowout preventer (BOP) to close in the
well also escalated the kick into a blowout (i.e., failure of step 3 in Figure 8.1). Since the
kill lines as well as choke lines of the BOP were damaged, it was also impossible to
perform kill procedure to re-establish the well control (i.e., failure of step 4 in Figure
8.1).
The risk of blowout cannot be eliminated, but can be reduced through preventive and
mitigative safety measures. Since risk is defined as the product of probability and
consequence, preventive safety measures are used to reduce the probability whereas
mitigative measures are applied to alleviate consequences. However, the priority is
usually given to the former, i.e., preventive measures (Holland, 1997). Safety measures,
whether preventive or mitigative, are normally contemplated and allocated to the system
of interest through risk assessment studies. Risk analysis not only determines if the risk is
acceptable, but it also identifies the risk major contributing factors for which reducing
measures should be applied. Conducting the blowout risk analyses, the blowout
probability estimation is the first task usually carried out using statistical methods or
traditional quantitative risk analysis techniques.
The blowout probability estimations using statistical data have often been questioned
(Holland, 1997). The reason is that such estimations apply a wide range of data which
differ in terms of the place of blowouts (e.g., North Sea or Canadian arctic waters), the
type of wells (e.g., exploratory or development well), the depth of drilling (e.g., shallow
or deep water drilling), and the time of blowouts (e.g., during drilling or tripping). From
the place point of view, factors such as the weather condition, formation temperature,
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pressure, penneability and porosity differ from place to place (Holland, 1997; Andersen,
1998; Nielsen et aI., 2001). Therefore, the data resources used for blowout frequency
estimation should be applied with extreme caution. For example, ERCB database (Energy
Resources Conservation Board, Canada) covers onshore blowouts while WOAD (World
Offshore Accident Databank, Norway) (1994) contains offshore blowouts as well as other
offshore accidents. SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database (1995) covers both exploratory
and development blowouts from the North Sea and the U.S. GoM OCS (Gulf of Mexico
Outer Continental Shelf).
However, even having reliable and up-to-date historical blowout data, these generic data
do not identify the series of events which finally resulted in a blowout. Thus, not only the
well-specific data such as the pore pressure (Pp ), bottom hole pressure (BHP), fracturing
pressure (Fp ) and the type of barriers are not taken into account, but also the causes of
the blowout whether human errors or mechanical failures are not considered in the
frequency estimation.
To overcome the aforementioned drawback of statistical methods, there have been
attempts to localize generic data to the case of interest using adjustment factors. These
adjustment factors reflect well-specific data (e.g., pore pressure) as well as company-
specific data (e.g., kick management policies) the applications of which result in site-
specific blowout frequencies. As an example of such statistical-based adjusting methods,
BlowFAM (Blowout Frequency Assessment Model, 2004) is based on the SrNTEF
database and examines different elements such as drilling activities, reservoir
characteristics and management parameters to identify total adjustment factor.
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On the other hand, many researchers broke down the blowout phenomenon to its
components such that the causal relationships among the components as well as the well-
specific and company-specific parameters could be analyzed in a systematic manner.
Bercha et al. (1978) used fault tree model (Ff) to estimate the blowout probability of
both exploratory and development wells in Canadian arctic waters. Although the
application of event tree (ET) has briefly been discussed to represent the blowout as a
potential consequence of the kick, the whole accident, starting from the causes of the kick
and ending with the blowout, has finally been modeled using Ff in their work. Later,
Andersen (1998) proposed a stochastic model based on the physical mechanism of the
kick as the initiating event of the blowout. The Ff method was then applied to estimate
the probability of the kick within each drilling sub-operation. Grouping of the drilling
operation into sub-operations such as drilling, tripping and casing was advised due to
different primary causes and safety barriers involved in each sub-operation.
Although being extensively used in the risk analysis of kicks and blowouts (Andersen,
1998; BP, 2010; Nielsen et aI., 2001; Bercha, 1978; Arild et aI., 2008; Worth et aI., 2008;
Arild et aI., 2009) static Ff is not suitable for large systems where, for example,
dependent failures or common cause failures are present (bobbio et aI., 2001; Khakzad et
aI., 2011; Khakzad et aI., 2012). Further, aside from presumably static parameters such as
formation porosity and permeability, there are dynamic parameters such as formation
temperature and pressure which varies over time as the well goes deeper. Also, drilling
parameters such as the weight and the volume of the drilling mud are always prone to
unexpected changes because of, for example, unexpected gas pockets, losses into
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formation and improper wellbore fill up in case of tripping (Holland, 1997). More
importantly, dynamic safety barriers, unlike static barriers, are due to replacement as the
well process proceeds from one phase (e.g., drilling phase) to another (e.g., production
phase), which need to be taken into account when conducting the risk analysis for
blowouts.
Bayesian networks (BNs) are probabilistic inference techniques for reasoning under
uncertainty, being used in the field of risk analysis and safety assessment since the last
decade. BNs apply d-separation and chain rule to represent causal relationships among a
set of random variables considering local dependencies (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007).
Many authors have shown the parallels between Ff and BN (Bobbio et aI., 2001;
Khakzad et aI., 2011; Torres-Toledano and Sucar, 1998; Boudali and Dugan, 2005) and
discussed how the limitations of the former technique can to a large extent be addressed
by the latter technique. However, the main advantage of BN making it a superior
technique for the risk analysis of dynamic systems such as well control is the ability to
perform probability updating. Applying Bayes' theorem, BN updates the initial beliefs as
new information about the system becomes available over time. Therefore, not only the
risk analysis can be used as a decision making tool to decide between various scenarios at
the design stage of the well operation, but it can also be applied during the well lifecycle
to identify risk factors helping to allocate proper safety measures as real-time changes
take place in the well system. The merit of BN models in risk analysis of well control
becomes accentuated when having more frequent accident precursors such as kicks can
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be interpreted as indicators for relatively rarer major accidents such as blowouts
(Skogdalen et aI., 2011).
The present work is aimed at showing the application of BNs in the risk analysis of LWC
and making a comparison with other conventional methods such as bow-tie (BT). The
scope of the work is limited to the first three steps of the well control (Figure 8.1),
investigating the probability of kick and its propagation into a blowout. In other words,
the well control regain is not covered in this study. The current study is mainly based on
the work of Andersen (1998) and Bercha et al. (1978). The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. The well control event including the physical mechanism of kick, kick
detection and the escalation of kick into blowout and the relevant barriers are discussed in
Section 8.2. A brief description of risk analysis methods, BT and BN, is reviewed in
Section 8.3. Section 8.4 is devoted to the application of BT and BN to the well control
risk analysis while the conclusion is presented in Section 8.5.
8.2 Well control
8.2.1 Kick mechanism
Defined as an uncontrolled and unwanted influx of formation fluids into the wellbore,
kick is the initial event which can potentially escalate into blowout unless detected at
early phases and promptly prevented. Even if kick is controlled, it takes a while to
circulate out the influx and re-establish the wellbore pressure balance. In the meanwhile,
extra costs are imposed to the drilling rig in terms of additional recovery works and
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several days of delay in resuming the drilling procedure (Nielsen et aI., 2001). In some
cases, the kick-induced damage is so severe that the well is plugged and abandoned.
A kick occurs as a result of the failure of the well primary barrier, i.e. the column of
drilling mud, in the drilling phase of a well. The drilling mud, as a barrier, is aimed at
maintaining the wellbore bottom hole pressure (BHP) greater than the pore pressure (Pp )
but lesser than the fracturing pressure (Fp ), i.e. Pp < BHP < Fp (Andersen, 1998). The
reason is that BHP greater than Pp prevents the formation fluids from flowing into the
wellbore, whereas being smaller than Fp assures that the formation is not fractured, thus
not causing the drilling mud to escape from the wellbore to the fractured formation. It
should be noted that in the case of a fracture, owing to annular losses (i.e., a drop in the
amount of the drilling mud), the hydrostatic pressure as a main component of BHP
decreases and a kick occurrence is very likely.
While primarily provided by the drilling mud, BHP is decomposed to several pressure
components (Equation 8.1) to better account for the variations in the drilling parameters
and characteristics (Andersen, 1998; Arild et aI., 2009).
Where p" is the hydrostatic pressure due to the height of the drilling mud column above
the wellbore bottom; PI is the frictional pressure due to the pumping of the drilling mud
through the drillstring; Pm and Psg are the swabbing and surging pressures due to the
drillstring tripping out and in the wellbore, respectively.
The arilling operation, whether exploratory or development can also be categorized into
sub-operations such as drilling, tripping, casing and cementing to explore the effective
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contribution of each pressure component on the entire BHP (Arild et aI., 2009). For
example, during drilling sub-operation, where a column of drilling mud is present
(hydrostatic pressure) and pumps are circulating the mud in the wellbore (frictional
pressure), BHP can be expected as BHP = Ph + Pt. Likewise, if the drillstring is pulled
out of the well (tripping out) to, for example, add a joint, and the pumps are off in the
meanwhile, BHP would be as BHP = Ph - Psw .
The hydrostatic pressure, P,,, is a function of the drilling mud's height (h) and density
(p). Therefore, factors which either cause h to decrease (e.g., annular losses) or cause p
to decrease (e.g., gas cut mud) result in a decline in Ph and consequently in BHP.
Likewise, since the frictional pressure, PI, is related to the pumping rate, a pump failure
or power outage would cause a drop in PI and thus in BHP. When pulling the drillstring
out of the wellbore, a negative pressure gradient, Psw, is created which may help a kick to
occur by reducing BHP. This effect is called swabbing. The amount of Psw depends on
the speed of tripping, the viscosity of the mud and the diameter of the wellbore (Nguyen,
1996). The narrower the wellbore, the more sever the swabbing effect would be. On the
other hand, a positive pressure gradient, Psg, is created when the drillstring is run into the
wellbore (tripping in). The effect is called surging.
Whether a decrease in BHP would cause a kick or not depends on the drilling margin or
the down-hole differential pressure (Andersen, 1998). The lower drilling margin, 6PL , is
defined as the difference between the initial bottom hole pressure, BHPo, and the pore
pressure, i.e. 6PL = BHPo - Pp , while the upper drilling margin, 6Pu, is defined as the
difference between the fracture pressure and the initial bottom hole pressure, i.e. 6Pu =
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Fp - BHPo. Assuming both a constant pore pressure and a constant fracture pressure, as
long as the decrease in BHP is smaller than ~PL' or the increase in BHP is smaller than
~Pu, neither a kick nor a fracture occurs. The drilling margins are decided by the type of
drilling. In shallow waters an overbalanced drilling policy (~PL > 0) is usually taken
whereas in deep waters, the near-balanced drilling (~PL == 0) is preferred since it results
in a higher drilling speed. Although the overbalanced drilling seems more desirable from
the kick prevention point of view, a major overbalanced drilling (~PL » 0 or ~Pu == 0)
may give rise to the formation fracturing which in tum causes annular losses and thus a
kick is likely to occur. It should be noted that a sudden increase in BHP, for example due
to Psg, would readily escalate an overbalanced drilling into a major overbalanced drilling.
On the contrary, although the near-balanced drilling advantageously results in a higher
rate of penetration, a sudden drop in BHP, for example due to an unexpected gas pocket
or circulation cut off, would result in an underbalanced condition (~PL < 0) and cause a
kick to occur. However, from the kick detection perspective, a near-balanced drilling is
suggested (see Section 8.2.2) (Nguyen, 1996).
8.2.2 Kick detection
Whether a kick would escalate into a blowout or not is highly dependent on how quickly
it is detected and how properly and timely the mitigative barriers are implemented. In this
case, the kick is controlled using kill operations, circulated out, and the well control is
regained. In shallow water drillings (depths less than 1200 m), however, the priority is
given over kick prevention rather than kick mitigation (Holland, 1997). The reason is that
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in shallow water drillings, due to the insufficient strength of the formation, it is not safe
to use blowout preventers (BOP) to close in the well and control the kick. In other words,
if the well is shut in using a BOP, the risk of underground blowouts and the consequent
cratering is impending. The cratering, in tum, can cause the drilling rig to tilt or even to
capsize. This is why drilling companies have focused on the diverting of the kick (using
diverter systems or riserless drilling methods) instead of trying to suppress the kick using
BOP (Holland, 1997). However, regardless of a drilling company policy to divert
(common in shallow water drilling) or suppress the kick (common in deep water drilling),
early detection of the kick is crucial in terms of the well and the personnel safety.
Drilling parameters such as the rate of penetration and the drillstring torque, operational
parameters such as the volume of mud tanks, and also mud characteristics such as
temperature and gas content are continuously monitored and recorded through mud
logging and wire-line logging. These data are then used not only to determine if the well
safety is secured but also to obtain geological information about the formation during the
drilling process (Nguyen, 1996).
Among drilling parameters, the rate of penetration is of great importance. An increase in
the rate of penetration implies that either the bit has reached a porous or fractured
formation or the lower drilling margin (LlPL ) has decreased due to a drop in BHP or a rise
in Pp • In the former condition, i.e. reaching to a porous formation, the risk of annular
losses and in the latter condition, i.e. a decrease in drilling margin, the risk of
underbalanced pressure is imminent. In either condition, a kick is very likely to occur.
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According to the relation between the rate of penetration and the drilling margin, as
shown in Figure 8.2 (Nguyen, 1996), when drilling with a high differential pressure (e.g.,
point d in Figure 8.2), a kick-induced drop in the pressure (e.g., the decrease of the
pressure from point d to c) has a small effect on the penetration rate (i.e. ~1), and is very
likely not to be noticed. On the other hand, when drilling with a low differential pressure
(e.g. point b), a decrease in the pressure (e.g., the decrease of the pressure from point b to
a) has a noticeable influence on the penetration rate (i.e., ~2). Thus, from the kick
detection point of view, the smaller the drilling differential pressure, the likelier is the
variation of the penetration rate (and consequently the kick) to be noticed. Likewise, the
variations in either the drillstring torque or the pumping pressure can be interpreted as
kick indicators.
Similar to for drilling parameters, the abnormal variations in operational parameters can
be used to measure the extent to which the well is exposed to LWC, particularly the kick.
Accordingly, the irregular changes in the volume of the drilling mud in the mud tanks as
well as the trip tank can be taken as kick signs. An anomalous decrease in the mud
volume may indicate annular losses, possibly due to the fractured formation, while an
increase in the mud volume implies a water or gas influx into the wellbore, i.e. a kick
occurrence. A more direct way to monitor the abnormal variations in the mud volume can
be performed using flow meters installed on the inlet and outlet of the mud flow and
comparing the differences (Bercha 1978; Nguyen, 1996).
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Figure 8.2. The relation between the penetration rate and the drilling margin [20]. Vo is the rate of
penetrationwhenAP=O.
In addition to the abovementioned parameters, the mud characteristics can also be
examined for any trace of the kick occurrence. In this regard, monitoring the changes in
mud density and conductivity is of great importance. These changes can be due to water,
gas or oil influxes into the well as a sign of kick. In the case of gas influx, aside from the
decreasing influence the gas has on the mud density and consequently on the hydrostatic
pressure, the type of gas, particularly CO2, indicates the vicinity of an efficient
hydrocarbon reservoir and thus a contingent risk of kick (Nguyen, 1996).
8.2.3 Blowout
Similar to a kick, a blowout occurs as a result of the failure of the well secondary
barriers. In fact, in the case of a kick occurrence, the kick can escalate into a blowout
either due to the mechanical failure of the secondary barriers or due to the non-detection
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of the kick and consequently not putting the barriers into action. Except for the formation
and the casing which are present in most phases as passive secondary barriers, the
secondary barriers vary in type and placement during the various phases. Regardless of
shallow water drillings in which the drilling mud acts as both the primary and the
secondary barrier, BOP, Kelly valve and/or the drillstring safety valve are considered as
secondary barriers in the drilling phase. In the production phase, on the other hand, a
surface-controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV) and a Christmas tree are used as
secondary barriers instead of BOP while in the wire-line phase a wire-line BOP is added
to the safety barriers to compensate for the disabled SCSSV (Holland, 1997).
To take into account the effect of the secondary barriers on the well control process, it is
also important to determine the blowout path. In fact, a kick can rise up in the wellbore
through various paths such as the drillstring, the annulus and also between the casing
(Holland, 1997). For example, in the case of an influx through the drillstring, the Kelly
valve or the string safety valve can prevent the flow from entering the atmosphere while
in the case of an influx through the annulus, a BOP can be activated. The BOP comprises
an annular preventer, pipe rams and a blind or shear ram to prevent the kick from exiting
the wellbore (i.e. blowout) as well as choke lines and kill lines to circulate out the kick
and regain the well control. Generally, the blowouts are more frequent during the drilling
phase and through the annulus path (Holland, 1997).
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8.3 Risk analysis methods
8.3.1 Bow-tie
BT is an effective graphical method commonly used for the risk analysis of accident
scenarios (Khakzad et ai, 2012; Delvosalle et aI., 2005; Khakzad et aI., 2012). Focused on
an undesired event as the pivot node, BT applies both a FT and an ET to determine the
potential causes and consequences of the undesired event, respectively. The undesired
event is indeed the top event of the FT. Figure 8.3 illustrates a typical BT in which
components such as primary events (PE), intermediate events (rE), top event (TE), safety
barriers (SB) and consequences (C) are shown.
The probability of the TE is calculated using the FT while the probabilities of the
consequences are determined using the ET, based on the failures or successes of
subsequent safety barriers. For example, the probability of C3 in Figure 8.3 can be
estimated as P (C3) = P(TE)P(SB1)P(SB2) (1 - P(SB3)).
Figure 8.3. Typical bow-tie model consisting ofa fault tree on the left and an event tree on the right-
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Although taking advantage of Fr and ET to construct a robust and transparent risk
analysis method, the application of BT in the risk analysis of large systems, where
common cause failures and dependent failures (conditional dependencies) are present, is
limited. More importantly, because of being composed of static methods such as Fr and
ET, BT has not widely been recognized in the context of dynamic risk analysis (Khakzad
et aI., 2012) where the information about frequent accident precursors (e.g. kick) can be
effectively used to update the estimated risk of rare major accidents (e.g. blowout)
(Skogdalen et aI., 2011). To take the new information into account to develop a dynamic
risk framework, the abovementioned methods, i.e. Fr, ET and BT, have been either
coupled with Bayes' theorem (Khakzad et aI., 2012; Kelly and Smith, 2009) or mapped
into Bayesian networks (Bobbio et aI., 2001; Khakzad et aI., 2011; Bearfield and Marsh,
2005). ill the present study, the latter approach is applied.
8.3.2 Bayesian network
BN is a graphical technique that has started to be widely applied in the field of risk
analysis. Known as an inference probabilistic method, BN is composed of nodes, arcs and
probability tables to represent a set of random variables and the conditional dependencies
among them. Due to its flexible structure and probabilistic reasoning engine, BN has
been focused as a promising method for the risk analysis of large and complex systems.
Considering the conditional dependencies of variables, BN represents the joint
probability distribution P( U) of variables U={A/, . .,An}, as:
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8.2
Where Pa(Ai) is the parent set of variable Ai [16]. Accordingly, the probability of Ai is
calculated as:
8.3
Where the summation is taken over all the variables except Ai. The main application of
BN is in probability updating. BN takes advantage of Bayes' theorem to update the prior
probabilities of variables given new observations, called evidence E, rendering the
updated or posterior probabilities:
P(UIE) = P;~~:) = L:~2E)
8.3.3 Object-oriented Bayesian network
8.4
Object-oriented Bayesian network (OOBN) is a type of BN, comprising both instance
nodes and usual nodes. An instance node is indeed a sub-network, representing another
BN. Using OOBNs, a large complex BN can be constructed as a hierarchy of sub-
networks with desired levels of abstraction (HUGIN, 2010). Therefore, the model
construction is facilitated and the communication between model's sub-networks is more
effectively performed. Further, the tedious task of repeating identical structure fragments
and probability tables is to a large extent alleviated, particularly in the case of repetitive
networks such as time-sliced BN.
Instance nodes are connected to other nodes through interface nodes, including input and
output nodes. Input nodes accept the same probability values as of their immediate
parents. Thus, each input node cannot have more than one parent. In contrast, output
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nodes are ordinary nodes, conveying their probability values to other input nodes or
affecting the probabilities of other usual nodes. Therefore, each output node can have
more than one child.
Figure 8.4 illustrates, as an example, how a simple BN (left) can be developed using a
hierarchy of smaller and simpler BNs (middle). As can be seen, node 4 is selected both as
the output node (with thick border) in instance node A and as the input node (with dashed
border) in instance node B to connect the instance nodes together. The BN can finally be
represented briefly using only instance nodes A and B (right).
Figure 8.4. Using OOBN to modularize BN into sub-networks. A BN (left) is constructed using
hierarchical structures with arbitrary levelsofabstraction(middle) and consequently shown using
instance nodes (right).
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8.4 Well control modeling
8.4.1 Case-study description
Before a well control risk analysis, it should be determined that for which well phase the
analysis is to be conducted. As mentioned earlier, the type and placement of safety
barriers for the drilling phase differ from those of the production phase. In the case of
drilling phase, it matters if it is shallow water or deep water drilling as well as if it is
exploratory or development drilling. Dividing the drilling phase into sub-operations such
as drilling, tripping, casing or cementing also helps to better identify the primary causes
of LWC.
In the present study, the risk analysis is performed for drilling phase since the frequency
of blowouts is higher for this phase. Also, it is assumed that the drilling is performed in
deep waters and for a development well. Therefore, in contrast to shallow water drilling,
both primary and secondary barriers are present and also a near-balanced drilling policy
is preferred to an overbalanced drilling. Further, as compared to exploratory drilling, the
required information about the formation properties such as Pp and Fp is presumably
available during the development drilling. The total risk of drilling phase equals the sum
of the risk of respective drilling sub-operation. In this study however, for illustrative
purposes, the risk analysis for the drilling sub-operation is carried out in which the
wellbore is initially filled with drilling mud and the circulation is in progress, implying
that both Ph and PI contribute to BHP.
189
8.4.2 Bow-lie modeling
8.4.2.1 Kickfault tree
Kick is the first undesired event in a series of events leading to LWC (see Figure 8.1).
Thus, according the foregoing case-study, a FT is developed in Figure 8.5 to estimate the
kick probability. It should be noted that since a near-balanced drilling is performed, it is
assumed that a decrease in either Ph or Pf will cause a decrease in BHP such that a
negative differential pressure (i.e. lJ.PL < 0) would be likely to occur. This is why in the
FT of Figure 8.5 intermediate events "Low hydrostatic pressure" and "Lost circulation"
contribute to "Negative differential pressure" via an OR gate. The FT components and
probabilities are shown in Table 8.1 (Bercha, 1978; OREDA; 2002)]. Assigning the
probabilities to the primary events of the FT, the probability of the kick is calculated as
1.22E-02.
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Figure 8.5. Kick fault tree.
Table 8.1. The components of the kick FT in Figure 8.5 and their probabilities
Description Probability Updated probability
Annular losses I.OOE-02 5.46E-OI
Riser rupture I.OOE-02
Temperature effects 2.50E-03
7.00E-03
Failure in density measurement equipment 2.00E-04
6 Operator failure in mixing the right density 1.70E-OI
7 Pump failure 2.27E-OI
8 Power failure 1.50E-03
9 Pump control failure I.OOE-03 5.70E-03
IO Efficient hydrocarbon formation 1.25E-OI
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8.4.2.2 Kick detection fault tree
Following the kick indicators briefly described in Section 8.2.2, a Fr is developed
(Figure 8.6) to estimate the failure probability of the kick detection. As can be seen from
Figure 8.6, a variety of drilling parameters, operational parameters and mud
characteristics is used as the kick signs. However, a combination of equipment failures
and human errors would result in the kick non-detection. It is worth noting that the mud
volume can be monitored using either mud tank indicators or flow meters installed on
flow lines. Likewise, as the rate of penetration and the pressure are related to each other
(see Figure 8.2), both of them can be taken into consideration to observe changes in the
circulation pressure. The Fr components and their probabilities are listed in Table 8.2.
Assigning these probabilities to the primary events of the Fr, the failure probability of
the kick detection is calculated as 8.60E-06.
Figure 8.6. Kick detection fault tree.
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Table 8.2. The components of the kick detection FT in Figure 8.6 and their probabilities.
Index Description
Failure of tank level indicator (float system)
Failure of operator to notice tank level changes
Failure of flow meter
Failure of operator to notice the flowmeter
Failure of pressure gage
Failure of operator to notice the pressure change
Failure of displacement sensor (related to penetration rate)
Failure of operator to notice the change in penetration rate
Failure of gas detector
10 Failure of operator to notice the gas
Failure of density meter (column-type)
Failure of operator to notice density changes
13 Failure of resistivity sensor
Failure of operator to notice conductivity changes
8.4.2.3 Safety barriers event tree
Beside the kick detection as a barrier crucially required for blowout prevention, a high
pressure 4-stage BOP stack including two pipe rams, a blind/shear ram and an annular
preventer is also considered as safety barrier (Nguyen, 1997). It should be noted that even
if the kick is detected and the BOP is activated, the blowout would not be prevented
unless the casing is strong enough to hold the kick inside the wellbore (Bercha, 1978).
The ET in Figure 8.7 illustrates the sequence of safety barriers devised for the blowout
prevention. Except for the kick as the initiating event and the kick detection as the first
barrier the probabilities of which are obtained from the FTs in Figures 8.5 and 8.6,
respectively, the failure probabilities of the other barriers are shown in Table 8.3.
193
m. mmmm~
w w~ lU W~
I I I I t
Figure 8.7. Escalation of kick into blowout event tree.
Table 8.3. The safety barriers of the ET in Figure 8.7 and their probabilities
Description Probability Updated probability
Kick non-detection 2.48E-02
Lower pipe ram
Upper pipe ram I.OOE-04 I.OOE-04
Blind/shear ram I.OOE-04 I.OOE-04
Annular preventer I.OOE-04 I.OOE-04
Casing 2.00E-04 9.75E-OI
8.4.2.4 Blowout bow-tie
Using the Frs and the ET developed in the previous sections, the BT model for the LWC
is generated in Figure 8.8. Assigning the probabilities listed in Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 to
the components of the BT, the probability of the blowout is consequently estimated as
2.55E-06.
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As mentioned earlier, BT suffers limitations of both FT and ET as sub-models. As a
result, it is not possible in a BT to take into account the probable common cause failures
and conditional dependencies among the primary events of the FT and the safety barriers
of the ET (Khakzad et aI., 2012). For example, consider a case where the same density
meter is used to measure the mud density both when the mud is mixed to the right density
to be pumped into the wellbore and when the mud is brought back to the surface to be
tested for kick signs.
Therefore, primary event 5 in the kick FT (Figure 8.5) and primary event 11 in the kick
detection FT (Figure 8.6) would have a common cause failure, i.e. the failure of the
density meter with the probability of 2.00E-04.
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Figure 8.8. Bow-tie model for loss of well control. PES in the kick FT and PEll in the kick detection
FT have common cause failures (colored in orange) as well as PEl in the kick FT and Casing in the
safety barrier ET (colored in yellow).
Consequently, the top events of the respective Frs can no longer be considered
independent from each other. In other words, both the initiating event (i.e. kick) and the
first safety barrier (i.e. kick detection) of the ET (Figure 8.7) would become conditionally
dependent although this dependency cannot be captured in the BT.
Likewise, the same problem would arise if the annular losses of the drilling mud and the
casing failure are both related to the poor cementing problem. In this case, primary event
I in the kick Fr (Figure 8.5) and the last safety barrier in the ET (Figure 8.7) share the
poor cementing as the common cause failure, making top event Kick and safety barrier
Casing conditionally dependent. Accordingly, for illustrative purposes, it is assumed that
in the case of poor cementing, the probability of annular losses would increase from 0.0 I
(Table8.i) to 0.1.
8.4.3 Bayesian network modeling
8.4.3.1 Mappingfrom bow-tie
To overcome the aforementioned limitations, the BT in Figure 8.8 is used to construct the
corresponding BN shown in Figure 8.9. In fact, after the respective BNs are developed
for the previously developed Frs and ET, they are included in the OOBN of Figure 8.9 as
instance nodes.
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In the OOBN, instance nodes Kick and Kick_Detection are mapped from the Frs in
Figures 8.5 and 8.6, respectively, while instance node Barriers is mapped from the ET in
Figure 8.7. It also should be noted that node BOP in instance node Barriers is itself an
instance node comprising safety nodes Lower pipe ram, Upper pipe ram, Blind/shear ram
and Annular preventer.
Further, another instance node, namely Common_causeJailures, is added to the network
to account for the conditional dependencies among the foregoing instance nodes. As
mentioned earlier, the failure of Density meter contributes to the failure probabilities of
Kick and Kick_Detection through primary nodes 5 and 11, respectively, while Cementing
affects the failure probabilities of Kick and Barrier through primary nodes 1 and Casing,
respectively. The BOP cannot be activated unless the kick is detected. This is why
Kick_Detection is connected to Barriers to take into account such dependency. Note that
when mapping the BT into the OOBN, Kick is connected to Consequence, adding another
state, namely Safe state to node Consequence to account for the non-occurrence of Kick
.After the OOBN is analyzed using HUGIN 7.4 software (http://www.hu<>in.com). the
probability of the blowout is calculated as 4.60E-06.
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Figure 8.9. OOBN for the loss of well control, including instance nodes and the usual node
Consequence.
As can be seen from Figure 8.9, only interface nodes, i.e., input and output nodes, are
presented for each instance node, making the network less complex and more tractable.
However, it is possible to illustrate the model even more briefly by showing only the
instance nodes (Figure 8.10).
Figure 8.10. Collapsed form of the OOBN for the loss of well control.
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8.4.3.2 Probability updating
In addition to offering a flexible structure and a robust reasoning engine, the main
application of BN is in probability updating which cannot be done by BT unless equipped
with other techniques such as Bayes' theorem or physical models. In probability
updating, not only the posterior probability of event Xi is calculated given a piece of
evidence, but also the most probable configuration of events leading to that evidence is
determined. The most common type of evidence used in such probability updating is the
knowledge about the top event or consequences being in one of their states according to
which the probabilities of the primary events are updated.
In the present study, the posterior probabilities of events, assuming that a blowout has
occurred, i.e. P(Xi I Consequence = Blowout), are estimated and shown in the last
columns of Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. Also, regarding the most probable configuration of
events, it is determined that the failure of casing led to the annular losses which in tum
caused a negative differential pressure. Due to the presence of an effective hydrocarbon
reservoir, this negative pressure caused an influx of the reservoir fluids into the well,
resulting in a kick. Although the kick was detected and the BOP was accordingly
activated and properly worked, the casing failed to hold the influx in the well and thus a
blowout occurred. The probability of this configuration of events is estimated as 0.35.
8.4.3.3 Sequential learning: application ofaccident precursors
Using BN for risk analysis of domains also makes it possible to take advantage of
sequential learning (Spiegelhalter et aI., 1990) to adapt the probability values of the
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system as changes take place over time. This method is also known as probability
adapting or sequential updating, and is particularly useful when modeling dynamic
systems (Spiegelhalter et aI., 1990). Knowing the causal relationships and the prior
probability distributions for the system under study, sequential learning takes new
observations, sequentially made over time, into account to revise the probability
distributions of nodes for which these observations have been recorded. While
propagating throughout the network, these new observations would also update other
nodes' probability distributions as long as these nodes are not d-separated from the
observed nodes (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007).
In the risk analysis of major accidents, which are low in probability and severe in
consequences, sequential learning can be implemented based on accident precursor
observations, which are more frequent but less severe (Mel and Seider, 2006).
Considering major accidents as accidents resulting in at least 5 deaths and significant
assets lost, accident precursors can be taken as incidents and near misses with no
significant consequences which, however, have the potential to escalate into major
accidents. Accordingly, in the context of well control risk analysis, kicks as well as near
misses such as loss of circulation or loss of drilling mud which can lead to a blowout can
be used as accident precursors (Skogdalen et aI., 2011). In the present study, for
illustrative purposes, it is assumed that the near misses and incidents in Table 8.4 are
observed and recorded over the course of 5 weeks of the drilling.
Table 8.4. Accident precursors during the 5 weeksofdrillingoperation.
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Week
Pump failure
Pump control failure
Power failure
Using these data, the prior probability distributions of the observed nodes Pump, Pump
control, Power and Gas-cut mud (the primary events of the FT in Figure 8.5) are revised,
resulting in updated probabilities for the kick and blowout (Figure 8.10). As can be seen
from Figure 8.10, the probabilities of the kick and the blowout have increased more than
4 and 7 times, respectively, compared to their initial estimates at the start of the drilling
operation, i.e. week O.
~ 6.0E-02
~
"O:"4.0E-02
l.SE-OS g
~
1.OE-OS ~
Figure 8.11. The updated probabilities of kick and blowout based on sequential learning.
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8.5 Conclusion
In this work, the risk analysis for loss of well control was carried out using both bow-tie
and Bayesian network approaches. Bayesian network was shown to be taken priority over
bow-tie since it can consider common cause failures as well as conditional dependencies
among the primary events of the well control system. In the present study, object-oriented
Bayesian network was used to model the complex and interlinked domain of well control
with significant levels of abstraction. Thus, the model became tractable, and the
dependencies among the model segments were better shown, resulting in a more effective
modeling and communication with stakeholders. It is also concluded that using Bayesian
networks to model well control events makes it possible to take advantage of Bayesian
updating as new information becomes available. This information can be used either for
probability updating and identification of the most probable configuration of events or for
sequential learning. However, this study showed that due to the scarcity of blowout data,
sequential learning can effectively be applied for probability adapting while near misses
and incidents are considered as accident precursors.
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9 Domino effect analysis using Bayesian networkstt
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Abstract
A new methodology is introduced based on Bayesian network both to model domino
effect propagation pattern and to estimate the domino effect probability at different
levels. The flexible structure and the unique modeling techniques offered by Bayesian
network make it possible to analyze domino effects through a probabilistic framework,
considering synergistic effects, noisy probabilities and common cause failures. Further,
the uncertainties and the complex interactions among the domino effect components are
captured using Bayesian network. The probabilities of events are updated in the light of
new information, and the most probable path of the domino effect is determined on the
basis of the new data gathered. The present study shows how probability updating helps
ttKhakzadetal.JournalofRiskAnalysis2012.
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to update the domino effect model either qualitatively or quantitatively. The methodology
is applied to a hypothetical example and also to an earlier-studied case-study. These
examples accentuate the effectiveness of Bayesian network in modeling domino effects
in processing facility.
Keywords: Domino effect, Bayesian network, Risk assessment.
9.1 Introduction
Domino effects or chains of accidents in which an accident in a unit propagates into
nearby units have recently been recognized as a priority issue among the risk and safety
community experts (e.g. see the requirements of the EU Seveso-II Directive (1996) and
its amendments). This is partly owing to the fact that today's ever growing industries are
complex and congested by dense pipelines, process equipment and storage tanks most of
which contain or transport hazardous material. Thus, it is not unlikely for a primary event
to evolve to a much more severe sequence of secondary accidents as nearby equipment
items or units are involved in the accident by means of heat, overpressure, and/or by the
impact of explosion-induced airborne fragments.
While a remarkable progress in the risk and safety analysis of individual accident
scenarios, limited to a single unit, has been achieved in recent years, domino accidents
have gained less attention in the context of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) both due
to their lower probability and higher complexity. However, frequent violent domino
accidents took place in the last decade (e.g., see Abdolhamidzadeh et aI., 201 I; Darbra et
aI., 2010) such as that occurred in the BP Texas City refinery, where a vapor cloud
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explosion (VCE) was followed by several other fires and explosions (CSB, 2007) These
severe events have urgently raised the demand for consideration of domino scenarios in
quantitative risk analysis and safety reports.
Accordingly, the study of domino effects in the literature has primarily been focused
either on damage probability or on domino effect frequency estimation. Damage
probability, alternatively known as escalation probability, has been estimated using
distance-based models (Bagster and Pitblado, 1991), threshold values (Gledhill and
Lines, 1998), probit models (Eisenberg et aI., 1975; Vilchez et aI., 2001; Cozzani and
Salzano, 2004), combination of threshold values and probit models (Khan and Abbassi,
1998; Cozzani et aI., 2006), and mathematical models based on the characteristics of
secondary units and the surrounding environment (Khan and Abbassi, 1998; Landucci et
aI., 2009).
Although the frequency estimation and the sequence of accidents in domino effects have
been investigated using statistical surveys (Darbra et aI., 2010; Vilchez et aI., 1995;
Kourniotis et aI., 2000), there are few works devoted to domino modeling and accident
propagation, particularly in the context of QRA (Khan and Abbassi, 1998; reniers and
Dullaert, 2007).
However, these works have drawbacks such as being mostly deterministic or using
oversimplified assumptions limiting their application in the framework of QRA. More
importantly, most of the previous research has neither recognized nor included the higher
levels of domino effects, but only the first level of accidents where primary and
secondary events are taking place. This shortcoming not only gives rise to an
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underestimation of the potential risk, but it also leads to an improper allocation of safety
measures (e.g., safety distances among adjacent units) since higher order events (e.g.,
tertiary events) and the synergistic effect of events of different orders are not considered
in the modeling. Furthermore, in almost all foregoing works, the evolution pattern of
domino accidents has not been taken into account, leading to the analysis of a cluster of
accidents rather than a chain of accidents. Thus, a holistic probability has been calculated
for domino effects, neither specifying the actual time-line of the escalation process nor
privileging the more likely time-sequences of the domino scenario.
For example, Cozzani et al. (2005) took all possible accident scenarios triggered by a
primary event into account in order to cope with the uncertainty arisen from the lack of
knowledge about the actual accident propagation pattern. In their work, each accident
scenario is a combination of the failure and non-failure of all secondary units which are
likely to be impacted by the primary event, and frequency is estimated as a multiplication
of probabilities. Later, Cozzani et al. (2006) and Antonioni et al. (2009) implemented the
approach in a GIS-based software tool, Aripar-GIS, to allow its application in the
analysis of industrial facilities or extended industrial areas. Most recently,
Abdolhamidzadeh et al. (2010) applied Monte Carlo simulation to capture the
dependencies between the primary event and the secondary events. However, the
selection of secondary events was similar to that of Cozzani et al. (2005) and was based
on randomly generated numbers, ignoring the actual accident propagation path.
It is worth noting that knowing the likely pattern and time-line of accident propagation
not only results in a more realistic and accurate probability calculation, but it also helps
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the analyst choose the most efficient placement of safety barriers, whether passive or
active, to impede the progress of an accident or cease it in the early stages.
Bayesian network (BN) is a probabilistic graphical method for reasoning under
uncertainty (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007) which has recently started to be used as a
promising substitute for the majority of conventional methods in risk analysis and
reliability engineering. A comprehensive statistical review of BN application can be
found in (Weber et aI., 2010), where the growing appeal of BN in various areas of
reliability, risk and maintenance engineering has been shown over the last decade.
The reason for the popularity of BN among analysts lies in the fact that it benefits from
both qualitative and quantitative modeling techniques. On the one hand, BN takes
advantage of its highly flexible graphical structure to show the causal relationships
among the nodes of the network. And, on the other hand, it determines the strength of
such causal relationships through conditional probabilities assigned to the nodes. [f the
system under study (e.g., a chemical process plant comprising several units) could be
considered as a set of variables (i.e., each variable stands for a unit or an equipment item,
depending on the level of detail of the analysis), BN would be used to factorize the joint
probability distribution of variables using the chain rule and d-separation rule,
significantly reducing the system complexity.
This paper introduces a new methodology based on BN for probability estimation and
propagation path determination of domino effects. After the propagation network is
developed based on escalation vectors and threshold values, it is modified to estimate the
probability of domino effect in different levels. The study also takes into account the
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possible synergistic effects of the primary event and secondary events to examine the
possibility of domino effect escalation to higher order events such as tertiary events and
so forth.
As the main purpose of the present work is to establish a methodology for modeling and
risk assessment of domino effects, it does not focus in detail on the methods used either
to estimate escalation probabilities or to calculate physical effects such as heat radiation
or explosion overpressure needed for escalation probability estimation. The paper
benefits from generic data available in the literature or applies simple methods to obtain
those data lacking in the literature.
Since the domino effect definition, characteristics, components, and relevant case studies
have been comprehensively discussed in the literature, only the terminology and main
concepts used in the present paper are recapitulated in Section 9.2. After a brief review of
the fundamentals of BN in Section 9.3, the modeling framework of domino effect is
presented in Section 9.4, in which both propagation path and probability estimation are
modeled. In Section 9.5, a practical application of the methodology is presented while the
conclusions from this work are discussed in Section 9.6.
9.2 Domino effect: terminology and characteristics
9.2.1 Accident propagation
Domino effect takes place when an accident in a unit, known as a "primary event",
triggers other accidents in adjacent units by means of escalation vectors. Escalation
vectors are physical effects such as fire impingement, fire engulfment, heat radiation,
2It
overpressure or explosion-induced projectile fragments, depending on a variety of factors
such as the type of the primary event and the distance between the accident epicenter and
nearby units. There are several methods to calculate escalation vectors, such as analytical
models, integral models and averaged models which are a combination of the two former
models (CCPS, 2000; Assael and Kakosimos, 20 10).
To determine which nearby units are impacted, the escalation vectors exerted by the
primary event on the nearby units are compared with predefined threshold values. The
escalation vectors well above the relevant thresholds are strong enough to cause credible
damage to the nearby units, resulting in loss of containment or loss of physical integrity.
Thus, based on a comparison between escalation vectors and threshold values, a
preliminary screening of the nearby units is performed, leading to the specification of
potential secondary targets. Figure 9.1 shows the outset of a domino effect in which the
primary event in unit XI impacts its neighboring units. It is assumed that based on
threshold values, units X2, X3, and X4 are selected as potential secondary target units.
8 8~8D8
~8 8
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Figure 9.1. Domino effect where an accident in Xl can trigger secondary accidents in Xl. Xj, and X•.
According to threshold values, Xs and X6 are not impacted by XI'
In other words, potential secondary units are those adjacent units that are more likely to
contribute to the domino effect. The inclusion of secondary units in the domino effect not
only intensifies the accident causing more severe consequences, but also helps the
domino effect escalate to the next level by impacting tertiary units. The escalation vectors
originating from secondary events in tum trigger other accidents in tertiary units either by
themselves or through synergistic effects.
Generally speaking, through synergistic effects, the escalation vectors of newly engaged
units (of order i) cooperate with those of already engaged units (of order i-I) to impact
the units of higher order (of order i+ 1) which had not passed the threshold criteria in
previous levels. For example, according to Figure 9.1, units X5 and X6 are more likely to
be involved in the domino effect as the escalation vectors of the secondary units X2, X3,
and X4 are added to that of the primary unit Xl, promoting the domino effect from the first
level to the second level.
9.2.2 Escalation probability
As mentioned earlier, the initial selection of potentially vulnerable units in each level of
domino effect is performed based on a comparison between escalation vectors and
threshold values. By this procedure, although a qualitative propagation pattern of the
domino effect would be schematized, the model cannot be quantitatively analyzed unless
the escalation probabilities of vulnerable units are determined.
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Among methods proposed in the literature, probit methods have been widely used to
estimate the escalation probability of equipment due to simplicity and flexibility enabling
application to a wide variety of equipment (Cozzani and Salzano, 2004). Probit methods
may consider both the type of equipment (e.g., atmospheric or pressurized) and the type
of escalation vector the equipment receives (e.g., heat radiation or explosion
overpressure) to calculate the probit value Y (e.g., see Cozzani et aI., 2005).
Generally, Y can be obtained using Equation 9.1:
Y = a+bLn(V)
Where a and bare probit coefficients determined using experimental data and regression
methods, and V is either the escalation vector (e.g., static overpressure LJP (kPa) in the
case of explosion) or an escalation-related parameter (e.g., time to failure of the
vulnerable equipment, ttf (s), in the case of heat radiation). After Y is determined, the
escalation probability, P£scalation, could be calculated as:
Pf:scalation = et>(Y-5) 9.2
Where <p is the cumulative density function of standard normal distribution. In the current
study, the probit methods proposed by Cozzani et al. (2005) are used to obtain the probit
values for overpressure and heat radiation.
Single hit dose-response models such as probit models express the escalation
probabilities as a function of escalation vectors. However significant uncertainty arising
from the lack of information or the extrapolation of escalation vectors has caused the
probit models to lead to different results (Rai and Rayzin, 1981). Therefore, multi hit
dose-response models have been proposed to overcome such limitations with a promising
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potential of application in domino effect modeling. However, as the main aim of the
present work is to introduce a new methodology based on BN, it does not further discuss
such models, that are an important area of future exploration.
9.3 Bayesian networks
BN is a directed acyclic graph for reasoning under uncertainty in which the nodes
represent variables and are connected by means of directed arcs. The arcs denote
dependencies or causal relationships between the linked nodes, while the conditional
probability tables (CPTs) assigned to the nodes determine the type and strength of such
dependencies. In EN, nodes from which arcs are directed are called parent nodes whereas
nodes to which arcs are directed are called child nodes. In fact, a node can simultaneously
be the child of a node and the parent of another node. The nodes with no parent and the
nodes with no children are also called root nodes and leaf nodes, respectively (Jensen and
Nielsen, 2007).
Using the chain rule and the d-separation criterion, EN expands the joint probability
distribution of a set of linked nodes, e.g., U = {Xl.XZ, ••• ,Xn }. In other words, by
considering only local dependencies, BN factorizes the joint probability distribution as
the multiplication of the probabilities of the nodes given their immediate parents (Jensen
and Nielsen, 2007):
9.3
Where P(U) is the joint probability distribution of variables and Pa(Xa is the parent set
of variable Xi' The main application of BN is in probability updating. EN takes
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advantage of Bayes theorem to update the probability of variables given
observations, called evidence E, to yield the posterior probability:
P(U!E) = P~~~E) = L:~iE)
In addition to its ability for probability updating, the flexible structure and modeling
techniques of BN, which allow incorporating conditional probabilities, multi-state
variables and common cause failures, have helped it emerge as a reliable alternative to
most conventional methods.
However, the capability of BN in the modeling of domino effects, where complex
interactions of variables cannot be neglected, has not yet been examined. So, the next
section is aimed at showing how BN can be employed for either qualitative or
quantitative investigation of domino effects.
9.4 Domino modeling
9.4.1 Propagation pattern
In order to model the likely propagation path of domino effect, the following steps are
taken:
Step 1- According to the layout of the process plant of concern, a node is assigned to each
process unit. These units are either susceptible to the accident or capable of escalating the
accident, including distillation columns and atmospheric and pressurized storage tanks.
For example, assume a process plant with six units (Xi> with i ranging from 1 to 6. See
Figure 9.2).
216
Step 2- Using safety reports usually available for process plants or through risk
assessment methods, the primary unit where the domino accident is likely to start is
determined (e.g., XI in Figure 9.2). It is worth noting that considerations such as having a
reasonably high occurrence probability and having enough inventory of hazardous
material to produce credible escalation vectors should be taken into account when
choosing the primary unit.
Figure 9.2. A likely propagation pattern of the domino effect. The numbers in parentheses show the
occurrence orders of events (Step 4 of the methodology).
Step 3- According to the type of possible accident scenarios in the primary unit, the
escalation vectors transmitted by the primary unit to nearby units are specified (e.g., see
Cozzani et aI., 2005; Antonioni et aI., 2009) for different accident-related escalation
vectors) and calculated. Methods for calculation of escalation vectors such as heat
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radiation and explosion overpressure can be found in CCPS (2000), the TNO Yellow
Book (1997) and Assael and Kakosimos (2010).
Step 4.1- Based on a comparison between predefined threshold values and escalation
vectors, those nearby units for which the received escalation vectors exceed the threshold
values are defined as potential secondary units (e.g., X2, X3 and X4 in Figure 9.2).
Step 4.2- In the case of fire or explosion, the probit values (Y) are calculated for the
potential secondary units.
Step 4.3- Using the probit values, the escalation probability of potential secondary units
given the primary event, i.e., P(XZIX1 ), P(X3 IX1 ) and P(X4 IX1 ), are calculated. It
should be noted that in the case of fragment impact, conditional damage probabilities
may be calculated by other approaches as those suggested by Nguyen et al. (2009).
Step 4.4- Among the potential secondary units, the one(s) with the highest escalation
probability is chosen as the secondary unit (for example X3 in Figure 9.2). Since the
secondary events are caused by the primary event, a causal arc must be directed from X/
to X3 , showing that the occurrence of X3 is conditional on the occurrence of X,.
Step 5- Given that the secondary units have been damaged, potential accident scenarios
and their occurrence probabilities for the secondary units are specified. For example, if a
pressurized LPG storage is damaged, two accident scenarios can be envisaged depending
on the type of release and the proximity of ignition sources. For example, an
instantaneous release along with immediate ignition would result in a fireball, whereas a
release over the course of 10 minutes along with a delayed ignition would result in a
vapor cloud explosion (VCE) (Cozzani et aI., 2005).
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Step 6- Substituting the secondary units for the primary unit, steps 3 to 5 are repeated to
determine potential tertiary units (e.g., X2 and X4), potential quaternary units (e.g., Xs and
X6) and so forth. In this case, it has been assumed since X2 and X4 (Xs and X6) have the
same escalation probabilities; they both are selected as tertiary (quaternary) units. Figure
9.3 illustrates the flow diagram consisting of the above-mentioned steps which are taken
to develop the propagation pattern of the domino effect.
It is worth noting that when repeating the same procedure (i.e., steps 3 to 5) for either the
secondary units or higher order units, synergistic effects should be considered. For
example in Figure 9.2, X2 and X3 cooperate with each other (i.e., their escalation vectors
are superimposed) to trigger an accident in Xs. So, causal arcs have to be directed from X2
and X3 to Xs, showing the conditional dependency of the latter on the former units.
Accordingly, when assigning the CPT of Xs, the escalation probability of Xs due to the
synergistic effect is also considered as P(XSIXZ'X3).
After the likely propagation pattern of the domino effect is developed as a BN, and the
probability of the primary event and the conditional probabilities of other events are
calculated, the joint probability distribution of the events contributing to the domino
effect can be derived. For instance, in Figure 9.2, the joint probability distribution of the
events contributing to the domino effect U = {Xv.'" X6 } is calculated as:
P(U) =P(X j )P(X 3 1 X\)P(X 2 1 Xl'XJ
p(X 4 1 Xl'X 3 )P(Xs l X 2 ,X3 )P(X 6 1 X 3 ,X4 )
It should be noted that choosing another starting point rather than XI would result in a BN
different from that developed in Figure 9.2 and consequently a joint probability
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distribution different from that shown in Equation 5. However, assuming XI as the
primary unit and according to Figure 9.2 and Equation 9.5, the likely timeline or
sequential order of the events would be as Xl --+ X3 --+ XZ/X4 --+ XS/X6 •
Figure 9.3. Procedure to develop the propagation pattern of domino effect.
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9.4.2 Domino probability
Knowing the propagation pattern of the domino effect, the occurrence probability of the
domino effect at different levels can be estimated. Generally, the probability of the
domino effect (PDomino) is calculated as the multiplication of the probability of the
primary event (PPrimory) and the escalation probability of the impacted units (PEscoIOlioll):
POomino = PPrimary X P£.\"ca!lllioll 9.6
For a domino effect to be in the first level, it is necessary that the accident in the primary
unit propagates into at least one of the nearby units. For example in Figure 9.2,
considering X3 as the secondary unit, the probability of the first-level domino effect is
calculated as:
9.7
Similarly, the domino effect could proceed to the second level only if at least one of the
tertiary units X2 and X4 is impacted by the first-level domino accident (i.e., by a
combination of XI and X2). Accordingly, the probability of the second-level domino
effect is calculated as:
9.8
To account for the union of X2 and X4 represented in Equation 9.8, Figure 9.2 can be
modified by adding the auxiliary node LI such that L1 = X2 U X4 (Figure 9.4). So, X2 and
X4 are connected to L j using OR-gate causal arcs, resulting in the CPT shown in Table
9.1 for the node Lj. It should be noted that the probability of L j equals the propagation
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probability of the domino effect to the second level, i.e., the probability that at least one
of the tertiary units X2 and X4 is involved in the accident.
Likewise, for the domino effect to proceed to the third level, it is necessary that the
accident in the tertiary units propagate into at least one of the quaternary units. For
example, according to Figure 9.2, either X5 or X6 has to be impacted by the second-level
domino effect to have a third-level domino effect. ill this way, the probability of the
third-level domino effect is:
Pn,;,d-Ievel =P(X I )P(X 3 1 XI)
P(X 2 uX 4 IX I ,X3 )·P(X S uX 6 1X 2 ,X3 ,X4 )
9.9
As for X2 and X4, the union of X5 and X6 could be accounted for by adding another
auxiliary node L2 to the BN (Figure 9.4) such that Lz = Xs U X6 .
Figure 9.4. Modified BN to incorporate the union of tertiary and quaternary events using auxiliary
nodesL,andL2,respectively.
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Table 9.1. The CPT assigned to the auxiliary node L. showing that it is conditionally dependent on its
parents through an OR-gate.
P(L1 IXb X4)
X2 X4 Accident Safe
Accident Accident I
Accident Safe
Safe Accident I
Safe Safe
Figure 9.4 can further be developed to directly render the probabilities of different-level
domino effects. To this end, the nodes DL" DL2 and DL3 are added to the BN, standing
for the three sequential levels of the domino effect, i.e., the first, the second and the third-
level, respectively (Figure 9.5).
According to Equation 9.7, the probability of the first-level domino effect can be
estimated as the product of P(X1 ) and P(X3 IX1 ). SO, if DL, is connected to X, and X3 by
AND-gate causal arcs, P(DL1 ) would be equal to the probability of the first-level domino
effect. This implies that for the first-level domino effect to occur, not only the primary
event X" but also the secondary event X3 is needed.
Likewise, according to Equation 9.8, if DL2 is connected to nodes DL, and L, by AND-
gate causal arcs, P(DLz) would be equal to the probability of the second-level domino
effect. This indicates that for the second-level domino effect to occur, not only the first-
level domino effect (i.e., DL,), but at least one of the tertiary events is also needed, i.e.,
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Figure 9.S. The complete BN for propagation pattern and occurrence probability estimation of the
Table 9.3 shows the CPT which has to be assigned to DL j (and also DL2) to model
intersection dependencies. In the same way, according to Equation 9.9, if DL] is
connected to nodes DL2 and L2 by AND-gate causal arcs, P(DL 3 ) would be equal to the
probability of the third-level domino effect.
Table 9.2. The AND-gate CPT of node DL I •
Accident Accident I
Safe
Safe Safe
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In addition to the domino effect probability, the probability of each event due to the
domino effect can be calculated by marginalizing the joint probability distribution of the
domino effect propagation network (i.e., Equation 9.5). For example, according to Figure
9.2, the probability of accident in X3 caused exclusively by the domino effect is
calculated as:
P(X 3 ) = 'LP(U) ='L P(X,)P( X 3 I X ,)
UIX, x, 9.10
where U\X3 states that the marginalization should be implemented over all variables
except X3 (CCSP, 2000). Equation 9.10 can be used either to estimate the domino-driven
probability of X3 or to estimate the domino-affected probability of X3. In the first case, it
is assumed that there would be an accident in X3 only if there is an accident in XI, i.e.,
only because of the domino effect (domino-driven probability). In this way, the CPT of
X3 is such as that illustrated in Table 9.3, in which P/3 is the escalation probability of X3
given the primary event in XI, i.e., Pl3 = P(X3 IX1).
Table 9.3. CPT of X) to estimate the domino-driven probability, where P 13 = P(X3 IX1 ).
Accident Safe
Accident ~3 1-~3
In the second case, however, it is supposed that there would be an accident probability for
X3 even if the domino effect does not occur, that is the primary probability of X3. So,
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given the domino effect, the probability of X3 would increase (domino-affected
probability). In this regard, one of the BN modeling techniques, known as the noisy-OR
gate, can be used to incorporate the primary probability of X3 as a leak probability in the
analysis. Using the noisy-OR technique, if a child node is influenced by its parents
independently of one another (disjunctive interaction), the total effect of all the parents on
the child can be estimated as:
P(X I Pa(X)) =l-Jlx~I-P;)
in which Pi is the probability of X given that its i-th parent is true and the rest is false.
Assuming the primary probability of X, PLeak , as an independent parent, the probability
of X, considering its parents and also its primary probability, would be as:
In this regard, the CPT of X3 is such as that illustrated in Table 9.4.
Table 9.4. CPT of X3 to estimate the domino-affected probability. The primary probability of X3 is
consideredasaleakprobability.
XI Accident
Accident I-(I-PLeak)(I-~3) (l-PLeak)(1-~3)
Safe PLeak (I-PLeak )
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9.4.3 An example
For the sake of clarity, the application of the methodology developed in the previous
sections is shown using a simple example. Figure 9.6 depicts a tank farm consisting of
three atmospheric storage tanks (Step 1). The characteristics of the tanks are listed in
Table 9.5.
Figure 9.6. Case study for domino accident analysis.
Table 9.5. Vessel characteristic.
Accident Primary
Type Substance Content(t) scenario probability Escalation vector
T 1 Atmospheric Gasoline 500 Pool fire I.OE-05
T2 Atmospheric Xylene 200 Heat radiation
TJ Atmospheric Gasoline 200 Pool fire I.OE-05
Because of the illustrative purpose, only one accident scenario (i.e., pool fire) and
escalation vector (i.e., heat radiation) are assumed for the units. Since the primary
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probabilities are identical for all three units, T1 is selected as the primary unit (Step 2)
because it can produce stronger escalation vectors (due to the larger inventory of
hazardous substance). Also, the threshold value for radiation effect on atmospheric
vessels is selected as Qth =15 kW/m2 (Cozzani et aI., 2005).
To determine the possible secondary units, the intensity of heat radiation received by T2
and T] in the case of a pool fire in TI is calculated as QI2 = 19.3 kW/m2 and QI3 =8.3
kW/m2, respectively (Step 3). As can be seen, based on a comparison between the
received heat intensity and the relevant threshold value (i.e., QtI,), T2 is more likely to be
the secondary unit impacted by TI (Step 4.1). Accordingly, in the corresponding BN, a
causal arc is directed from node T1 to node T2 (Figure 9.7). To form the CPT of node T2,
the escalation probability of T2 given the pool fire in T1 is calculated using the probit
functions proposed in [16] as P(TzIT1 ) = 3.041£ - 06 (Steps 4.2 and 4.3).
Figure 9.7. BN developed for the example in Figure 9.6.
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As noted previously, based on a comparison between Qth and QJ3, Tj did not exceed the
threshold criteria, thus it is not selected as a secondary unit. However, to examine the
possibility of Tj being impacted as a tertiary unit, the received radiation intensity by Tj
due to T2 is calculated as Q23= 9.3 kW/m2. Compared to Q"" the pool fire in Tz does not
produce sufficiently intense heat radiation to impact Tj • Nevertheless, considering the
synergistic effect of T, and T2, it can be seen that the total heat radiation received by Tj
due to both T, and T2 would be sufficiently above the threshold value to damage Tj (i.e.,
QJ3 + Q23 = 17.6 kW/m2). So, Tj is a tertiary unit involved in the domino accident,
enabling the domino effect to proceed to the second level (Step 6). Accordingly, since Tj
is influenced by T, and T2 together, it is connected to both of these nodes in the
corresponding BN in Figure 9.7. Again, in order to populate the CPT of node Tj, its
escalation probability given the pool fires in T, and T2 is calculated using the probit
method as P(T3 ITv Tz) = 1.197£ - 06.
It should be noted that Step 4.4 was skipped since the only available potential secondary
unit is T2. So, there would be no need to make a comparison among competitive potential
units to select the secondary unit. Step 5 has also been neglected in this example as the
primary and secondary accidents of all units are determined in Table 9.5. To estimate the
probability of the domino effect at different levels, nodes DL, and DL2 are added to the
network. It should be noted that since there is only one secondary and one tertiary event,
auxiliary nodes to model the union of the same order units need not to be added to the
network. To account for the first-level domino effect, DL, is connected to the primary
unit T, and the secondary unit T2 such that P(DL1) = P(T1)P(TzIT1). Similarly, to
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consider the second-level domino effect, DL2 is connected to the first-level domino effect
node DL/ and the tertiary unit T3 such that P(DLz) = P(DL1)P(T3 ) After the BN is
modeled using the HUGIN software tool (2010), the probability values 3.04£-// and
3.64£-17 are obtained for the first and the second-level domino effects, respectively. So,
as opposed to the probabilities listed in Table 9.5, the occurrence of domino effects seems
unlikely, particularly the second-level domino effect.
9.5 Application
9.5.1 Case-study
To apply the current methodology to domino effects including a wider range of accident
scenarios than in the example previously discussed (Section 9.4.3), a case-study from
(Cozzani and Salzano, 2004) is adapted and modeled in this section. Figure 9.8 illustrates
the schematic of a tank farm comprised of 8 atmospheric storage tanks with fixed roofs
(D/-DB). The tanks contain gasoline with the capacity of 2000 metric tons, each. Table
9.6 shows the distances among the storage tanks.
To consider the influence of different accident scenarios on the domino effect modeling,
it is assumed that either a pool fire or VCE can be envisaged as the likely accident
scenario for a damaged storage tank. In this regard, the primary probability values
assumed for pool fire and VCE are 1£-05 and 2£-06, respectively. However, after a
storage tank is impacted through the domino effect, its likelihood to develop a pool fire or
VCE is assumed to be equal, i.e., 0.5.
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03 06
Figure 9.8. Schematic of storage tanks ina tank farm.
Table 9.6. Distances (m) among the units in the tank farm layout in Figure 9.8.
0, O2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7
0, 100
O2 50
0 3 50 50
0 4 71 50 100
0 5 50 50 50
0 6 50 100
0 7
Os 50 50
To commence modeling, the following assumptions are made:
Os
50
The storage tank D I is determined as the primary unit, from which the domino effect
modeling starts.
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The events of the same order, e.g., secondary events, take place simultaneously.
Therefore, it is not possible for them to impact one another. In other words, in the
corresponding BN, there is no causal arc between units of the same order.
Unlike pool fire accidents which may last for several hours or even days (based on the
amount of fuel and the burning rate), the shock waves resulting from explosions
(responsible for overpressure damages) lasts for at most several seconds (Khan and
Abbassi, 1999). To consider the synergistic effect of overpressure, the assumption of the
concurrence of events of the same order is inevitable.
The threshold values of heat radiation and overpressure are selected as Q,h = 15 kW/m2
and LJP'h = 7 kPa for atmospheric storage tanks with fixed roofs.
In order to specify the propagation pattern and escalation probabilities, the overpressure
(Cozzani and Salzano, 2004) and heat radiation escalation vectors are calculated and
illustrated in Tables 9.7 and 9.8, respectively.
Table 9.7. Overpressure escalation vectors (kPa) (Cozzani and Salzano, 2004).
0, 0 8
0 1
O2
D) 2
D. 10 10
0 5 8
0 6 4 8
0 7 10 10
0 8
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Table 9.8. Heat radiation escalation vectors (kWfm2).
D, D2 D) D4 D5 D6 D7 D8
D) 19.3 4.6 19.3 9.3 3.6 4.6 3.6
D2 19.3 19.3 9.3 19.3 9.3 3.6 4.6
D) 4.6 19.3 9.3 19.3 2.2 3.6
D4 19.3 9.3 3.6 19.3 4.6 19.3 9.3
D5 9.3 9.3 9.3 19.3
D6 3.6 9.3 19.3 3.6 9.3
D7 4.6 3.6 2.2 9.3 3.6
D8 3.6 4.6 3.6
9.5.2 Results and discussion
Because the likely accident scenarios for D 1 are pool fire and VCE, D1 can impact nearby
units by means of either heat radiation or overpressure. Based on a comparison among
the threshold values and the escalation vectors in Tables 9.7 and 9.8, D1 can impact D2
and D4 by either heat radiation or overpressure while it affects Ds only by overpressure.
Thus, D2 and D4 are selected as the secondary units due to their higher escalation
probabilities, which in tum can result in pool fire or VCE (with equal probabilities). In
this regard, causal arcs are directed from D I to the aforementioned nodes in the
corresponding BN in Figure 9.9.
Similarly, the secondary units are likely to trigger other accidents in the tertiary or
quaternary units. In this case study, regardless of the type of accidents in D2 and D4, units
D], Ds and D7 can be involved in the domino effect as tertiary units.
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Figure 9.9. Propagation pattern of the domino effect in the tank farm.
It is worth noting that among the tertiary units; only Ds is impacted by the synergistic
effect of the primary and the secondary units. Likewise, units D6 and D8 are impacted as
quaternary units in the domino effect. Drawing causal arcs from the parent units to the
associated children units, the likely propagation pattern of the domino effect in the tank
farm would be as shown in Figure 9.9.
To calculate the probability of the domino effect, the escalation probabilities of units D2
to D8 for every state combination of their parents are calculated using the probit models
suggested in Cozzani et al. (2005), considering synergistic effect and noisy gates. For
example, the escalation probability of Ds given VCE in D/, PF in D2 and also VCE in D4,
i.e., P(DsID1 = VCE,Dz = PF,D4 = VCE), can be calculated using the noisy-OR gate
probability as follows:
If P(DsID1 = VCE) = 0.0211, P(DsIDz = PF) = 5.43E - 06 and P(DsID4 = VCE) =
0.0685, then P(DsID1 = VCE,Dz = PF,D4 = VCE) = 1- (1- 0.0211)(1- 5.43E-
0- 6)(1- 0.0685), of which there is a 50% probability to have either a pool fire (PF)
or VCE, i.e., 4.408E - 02.
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To calculate the domino effect probabilities, nodes L" L2, L3, DL" DL2, and DL3 are
added to the BN (Figure 9. La). After the CPTs are assigned to the nodes, the BN is
analyzed using HUGIN software. The accident probabilities and the probability of the
domino effect at sequential levels are listed in Table 9.9 (columns 2 and 3). It should be
remarked that in Table 9.9 that the values listed for DLo, DL" DL2 and DL3 include both
the probabilities of PF and VCE. It should be noted that the probability of the zero-level
domino effect, P(DLo), equals the probability of the primary event, P(D,).
Figure 9.10. BN to model domino effect in the tank farm.
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Table 9.9. Domino effect probabilities.
First modeling Second modeling
Priors Posteriors given 06=PF Priors Posteriorsgiven06=PF
Unit VCE VCE VCE VCE
0, I.OOE-05 2.00E-06 2.00E-04 9.99E-OI I.OOE-05 2.00E-06 2.00E-04 9.99E-01
Oz 6.86E-08 6.86E-08 1.60E-02 5.5IE-OI 6.86E-08 6.86E-08 5.60E-01
0] 2.35E-09 2.35E-09 7.80E-02 2.7 1E-09 4.62E-02
O. 6.86E-08 6.86E-08 3.23E-02 9.04E-02 6.86E-08 6.86E-08 3.43E-02 3.43E-02
0 5 2.62E-08 2.62E-08 2.46E-02 5.59E-01 2.IIE-08 4.90E-03 5.49E-01
0 6 I.72E-09 I.72E-09 I.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO 1.59E-09 1.59E-09
0 7 2.35E-09 2.35E-09 3.IOE-03 2.7 IE-09 2.7IE-09 1.06E-02 1.06E-02
0 8 I.72E-09 2.07E-02 1.59E-09 1.59E-09 2.28E-02 2.28E-02
OLo 1.20E-05 I.OOE+OO 1.20E-05 I.OOE+OO
OL, 3.02E-07 I.OOE+OO
OLz
OL] I.92E-09 2.87E-01
'The probability of the zero-level domino effect, P(DLo), equals the sum of the probability of the
different accident scenarios (pF and VCE) of the primary event, i.e., P(D, = PF) + P(D, = VCE).
According to the prior probabilities in columns 2 and 3 of Table 9.9, among the tertiary
events, i.e., D], Ds and D7, the probability of Ds is an order of magnitude higher than the
others. This is because of the fact that, unlike D] and D7 which are impacted only by the
secondary units, Ds benefits from the escalation vectors of both the primary unit D 1 and
the secondary units. Its escalation probability is therefore expected to be higher as
opposed to that of D] and D7.
On the other hand, the escalation probabilities of the quaternary units D6 and DB are of
the same order. The reason is that all these units are likely to be triggered by either heat
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radiation or overpressure emitted by the tertiary units, exposing them to almost the same
level of vulnerability.
Comparing the domino effect probabilities at different levels, it is also noted that except
for P(DLo) and P(DL1 ) which differ in amount by two orders of magnitude, the
difference between sequential domino levels is one order of magnitude. This implies that
even though the probability of the first-level domino effect given the primary event is not
very high, its propagation from the first-level to the second-level and from the second-
level to the third-level is significant and cannot be neglected. Consequently, in the
allocation of safety measures, multi-level domino effects should be taken into
consideration.
As previously mentioned, the BN takes new information into account to update the prior
probabilities (see Equation 9.4). This way, the posterior probability of events given an
item of evidence (e.g., the knowledge about the state of a node) and also the most
probable configuration of events leading to the evidence, are often of significant
importance.
To perform probability updating in this case-study, the updated probabilities of events
(posteriors) are calculated given that a pool fire has been observed in D6, i.e.,
P(DdD6 = PF) in which i =t= 6. The posteriors are listed in Table 9.9 (columns 4 and 5).
Also, the most probable configuration of events leading to the pool fire in D6 is
determined as (D1 = VCE) ~ (Ds = VCE) ~ (D6 = PF) whereas the other units are in
the safe state.
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Considering the most probable configuration, it can be seen that the domino effect has
proceeded to the second level, escalating D5 , without passing through the first level,
resulting in no escalation of Dz or D4. This is also evident from the posterior probabilities
of the sequential levels of the domino effect (the last four numbers in colullU1 3 of Table
9.9); despite the observation of a pool fire in D6 which implies that the domino effect
must be in its third level (i.e., P(DL 3 ) = 1.0), the probability of the third-level domino
effect is noticeably below 1.0, i.e., P(DL3 ) = 2.871£ - 01. Furthermore, being in the
third level necessitates the domino effect having already passed the first and second
levels, i.e., P(DL1 ) = P(DLz) = 1.0. However, according to Table 9.9, these values also
differ from what is expected.
As mentioned previously, the primary unit, D" is capable of impacting D5 by means of
overpressure even if Dz or D4 does not contribute through the synergistic effect. This fact
and also the abovementioned most probable configuration of events, where D5 occurs
after D" increase the possibility of D5 being involved in the domino effect as a secondary
unit. Accordingly, shifting D5 to the set of secondary events, the updated propagation
pattern of the domino effect would be as shown in Figure 9.11.
In this way, Dz, D4 and D5 are involved in the domino effect as secondary events while
D3, D6, D7 and DB contribute to the domino effect as tertiary events. Modeling the
modified network in HUGIN, the new prior probabilities shown in Table 9.9 (colullU1s 5
and 6) are obtained.
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Figure 9.11. Modified propagation pattern of the domino effect.
It also should be noted that by adding D5 to the secondary events, the highest level of the
domino effect is reduced in the second level. Using the posterior probabilities to verify
the modified network, the most probable configuration of the events causing the pool fire
in D6 is determined as (Dl = VCE) -4 (Dz = VCE) -4 (D6 = PF), showing that a logical
sequence of events of different orders has been fulfilled. The posterior probabilities of the
modified network given the pool fire in D6 are also displayed in columns 7 and 8 of Table
9.9. It is worth noting that the posterior probabilities of the sequential levels of the
domino effect equal unity.
9.6 Conclusion
The present study has introduced a new methodology for probabilistic analysis of domino
effects in chemical process plants based on BNs. The likely propagation pattern of
domino effect starting from a primary event was developed in the form of a BN. The BN
was then further modified to account for the probability of the domino effect at
subsequent levels. To take the complex interactions among adjacent equipment into
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account, the conditional probability tables assigned to events were populated considering
synergistic effects and noisy probabilities.
The application of the methodology to a real case-study showed that the BN is effectively
suitable for the analysis of domino effects from both qualitative and quantitative points of
view. From a qualitative perspective, the flexible structure of BN makes it possible to fit
to a wide range of accident scenarios and also to embed versatile types of information in
the network by adding auxiliary nodes. The graphical representation of units and
escalation vectors by means of nodes and causal arcs through BN remarkably helps to
visualize the propagation pattern of the domino effect, which is not easy with most
deterministic and probabilistic methods.
From a quantitative point of view, BN takes advantage of robust CPTs to model different
types of causal relationships among events. CPTs help in considering the synergistic
effect of contributing events by either adding similar escalation vectors or using noisy
probabilities in the case of different escalation vectors. Considering the complex
interaction and conditional dependencies among the units involved in the domino effect,
several limiting assumptions such as independent events or random or binomial selection
of target units can be relaxed.
More importantly, using new observations as evidence, BN employs Bayes' theorem to
update the prior probabilities. Consequently, the posterior probabilities are obtained in
the light of new observations and also the most probable configuration of events leading
to that observation can be determined. Considering posterior probabilities as well as the
most probable configuration, the most likely propagation path of the domino effect can be
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identified. The present study showed that using the new information, not only the
quantitative part but also the qualitative part of the domino model can be updated.
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10 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations
10.1 Summary
The present study has illustrated the use of Bow-tie and Bayesian network in dynamic
risk assessment and safety analysis of process systems. It has focused on innovative
applications of both methods to consider the complex behavior of interlinked and
dynamic systems, and also extended the modeling power of these techniques by
introducing ncw algorithms and formulas.
From an application point of view, the aforementioned methods have effectively been
applied to model a wide range of complex accident scenarios from process systems to
offshore drilling operations and to risk-based design of process equipment to domino
effect accidents. From a model development perspective, several innovations such as
application of physical reliability models in dynamic risk analysis, developing an
algorithm to map Bow-tie into Bayesian network, introduction of new relationships for
dynamic gates as well as a novel methodology, neutral dependency, to enhance the
perfonnance of dynamic Bayesian networks have been represented.
Bow-tie has been used to represent a transparent logical connection among the accident
scenario components. It is of great importance among the experts due to being tractable
and communicable. However, it suffers limitations such as bcing static and incapable of
capturing conditional dependencies and common cause failures. These limitations may be
relaxed through application of Bayesian approaches or physical models, or mapping bow-
tie into Bayesian network.
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Baycsian network, on the other hand, take advantage of its flexible structure and robust
rcasoning engine to model a wide variety of accidcnt scenarios. Aside from its capability
to considcr multi-state variablcs, common cause failurcs, conditional dcpcndencies, and
expert judgment, Bayesian network is able to perform probability updating, a task that is
difficult to do with Bow-tie. Owing to the foregoing features, Bayesian network was
given priority ovcr bow-tie. One of the main issucs identified in Bayesian nctwork
application is the population of conditional probabilitytablcs.
10.2 Conclusions
The main conclusions of this study are:
10.2.1 Mapping fault tree into Bayesian network
This study showed that each fault tree can be mapped into a corrcsponding Bayesian
network; however, a Bayesian network does not necessarily have an equivalent fault tree.
Although conditional probability tables of such a Bayesian network are deterministically
populated based on the fault tree AND/OR gates, this Bayesian network is still a much
effective technique than its respective fault tree. It is because Bayesian network is able to
model multi-statc components, sequentially dependent failures, and more importantly to
conduct probability updating in the light of new observations.
Bayesian network takes new observations into account to reduce the uncertainty arising
from historical data and expert judgment in the form of prior probabilities, making the
probabilities more case-specific in the form of posterior probabilities as new information
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bccomes available. It is also illustratcd that, compared to minimal cut-set conccpt in fault
trccs, Bayesian nctwork produces a more cffcctive dcfinition in foml of the most
probable configuration of primary events leading to the top cvent (accidcnt).
10.2.2 Mapping bow-tie into Bayesian network
This study introduced a mapping algorithm from bow-tie approach into a corresponding
Baycsian network, relaxing its limitations. As a rcsult, the conditional dcpendcncics
among all componcnts of bow-tie can be modelcd. Although a bow-tie can consider the
conditional depcndencies among its safcty barriers, it is not capable of modcling such
dcpendencies among the primary causes of the accident and the safety barricrs. In
addition, as a bow-tic is composed of a fault tree and an event tree, it carries the
limitations of the both techniques.
Mapping a bow-tie into a corresponding Bayesian network solve the above-mentioned
problem, and also provides the analyst with effective features of Bayesian network for
conducting probability updating and sequential learning (probability adapting). In
contrast to probability updating in which knowledge about a node's state is uscd to
update other probabilities, in sequential learning, the cumulative infomlation of a systcm
which has been observed and recorded over time is taken into account for probability
updating (adapting). Probability adapting is more effective than probability updating in
dynamic safety analysis although it has not been considered in process safety analysis.
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10.2.3 Application of Object-oriented Bayesian network in complex systems
Mapping a bow-tie into its corresponding Baycsian nctwork provides the analyst with
outstanding modeling merits such as probability updating and considering conditional
dependent failures. However, like bow-tie approach, the standard Bayesian network of a
complex and interlinked systcm such as well control risk analysis can potentially result in
an intractable and complicated network of nodes and arcs.
Object-oriented Bayesian networks, on the other hand, make it possible to model such a
complex system with sevcral levels of abstraction. Regarding object-oriented Bayesian
network tcchnique, the system of interest can be divided to sub-models for cach of which
a detailed Bayesian network can be developed. These individual Bayesian networks arc
then combined using interface nodes, significantly facilitating the interpretation of the
model and better illustrating dependencies among the model segments.
10.2.4 Application of physical reliability models in dynamic risk analysis
To enable the application of conventional risk analysis techniques in dynamic risk
analysis, Bayes' theorem has long been used to update the probabilities in the light of
new information. This study proposed physical reliability models as an alternative to
directly incorporate the effect of changing environment in risk analysis.
Using physical reliability models, varying operational parameters such as dimension,
temperature and pressure, contributing to the risk of an accident scenario are directly
taken into account to revise the probability of the accident. This, in turn, leads to revised
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risk estimation as the system's operational parameters change dynamically. Physical
reliability models demand a number of experimental, site-specific inventories of data to
be developed through regression methods.
10.2.5 Application of dynamic Bayesian networks in risk-based design
In the risk-based design of process systems, the focus is on the augmentation of the layers
of protection, i.e., by contemplating extra safety measures to mitigate the consequences
of an undesircd event. Accordingly, risk analysis is repeated for the system under study in
the presence of different layers of safety barriers, not necessarily leading to the most cost-
effective design.
This study illustrated that dynamic Bayesian networks can potentially be applied as an
effective tool for risk-based design of process systems. Using dynamic Bayesian network,
not only different combination of safety measures but their sequential failure can be
accounted for to identify the best spatial and temporal arrangement of safety measures.
Compared to other time-including methods such as Markov chains, dynamic Bayesian
networks are relatively simpler to construct and avoid the notorious issue of state-space
explosion. [n addition, dynamic Bayesian networks make it possible to revise the system
design through probability updating given that an accident has occurred.
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10.2.6 Improving the performance of discrete-time Bayesian networks
Discrete-time Bayesian networks model dependable systems using dynamic gates such as
cold spare gate, sequentially enforcing gate and priority AND gate. The conventional
forms of the foregoing dynamic gates have drawbacks such as not easily being applicable
to non-exponential distribution functions or resulting in intractably huge conditional
probability tables.
The present study improved the power of discrete-time Bayesian networks by modifying
the conventional forms of cold spare gate and sequentially enforcing gate such that for
most probability distribution functions, closed-form analytical solutions can be obtained
without resort to numerical integration methods or simplifying assumptions.
Further, to improve the performance of conventional priority AND gates which, in the
simplest case, lead to huge conditional probability tables of size (n + 1)3, a new
algorithm, neutral dependency, was introduced. Using this algorithm, the conditional
probability table of a gate is decomposed into two tables, both of which are smaller in
size than the original table (usually by an order of magnitude). This way, the problem of
large and intractable multi-dimensional tables for which discrete-time Bayesian networks
have been criticized is addressed.
10.2.7 Application of Bayesian networks in domino effect modeling
The present study has introduced a new methodology based on Bayesian networks for
probabilistic analysis of domino effects in chemical process plants. Instead of relying on
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oversimplified assumptions such as considering independent events or random target
units, the likely propagation pattern of domino effect was developed in the form of a
Bayesian network, reflecting the underlYing mechanisms of domino effects.
The graphical representation of units and escalation vectors by means of nodes and causal
arcs through Bayesian network remarkably helps to visualize the propagation pattern of
the domino effect, which cannot ea,y be modeled with most deterministic and
probabilistic methods. In addition, Bayesian networks take advantage of conditional
probability tables to model the highly complex interaction of units in a domino effect
considering synergistic effects and using noisy probabilities. Performing probability
updating given an accident in a unit, posterior probabilities of other units as well as the
most probable configuration of units leading to that accident can be identified.
10.3 Recommendations
The present work attempts to introduce new concepts and also overcome the limitations
of existing techniques in the field of dynamic risk analysis and safety assessment of
process industries as well as Oil and Gas industries. This study, however, can be
extended further as suggested below:
10.3.1 Non-conjugate probability distributions
This study has shown the role of Bayes' theorem in probability updating of components
of a bow-tie. However, probability distributions used for priors and likelihood functions
were chosen from conjugate families, e.g., Poisson-Gamma or Beta-Binomial
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distributions. These conjugate pairs were selected due to resulting in closed-foml
standard posteriors and avoiding numerical methods. However, with advent of advanccd
approaches for Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling and availability of open source
softwarc such as WinBUGS and OpenE UGS, a wide variety of probability distribution
can be used for probability updating. Therefore, it seems no longer necessary to restrict
the modeling to conjugate family distributions for the sakc of mathematical convcnicnce
in future work.
10.3.2 Data requirement
Most of proposed approaches in this study demand high amount of quality data which arc
often difficult to obtain. For example, .llthough physical reliability models illustrate an
efficient approach for real-time revising of probabilities, they need a large invcntory of
experimental as well as test data to be developed using regression methods.
Likewise, although it was shown that rrobabilistic populating of conditional probability
tables using noisy gates remarkably augments the reasoning strength of Bayesian
networks, these noisy gates cannot be developed unless individual influence of each
parent node on a child node is identified. This in tum demands a considerable amount of
cause-effect data not easily available.
According to these data-intensive approaches, data gathering from other similar case
studies, applications and also expert opinions with different levels of expertise seems
inevitable. Hierarchical Bayesian methods are an efficient tool to handle these multi-
source data which can be considered in future studies.
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10.3.3 Uncertainty handling
Since this study was aimed at introducing new methodologies in safety management and
risk-based decision making, the focus was on methods rather than numbers. However,
both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty contents resulting from our incomplete state of
knowledge in modeling of accidents and stochastic nature of accidents themselves,
respectively, need to be introduced and handled in the proposed methods. Monte Carlo
Baycsian networks, fuzzy Bayesian networks, and hierarchical Bayesian approaches can
be applied to either handle or reduce uncertaintics arisen from data variability and hiddcn
in point estimates.
10.3.4 Lack of availability of commercial tools
This study illustrated that bow-tie approach and Bayesian network can be effectively
applicd in the context of dynamic quantitative risk assessment and safety analysis.
Although there is a lot of software available to perform aforementioned methods
particularly Bayesian analysis, there is not such tool available to conduct dynamic risk
analysis. There is necd to develop a tool for dynamic risk analysis.
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